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ABSTRACT 
TITLE: PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS AND PARADOXES IN THE CONCEPT OF 
SELF-DECEPTION, WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO PERVERSIONS 
OF RATIONALITY 
CANDIDATE: BAK, Nelleke 
The problem of self-deception has been described as the paradoxical state 
of fooling oneself into believing what one knows to be false. The epis-
temological paradox of believing that .E. and believing that not-.E_, the 
psychological paradox of intending to do what one knows one cannot do, and 
the ethical paradox of being both agent and victim of one's own deception 
arise when self-deception is based on the structure of other-deception. 
Traditionally the approach to these paradoxes has been either to assert 
that literal self-deception, as based on the structure of other-deception, 
is impossible and that those phenome,na which we falsely call "self-
deception" are merely metaphors of other-deception, or the other approach 
is to assert that literal self-deception, as based on the structure of 
other-deception, is possible with all its accompanying paradoxes. Taking 
as her starting point the belief that self-deception can be based on the 
structure of other-deception, the author aims to show that self-deception 
is problematic but not necessarily paradoxical and that the two traditional 
approaches are not necessarily exclusive. The author has placed self-
deception on a sliding scale from "weak" to "hard" cases, analogous to a 
sliding scale of 11 Weak" to "hard" other-deception. By means of conceptual 
analysis of 11 deception'' and the comparison and evaluation of different 
arguments, the author attempts to explain how self-deception, as the 
holding of contradictory beliefs, is possible. 
i i 
The thesis addresses the following questions: 
1. What distinguishes self-deception from other forms of irrational 
belief-formation or irrational action? 
2. What are the strategies employed by the self-deceiver in order to 
prevent his own rationality? 
3. Does self-deception necessarily imply internal irrationality? 
4. How is "hard" self-deception possible? 
5. How is the Freudian theory of systems compatible with that of 
Davidson? 
In answer to the first two questions the author extricates characteristics 
of self-deception from various related phenomena and follows David Pears' 
classification of three main strategies. In response to the others, she 
discusses the numerous theories of 11 Weak 11 self-deception and in particular 
the theories of "hard" self-deception advanced by David Pears and 
Donald Davidson. 
The thesis concludes that 
1. Self-deception implies internal irrationality only when the agent 
holds a second-order principle. 
2. 11 Hard11 self-deception is possible only if the psyche is compartment~ 
alized into mental systems. 
3. The Freudian theory concentrates on the psychological aspects of 
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INTRODUCTION 
PARADOXES AND PROBLEMS OF SELF-DECEPTION 
The notion of self-deception, with its air of paradox, is an odd 
enough idea to have elicited a great deal of attention in recent years. 
It is a puzzling idea, for it is not merely a non-rational phenomenon 
which lies outside the bounds of the rational, but it is irrational, 
an overthrow of reason. 
In the Oxford English Dictionary 11 Self-deception 11 is defined as 11 the 
action of deceiving oneself... This definition steers our understanding 
of the concept of self-deception in the direction of deception of others, 
and tempts us to base our explanation of self-deception on the model of 
other-deception. If other-deception then is getting someone else to 
believe something one knows is not true, then self-deception is getting 
oneself to believe something one knows is not true. Therefore, if 
self-deceptiDn is 11 the action of deceiving oneself 11 , then we have a case 
in which one and the same person deceives himself through one and the 
same action (i.e. the action of self-deceiving) with regard to his own 
beliefs. The one pe~son is at the same time both deceiver and deceived, 
agent and victim, blameworthy and blameless, aware and ignorant by 
persuading himself to believe something he knows to be false. Raphael Demos 
rekindled the recent interest in the philosophical investigation of the 
concept of self-deception by describing the phenomenon in the following way: 
11 Self-deception exists, I will say, when a person 
lies to himself, that is to say, persuades himself to 
believe what he knows is not so. In short, self-
deception entails that B believes both E and not-p at 
the same time. Thus self-deception involves an Tnner 
conflict, perhaps the existence of a contradiction. 11 
(Demos, 1960, p. 588) 
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It would seem then that self-deception for a rational, sane person 
is not possible, that "self-deception" contradicts itself and that 
self-deceivers cannot literally deceive themselves. The fact that the 
word "self-deception" occurs in our vocabulary and the fact that we use 
the word frequently in our everyday language is in no way a guarantee of 
the actual existence of what the word literally means, i.e. the act of 
consciously getting oneself to believe something which one at the same 
time knows to be false. It has been argued that such a phenomenon, 
taken literally, is impossible (1), and yet we do use the word "self-
deception" often and come across cases of self-deception in everyday life. 
The following are examples of what, I think, people would call typical 
cases of self-deception: the wife who, in the teeth of the evidence, will 
not admit that her husband is being unfaithful; the scientist who wilfully 
ignores telling evidence which will refute his favoured hypothesis; the 
athlete who is unable to reconcile himself to his deteriorating performance 
and waning powers; the person with cancer who refuses to acknowledge the 
fact that he needs medical attention, the physicist who denies that his 
research in developing nuclear arms implicates him in any way in promoting 
warfare; the girl who has been spurned by her lover, and then pretends 
that she never.wanted to marry him anyway. But to present a list of 
typical examples of self-deception is in no way to offer an explanation of 
-
what these cases are typical of and fails to show any understanding of how 
self-deception is at all possible. 
In this chapter I shall, by way of an introduction, note the different 
meanings of the word ''deceive", before going on, at a later stage, to look 
at the implications in more detail. The different interpretations of 
"deceive~ have given rise to different theories with different emphases. 
By briefly mentioning some of the theories, I aim to show that self-deception 
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has no clear-cut boundaries and it is this which leads to divergent 
descriptions and analyses. Before launching into an investigation of 
self-deception, it is necessary to define the meaning of the word 
"deception" clearly. It is important to distinguish between the literal 
meaning of prefixing "self" to "deception" and the everyday, common 
meaning of "self-deception". A little later on in this chapter, I shall 
look in more detail at the denotation and connotation of "deception" and 
thus "self-deception". I have already mentioned the definition of 
"deceive" as getting someone else to believe something one knows to be 
false, but the Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary offers a 
second definition of the word "deceive", viz. "to cause to believe what is 
false". These two meanings of the word "deceive" lead to two distinct 
meanings of other-deception. First 6f all, there is deception 1 which 
rests on the meaning of deceive as "to cause to believe what is false". 
In terms of other-deception then, B is deceived if B believes falsely that 
.£because of something A has done. In" other words, A has caused B to 
form and hold a false belief. For example, A accidentally misreads some;,. 
thing from the newspaper and B, therefore, comes to hold a false belief; 
or A mishears a snippit of information, tells Band Bas a result forms a 
false belief; or A mumbles indistinctly about something which causes B to 
form an erroneous conclusion. My reason for noting these examples is to 
show that A can deceive B without intending to do so. In fact, A is un-
aware that B has been deceived because of A's accidental misreading, or A's 
telling B something which is false but which A believes to be true, or A's 
indistinct mumblings. Then there is deception 2 which is based on the 
meaning of deceive as an intentional action. In terms of other-deception 
then, B has the false belief that£ because A who has the true belief that 
not-£ wants B to believe falsely that£ and gets B to believe falsely that£· 
A's desire to knowingly deceive B makes this a case of intentional deception. 
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So, referring to deception 1, "B is deceived about .e." may mean simply 
that B has been caused by someone or something to be in error with 
respect to E.· Whoever did the deceiving, need not have done so inten-
tionally. If B is mistaken about E. because of something A has said or 
done (or has failed to say or do), it does not necessarily imply that A 
purposely cultivated a false belief in B which A knows to be false. Even 
though A has been the cause of B's holding a false belief, A need not 
necessarily have done this intentionally. This means that not all 
deception entails intentional deception. Intentional deception is, of 
course, the central case of deception, but I want to stipulate the different 
meanings and uses of "deception". If "deception" and, therefore, "self-
deception" are not clearly defined, the confusion could lead to many 
problems. 
Basing one's understanding of self-deception on the model of other-deception 
then involves having two different meanings of self-deception as well. 
Self-deception 1 based on the model of deception 1 thus means that "A is 
self-deceived" when A believes falsely that E. because of something A has 
done. A is, therefore, in error with respect to E.· Self-deception 2 
based on the model of deceptfon 2 is the more interesting and paradoxical 
case in which "A is self~deceived" when A believes falsely that E. because~ 
believing that not-£, he wants to believe that E. and gets himself to 
believe that£· So "self-deception" can mean to deceive oneself (self-
deception 2), as well as causing oneself to be deceived about oneself, to 
be in a state of error about one's own thoughts and feelings (self-deception 1). 
Hamlyn notes that the double-life of the meaning of "deception" can lead 
to confusion about self-deception. 
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•••• self-deception, as we typically understand 
it, cannot be construed as the parallel of those 
forms of deception in which we deceive someone by, 
for example, giving him by mistake erroneous 
information. Hence, it may seem reasonable to 
attempt to construe self-deception on the pattern 
of deception of others when this involves, as we 
might put it, being false to them ... 
(Hamlyn, 1971 a, p.47) 
Clearly, what is of interest in a philosophical investigation of self-
deception is the case of 11 knowingly being false .. , of intentionally 
deceiving oneself. However, before looking in more detail at unintentional 
and intentional deception, it is necessary to define the meaning of 
"deception11 a little further. 
Another confusion which arises is that between "deception" and 11 deceit 11 • 
The word "deception .. immediately conjures up an association with "deceit .. , 
but the association is not always a necessary one. Not everything that 
deceives is deceitful~ The word "deceit" has a moral implication in that 
the deceitful agent wilfully causes someone else to accept a falsehood, 
whereas the word 11 deception" can in some cases be free from any moral 
condemnation, but may merely point to a state of error. Not everyone or 
everything.that brings about a state of error (e.g. mistaken perception) 
does so with moral (or rather, immoral) intentions. In a desert a mirage 
may deceive the thirsty traveller into thinking that an oasis is nearby, 
or the MUller-Lyer visual illusion with its arrangement of two lines of 
equal length may deceive the observer into believing that one line is longer 
than the other. Even though the deceptive arrangement causes the innocent 
eye into believing the equal lines to be of unequal length, we would not 
call the deceptive MUller-Lyer visual illusion deceitful. We may also 
talk about the deceptively slow ball, but there is no moral implication in 
such an observation. (Champlin, 1979, p.87). So, the self-deceiver is 
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not always a cunningly deceitful liar, but he can be someone who sets 
up a deceptive screen between himself and a too painful reality. The 
screen hides or distorts the unwelcome truth and the agent himself is 
then taken in or deceived by this distorted, deceptive appearance of his 
own making or he might form and hold on to a favoured belief, despite 
evidence for a counter-belief. But this does not really distinguish a 
case of self-deception from a bit of harmless wishful thinking or a case 
of mere oversight. In Chapter 2 I shall draw the distinction more 
clearly, but it does seem that self-deception proper seems to imply a 
moral element of dishonesty with oneself. Self-deception proper then is 
not merely being in a state of error, but implies an intentional cultivation 
of a false belief, a deliberate lying to oneself. Although this case of 
self-deception, with its moral implications, forms the most fascinating 
and most central case of self-deception, it is not representative of all 
cases of self-deception, which are not all coloured by moral tones. 
It is not surprising that such slippery terms as 11 Self-deception .. and 
11 Self-deceivers 11 have been described. by a colourful collection of ideas . 
and images. Self-deception ha~ been compared to the act of concealment~ 
se·lf-deceivers hide or bury or camouflage the truth from themselves.(2) 
Visual images include descriptions such as self-deceivers being blind to 
the truth, preventing themselves from seeing the facts, intentionally 
obscuring their own view of reality. Other descriptions appeal to auditory 
comparisons, such as self-deceivers refusing to listen to or hear the 
truth, or being deaf to what they do not want to hear. Using recognition 
terms, philosophers describe them as avoiding the unpleasant belief, 
refusing to identify or recognize what they suspect.(3) In the language 
of the theatre they are described as playing two conflicting roles, as 
acting out their irrational beliefs; they are accused of pretending that 
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some strongly desired thing is so as to increase the illusory realism 
of their theatrical project.(4) In the language of rationality., self-
deceivers are seen as refusing to make explicit in language, a "spelling-
out", of some feature of the world, or of persuading themselves of 
something which is not, or of fooling themselves.(S) Affective terms 
describe self-deceivers as being blinded by passion or misled by desire. 
In the language of consciousness, it is said that they ignore the harsh 
reality, or suppress unwelcome ideas and topics. Self-deceivers are 
described in terms which invite evaluative judgments, such as lying to 
themselves, as being guilty of dishonest role playing, inauthenticity or, 
indeed, as practising self-deceit.(6) In social terms we see self-
deceivers as being in a certain engagement in the world, a refusal to avow 
or confess something to themselves, as desiring to appear existentially 
successful. ( 7) 
Following the diversity of descriptions of self-deception are a number of 
divergent theories on what self-deception is, how it is at all possible, 
and why it takes place. However, there is a common starting point or 
basic description of self-deception upon which various theories are built. 
The common assumption, anyhow in clear-cut cases of self-deception, is 
that to deceive oneself entails persuading oneself to hold a belief believed 
to be false.(8) The various problems coupled to this assumption are to 
explain just when false beliefs constitute a case of self-deception rather 
than, say, wishful thinking and how self-deceivers form their false beliefs 
(the initiation of the project of self-deception) and how they maintain 
their false beliefs (the perpetuation of the state of self-deception). 
With such a shifty topic as self-deception, it is not surprising that 
theories have developed into various directions, stressing different aspects 
of the phenomenon. One theory sees self-deception primarily as a function 
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of what one thinks (or avoids thinking about) as opposed to what one 
believes. Self-deceivers do not necessarily hold conflicting beliefs 
but rather avoid the unwelcome thought(9); they rarely have the intention 
of deceiving themselves - they are motivated by desire to manipulate 
data(10); they neither just believe, nor both believe and disbelieve, nor 
just disbelieve what they present themselves as believing- they are 
genuinely uncertain about the evidence and formulate the favoured belief 
not against the evidence, but within the latitude which the inconclusive 
evidence allows(11); they are involved in some kind of "conflict state", 
but they need not be aware of it(12); they form their beliefs in "belief-
adverse circumstances", circumstances in which the evidence is heavily 
weighted against the unwe~tome belief(13); the self-deceivers do not 
necessarily, jointly and simultaneously, fulfill the conditions for full 
belief and for full disbelief, there is only partial satisfaction of the 
different criteria for belief and for disbelief(14); they are in a conflict 
state, but the wish for the favoured belief "screens" the unwelcome belief 
from consciousness(15); they both know and do not know, believe and do 
not believe(16); self-deception is possible because there is a causal 
mechanism involved whereby repetition of statements which are false (and 
known to be false) eventually produces a belief in their truth(17); self-
deception involves two conflicting beliefs but both can survive because 
they are kept apart by their failure to interact rationally with each 
other(18); self-deception is not a matter of knowledge and belief- it is 
rather a refusal to "spell out" a specific engagement in the world(19); 
self-deception is reinterpreted as attempts at self-modification taking 
place within a "zone of indeterminancy'' which allows the self-deceiver to 
pick out selective evidence(20); self-deception cannot be studied in 
isolation of the motivational context in which it occurs(21); the 
significance of motives in self-deception has been overvalued - it is the 
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deception, and not the motives for it, that is the essence of self-
deception(22); self-deception occurs when the individual's self-
interpretation disagrees with the community's standard view of that 
individual(23); self-deception is never more than a metaphor, not a real 
description, but a licence to improvise(24). 
Although valuable insights have been yielded by all these diverse theories, 
many of the theories emphasize only a few cases of self-deception 
(e.g. desire-motivated cases or "weak" cases) while ignoring or neglecting 
others (e.g. intellectual distortirin of the evidence or cases in which the 
false belief is formed in the teeth of conclusive evidence for the unwelcome 
but true belief). Or a single aspect of self-deception (e.g. the inten-
tionality of self-deception) is singled out while other elements (e.g. the 
mechanisms of self-deception) are not discussed. The long list of the 
various examples of self-deception, the different terms in which it is 
described and the divergent theories of self-deception illustrate the fact 
that self-deception can take innumerable forms, either in self-deceptive 
behaviour or self-deceptive belief formation. The different meanings and 
different uses of "deception" and "self-deception" in everyday language 
further compound the problem. Furthermore, "self-deception" can be 
applied to either the process of initiating the self-deceptive project or 
can refer to,the state of being in self-deception. The boundaries of 
self-deception are vague, with no clear-cut distincti~ns always drawn 
between wishful thinking, akrasia or even unintentional ignorance or in-
advertently biased beliefs. 
And even when the self-deceiver has persuaded himself to hold a false belief, 
the way in which he persuades himself can take many different forms, the 
belief can be held in a variety of different manners, and the context within 
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which the belief is either formulated, held or acted out can change 
continuously. Moreover, the motives which give rise to self-deception 
can vary greatly from ambition, greed, fear, conscience to general desire. 
Added to this is the fact that self-deception is not necessarily a case 
of beliefs only - it can amount to wilful ignorance, avoidance of certain 
evidence, emotional detachment, or even self-hypocricy (not really having 
a belief, but pretending to have one). 
With such a motley collection of approaches, emphases, perspectives and 
meanings, it will be necessary to stipulate exactly what the boundaries of 
my investigation will be, the meaning of the word 11 Self-deception 11 and 
from which perspective I shall view the problem of self-deception. 
First of all, I shall base my notion of self-deception on the model of 
other-deception. 
11 If deceiving someone else is getting him to believe 
something one knows is not true, then deceiving oneself 
would appear to require getting oneself to believe 
something one knows is not true ... (Mele, 1982, p.159) 
However, it is important to note that 11 When one man deceives another, it 
need not be the case that he intends to deceive him. 11 (Champlin, 1977, p.292) 
Champlin cites the case of a spy who, without his knowledge, is given 
false information about secret plans for an invasion. His deceivers, the 
heads of Special Operations, are gambling on the spy's being captured by 
enemy forces, cracking under torture, and leaking the plans of the alleged 
invasion to the enemy. So, the Special Operations Chief deceived the spy 
into believing that he had genuine information; the spy (who did duly crack 
under torture) deceived the enemy into believing his information to be 
genuine. Although we can say that the Sp~cial Operations Chief intentionally 
deceived the spy, we would be wrong to say that the spy intentionally 
deceived his tortures, even though he did deceive them. The spy deceived 
the enemy without knowing that he was doing so. 
If the second definition of "deceive", as found in the Compact Edition of 
the Oxford English Dictionary, is employed (i.e. "to cause to believe what 
is false •.• ") then A may induce a false belief that .E. in B, and thus 
deceive him in this sense, without A's knowing o.r even believing that .E. is 
false. Indeed, A may believe that .E. is true, and he may have intended to 
communicate this to B by telling him that .E.· Although this is not a case 
of intentional deception, it is a case of deception nonetheless. There 
are other examples of unintentional other-deception. A may unintentionally 
neglect to inform B of a change, thereby causing B to form a false belief. 
Unintentional other-deception may also be due to the inadvertent use of an 
ambiguous word or gesture, forgetfulness, misperception, indiscriminate 
haste or plain bad luck. 
Although there are-cases of unintentional other-deceptioD and, therefore, 
of unintentional self-deception, since I shall be basing my notion of self~ 
deception on the model of other-deception (see Chapter 4 for a discussion 
of unintentional self-deception), the cases of self-deception and other-
deception I am really interested in are those of intentional deception. 
"The suggestion that self-deception should be modeled 
after unintentional interpersonal deception runs the 
risk or-oversimplifying matters. Unintentional inter-
personal deception may be quite accidental. But self-
deception seems to be motivated by desires or fear_s ___ 
of the agent-patient." (Mele, 1983, p.367) 
If, for example, Tim unintentionally misreads the results of the horse races, 
thereby causing Ed to have the false belief that he has won a lot of money, 
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then Tim caused Ed to be mistaken or deceived about the matter and is 
said to have deceived Ed (albeit unintentionally) about it. Similarly, 
if Tim were to misread the results due to unmotivated carelessness, thereby 
causing himself to have a false belief and, hence, tb be deceived, he is 
unintentionally self-deceived. But intentional self-deception seems to entail 
a desiring element, something which occurs because the agent wants it to 
be the case that£· So, if Tim, who has been having a run of bad luck 
on the horses and who desperately wants to win some money, misreads the 
results as being in his favour due to his desire for the money, we come 
much closer to a case of intentional self-deception. 
Cases of unintentional other-deception employ a "loose•• sense of "deception" 
(i.e. "to cause to believe what is false ••. 11 ), for one can cause without 
wanting to cause or even without knowing that one will cause or has caused 
someone else to hold a false belief. Intentional other-deception, on the 
other hand, appeals to a stricter sense of "deception11 , that of wanting to 
deceive the other person. The deceiver knowingly embarks on a belief-
misleading project, "an attempt to manoeuvre some intended victim into 
taking what is only an appearance for a rea 1 ity, so that the victim forms 
a belief leading him to act (or think) in some way that is desired by the 
deceiver but that he would not act in if he knew the reality. 11 (Kipp, 1980, 
p.313). 
However, intention needs more than mere desire. Davidson distinguishes 
the various ways in which intention operates. A may have the desire to 
deceive B, but through an unrelated action of A's (one not calculated to 
deceive), B becomes deceived. In this case, A did not deceive intentionally. 
However, in the second case, A has the desire to deceive B, believes that 
action x will cause B to become deceived, and deliberately performs action x 
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which leads to the successful deception of B. In this case, A has 
deceived B intentionally. Then there is the third case in which A has 
the desire to deceive B, believes that action~ will cause B'tb become 
deceived, but another inadvertent action by A causes ~ to come about which 
still leads to the successful deception of B. However, in this third 
case we would not accuse A of intentionally deceiving B because A's desire 
and belief did not cause the action~ in the right way (as they did in 
case 2). Furthermore, for a case of intentional other-deception, knowledge 
is a prerequisite. The degree of knowledge necessary for a case of in-
tentional other-deception, however, varies from suspicion in "weak" cases 
of deception to absolute certainty in "hard" cases. Lastly, deception 
includes the notion of effect. Deception implies the success of inducing 
an erroneous belief in the other's mind. 
Haight offers the following description of intentional other-deception: 
" .•• (I)f A deceives B, then for some proposition(s) 
£, A knows that£; and either A keeps or helps it 
, to keep B from knowing that£, or A makes or helps 
to make B believe that not-£, or both." (1980, p.9) 
I shall use this as a general definition of other-deception and shall look 
at various ways in which the deceiver prevents the deceived from knowing 
the truth, or how the deceiver distorts or manipulates the truth, or how he 
does both. I shall use the above definition, as well as the following ways 
in which one person deceives another, as a model for self-deception. Just 
how the analogous ways of other-deception manifest themselves in self~ 
deception will be discussed in Chapter 4 which will concentrate on 11 Weak" 
cases and Chapters 5 and 6 which will 1 oak at 11 hard .. cases. 
The following ways in which one person can intentionally deceive another are 
arranged in an order of increasing severity, i.e. from five "weak" cases 
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to a "hard" case. 
1. A withholds evidence from B to cause B to have a false belief. 
For example, Tim deliberately does not tell Ed that a mutual friend 
has been acquitted on a charge of fraud, thus causing Ed to hold 
the belief which A wants him to hold, i.e. that the friend is guilty. 
2. A selectively exposes B to or steers B away from certain telling 
evidence, thus causing B to have the false belief which A wants him 
to have (or A wants to prevent B from holding the true belief). 
3. A emphasizes certain evidence to B causing B to have the false belief 
A wants him to have. 
4. A generates pseudo-evidence to B causing B to have the false belief 
A wants him to have. 
5. A distorts available evidence to B causing B to have the false belief 
A wants him .to have. 
6. A directly tells a falsehood, lies, to. B causing B to have the false 
belief A wants him to have. 
Cases 1 to 5 are "weak" cases of other-deception, in that there is a certain 
amount of "leeway" or "latitude" in which the manipulated evidence can be 
interpreted. If, for example, A wants B to think that his wife is being 
unfaithful, A may deliberately steer B into a restaurant where s•s wife is 
having lunch with a male friend. s•s noticing his wife is no guarantee 
for s•s forming the false belief of his wife•s infidelity. He may, of 
course, form the false belief but, on the other hand, he may interpret the 
lunch as an official business appointment. A gambles on the chance that B 
will form the false belief but he has no certainty of this happening. 
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Case 6, however, is regarded as a "hard" case of other-deception in 
that it is not a case of manipulating or exploiting available evidence, 
but of fabricating false evidence which is then directly presented to the 
victim as being true evidence, i.e. A would declare to B, "Your wife is 
unfaithful"~ even though A would know that this is not the case. 
Other-deception is, therefore, a relation between two persons, one who 
knows the truth and another who is ignorant of it, or one who believes what 
the other knows is false. The following is a summary of the relation which 
holds between deceiver and deceived: 
1. A withholds/manipulates/distorts evidence or makes a statement(£) 
to B which A knows or believes or suspects to be false or A withholds 
from making a statement (not-£) to B which A knows or believes or 
suspects to be true. 
2. A intends B to believe that£· 
3. B comes to believe that£ as a result of A's behaviour in the manner 
A intended. 
Therefore, for successful intentional other-deception to take place, the 
above conditions will apply. The conditions are by no means undisputable, 
but merely serve as a general analysis of other-deception(25) and thus as 
a general model of self-deception. 
If the notion of self-deception is to be modelled on the structure of other-
deception, it seems as though it runs into some serious paradoxes. Before 
an answer can be found to these paradoxes, it will be necessary to look at 
what exactly the paradoxes are. In this chapter I shall confine the 
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discussion to an elucidation of the problems themselves, without 
attempting to find an answer to them at this stage. I want to base my 
notion of self-deception on that of other-deception, but how can conditions 
(1) to (3) all be satisfied in the case of one person? How can one 
believe a statement is true when one at the same time knows or believes it 
to be false? (conditions (1) and (3)). Or how can one intend to do 
something which one knows one cannot do? (condition (2)). The symmetry 
between other-deception and self-deception can be expressed in the following 
questions: "Can you deceive someone else into believing what he already 
knows to be false? 11 and 11 Can you deceive yourself into believing what you 
already know to be false?" We can answer a fairly confident "yes 11 to the 
first question (we need look only at the success of propaganda and brain-
washing), but hesitate to answer the same to the second question, because 
of the paradoxical implications. I shall classify the various paradoxes 
into three main groups: the epistemological paradox which entails that 
the self-deceiver both believes Rand believes not-R; the psychological 
paradox in which the self-deceiver cannot be aware of what he is doing (if 
the deception is to be successful), nor can he be unaware; and the ethical 
paradox which implies that the self-deceiver is both sincere in the pro-
fession of his belief and insinc~re in employing various devices to conceal 
the truth. 
First of all, the epistemological paradoxes centre on knowledge and belief. 
Is it possible to persuade oneself intentionally to believe what one 
simultaneously knows to be false? To act on such an intention requires the 
self-deceiver to use his very grasp of the truth in order to negate that 
very same truth. Surely if the self-deceiver knowingly embarks on a sub-
versive attempt to undermine the truth his project is doomed from the start? 
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But there are examples of successful self-deception. What does the 
success of such a paradoxical project imply? Can we wilfully distort 
our beliefs even when there is counter-evidence for those beliefs? Can 
we simultaneously and knowingly hold directly contradictory beliefs or do 
we have two separate minds, one doing the deceiving and the other being 
deceived? When self-deception occurs it seems as though one "self" knows 
something, but prevents the other "self" from knowing it, or even getting 
the other "self" to believe the opposite of what the first "self" knows. 
The main problem of the epistemological paradox can be expressed as follows: 
"Could a self-deceiver .•• bring to consciousness two directly contradictory 
beliefs at the same time, formulate them in words, be clear about their 
meaning; believe they are contradictory, be sane and not intoxicated, and 
still hold them?" . (Martin, 1986, p.23) 
The epistemological paradox is the one which has attracted the bulk of 
philosophical interest. It has been expressed in many ways from Demos's 
"self-deception entails that B believes both£. and not-£_ at the same time" 
(1960, p.588) to Sartre•s formulation of self-deception as "bad faith". 
Sartre interprets other-deception in terms of lying to another (case 6) and, 
basing self-deception on the model of other-deception, he interprets self-
deception as "a lie to oneself11 • Only what changes everything is that in 
self-deception 11 it is from myself that I am hiding the truth 11 and adds· that 
11 the essence of the lie implies in fact that the liar actually is in complete 
possession of the truth which he is hiding. A man does not lie about what 
he is ignorant of11 • (Sartre, 1958, p.48) To interpret the phrase "self-
deception'' literally then, would require us to regard the self-deceiver as 
someone who knows that something is not so, and yet persuades himself that 
it is so, just like in other-deception, except that the self-deceiver is 
both agent and victim. From here it is a short step to saying that this 
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implies that the self-deceiver must believe the conjunction of the two 
contradictory propositions. Since this is impossible for any sane 
person, it is argued by those who deny that literal self-deceptio-n can 
exist, that self-deception is impossible. If we follow the arguments 
which deny the possibility of literal self-deception then there are two 
assumptions: first of all, it is necessary for literal self-deception that 
the original belief should exist right up to the end of the project of 
self-deception, which entails not only the formation of the rational belief 
and its opposite, but also the safeguarding of this belief against telling 
evidence. Secondly, someone who believes two contradictory propositions 
believes their conjunction. Both these assumptions should not be granted 
so easily. Later on I shall explain how the self-deceiver, with the passage 
of time, may come to forget the initial belief (Chapter 5), and how the 
self-deceiver can still be self-deceived, w-ithout his putting the two contra-
dictory beliefs together. (Chapters 4 to 6) 
The alleged contradiction(26) of .E. and not-£ can be expressed in a number 
of different forms: 
( 1) aBp+-aBp 
(2) aBp+aB-p 
where it means that Andrew believes .E. and it is not the 
case that Andrew believes .E.· This is an outright 
contradiction. Since this is an obvious impossibilitys 
this formulation of self-deception is ruled out. 
where it means that Andrew believes .E. and Andrew believes 
not-£. at the same time. Although aBp+aB-p seems like a 
contradiction, it is not necessarily so. Priest points 
out that "Many, in fact most, of us believe contradictions. 
The person who has consistent beliefs is rare. If some-




this probably means that they just have not thought 
about them long enough." (1986, p.102) It is, in facts 
this formulation of self-deception on which I have based 
my study and in Chapters 4 to 6 I shall argue for the 
possibility of the self-deceiver believing Rand believing 
not-Q~ Logic prevents both beliefs from being true at 
the same time, but it does not prevent both beliefs from 
being hel~. I shall show, however, that not all cases 
of inconsistent beliefs are cases of self-deception. 
where it means that Andrew believes Rand he disbelieves 
R· It would seem that logic would rule out the 
possibility of two contrary attitudes-pro and con, 
believing and disbelieving-existing in the same person. 
However, to believe and to disbelieve does not necessarily 
point to a contradiction. Andrew may have heard good 
arguments both for and against capital punishment and is 
swayed to believeR and to disbelieveR' depending on 
which speaker is arguing. 
where it means that Andrew believes that a contradiction 
is true. This is the limiting case of the epistemo-
logical problem, and the one on which philosophers con-
centrate in their arguments for the impossibility of 
literal self-deception. This form requires the self-
deceiver not only to hold two conflicting beliefs but 
to conjoin them as well. Audi notes that 11 While it 
seems possible for one to have beliefs of incompatible 
propositions, it is not clearly possible for one to 
believe two propositions one believes are incompatible ... 
( 1 982 ' p. 1 38) 
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In other words, a conflict of beliefs seems possible, 
but a belief in what is conflicting seems not.(27) 
However, I shall argue that it is not necessary for the 
self-deceiver to conjoin the two conflicting beliefs in 
order for his project to qualify as a case of self-
deception. It is obvious that many people have incon-
sistent beliefs,£ and~' but to believe in a contradiction9 
i.e. (e.+-£_), is quite different to holding incompatible 
or inconsistent beliefs. 
A further complication arises. Case (2), aBp+aB-p, can be expressed in the 
following two statements:· 
(1) Andrew believes that he has red hair. (£) 
(2) Andrew believes that he does not have red hair. (not-p) 
The problem is not just two apparently contradictory statements, (Andrew 
believes both proposition .P. and its negation not-.e.) which he holds without 
putting them together, but he believes not-.e. because he believes£· If 
Andrew did not have the belief that he has red hair, he would have no need 
to deceive himself about it. ..Self-deception is notoriously troublesome, 
since in some of its manifestations it seems to require us not only to say 
that someone believes both a certain proposition and its negation, but also 
to hold that the one belief sustains the other ... (Davidson, 1985, p.138) 
In Chapters 5 and 6 I shall explain how someone can have beliefs like in 
(1) and (2) without his putting .P. and not-.e. together, even though he believes 
not-p because he believes .P.· 
The second paradox of self-deception, the psychological paradox, encompasses 
most of the problems posed in the epistemological paradox, with the added 
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complication of the intention with which the self-deceiver embarks on 
the process of self-deception and sustains the state of self-deception. 
Other-deceivers act on the basis of what they know in order to hide or 
distort this knowledge to their victims. But then the self-deceiver is 
required to use his knowledge or suspicions of some truth as a basis for 
intentionally ignoring that truth. 11 It seems especially puzzling that 
some self-deceivers can systematically ignore what is so easy for them to 
g.rasp." (Martin, 1986, p.24) Pears observes in Motivated Irrationality 
that what makes self-deception seem paradoxical is not merely what the 
self-deceiver believes or the irrationality of his contradictory beliefs 
or his belief unfounded on evidence, but also what the self-deceiver does 
which, according to Pears, is intentionally cultivating an irrational 
belief. The self-deceiver intentionally accomplishes the feat of his 
holding contradictory beliefs. He designs a plan which will successfully 
conceal the unwelcome belief from him, and yet to formulate the plan he 
must be aware of his contradictory beliefs and the irrationality of his 
favoured belief, which brings us back to the epistemological paradox. He 
knowingly forms the self-deceptive plan and yet, perplexingly, for the plan 
to be effective he cannot be aware of it. The paradox of motivated 
~rrationality is particularly evident when the action is intentional and 
free. The self-deceiver does not appeal to others to do the job for him, 
such as hypnotists or brain surgeons, but he does the job himself. The 
paradox would disappear if the subject were hypnotized or brainwashed. 
Even if he intentionally went to a hypnotist and instructed him to 11 implant" 
a false belief, we would not have a case of self-deception, for an external 
factor has done the 11 implanting 11 of a false belief. The question may arise 
whether the paradox of self-deception is preserved if the agent intentionally 
practises hypnosis on himself. Self-hypnosis used for successful self-
deception does not contain a paradox because the unwanted belief is expunged 
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and does not sustain its opposite. The paradox would also disappear 
if the self-deceiver fails to recognize the irrationality of his beliefs, 
due to fatigue, negligence, incompetence, impetuosity or plain bad luck. 
"Conscious irrationality is paradoxical only if it is avoidable. There 
is nothing suprising about a consciously irrational belief that is truly 
obsessional." (Pears, 1982b,p.162) If a person were not competent to 
detect his errors, or ~o diagnose the irrationality of them, the paradox 
of self-deception would disappear. The self-deceiver who poses a problem 
is the one who is intentional, free (from external forces) and competent 
to detect his own irrationality. How then can a rationally competent 
person freely and intentionally form a belief against the total weight of 
the evidence available to him? How can a rationally competent person 
__ freely and intentionally lie to himself? Sartre expresses the paradox as 
follows: "The liar intends to deceive and he does not seek to hide this 
intention from himself nor to disguise the translucency of consciousness" 
and concludes that "the liar must make the project of the lie in entire 
clarity and that he must possess a complete comprehension of the lie and of 
the truth which he is altering." (Sartre, 1958, p~48-49) In forming 
and trying to act on the intention to i.gnore/conceal/distort would not 
using the knowledge of what is to be concealed/distorted block the very 
effort of concealment or distortion? In Sartre's words, deceivers 
apparently "must know the truth very exactly in order to conceal it more 
carefully". (1958, p.49) Moreover, the self-deceiver has knowledge of 
the intention to deceive but would not this self-knowledge thwart the project 
of deception? Sartre, who refers to deception as "bad faith", poses the 
problem as "that which affects itself with bad faith must be conscious (of) 
its bad faith since the being of consciousness is consciousness of being 
~hat it i iJ . " ( p. 49) . 
23 
The third paradox of self-deception, the ethical paradox, concentrates 
on the problematic moral status of the self-deceiver. As active agents, 
self-deceivers seem guilty of practising deceit and are guilty of any 
harmful consequences of that deceit; as passive victims, self-deceivers 
seem to be innocent victims. When the agent deceives himself, we have 
a case where one and the same person, with regard to one and the same 
action of his, is both morally blameworthy (in his role as deceiver) and 
deserving of moral sympathy (in his role as a victim of deception). 
11 Viewed as liars, they appear insincere and dishonest; viewed as victims 
of a lie, they appear sincere and honestly mistaken. As deceivers, they 
seem responsible and blameworthy for cowardly hypocrisy; as deceived, they 
apparently deserve compassion and help in gaining full awareness of the 
guile perpetrated on them ... (Martin, 1986, p.29) 
Gardiner discusses (1970, p.221-3) Butler, who presented one of the earliest 
accounts of the moral paradox of self-deception. Bishop Butler, an 
eighteenth century cleric, looked at self-deception as 11 Self-deceit11 in a 
predominantly moral context. He was concerned with cases. in which an in-
dividual might be said not to recognize such things as his own faults and 
failings. Butler concludes that in self-deception, being a species of 
dishonesty and 11 falseness of heart .. , the deceiver is more guilty than 
innocent. Possibly because of his clerical preoccupations, Butler regards 
self-deception almost entirely as a case of wrongful action and the appli-
cation of double standards. Self-deception is seen as involving some sort 
of conflict between good and evil forces, the force of conscientious scruple 
which is defeated by the force of selfish desire. The moral paradox is 
not so easily dismissed, for self-deception displays itself in situations 
in which the moral issues are often shadowy and ill-defined, where it is hard 
to draw a sharp line indicating the point at which right ends and wrong 
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begins. Moreover, self-deception is not always a triumph of "selfish 
desire", e.g. a mother who is petrified of water could deceive herself 
into thinking that she is not scared of plunging into the river and so 
save her child from drowning. 
The epistemological, psychological and ethical paradoxes cover the three 
main problematic areas of self-deception. I shall, however, mention a 
few further problems involved not only in self-deception itself but also in 
the method of approach to and the description of the concept of self-deception. 
The epistemological paradox of self-deception focuses on those agents who 
are interested in the truth (albeit an interest in distorting or avoiding 
the truth). But people, in general, are not always interested in truth. 
Some theories of self-deception seem to be inseparably dependent on the 
assumption that the self-deceiving agent has a compelling interest in the 
truth of what he appears to believe. Gardiner (1970, p.241) points out 
that human attitudes and behaviour are often treated as being more purpose-
ful, more reflective, more deliberate, more under control of the conscious 
will, than experience suggests them to be the case. One way of solving the 
problem of self-deception is to interpret the intention of the self-deceiving 
agent and his knowledge of the fa.lsity of the favoured belief not as the 
sort of fully-fledged conscio~s deliberations that cause trouble and give 
rise to the paradoxes. In most cases of self-deception, Gardiner states, 
there is often no apparent realization on the subject•s part, or at best only 
an intermittent one, that he is falsifying things or making them look other 
than they are. People are naturally open to simultaneously holding opposing 
beliefs. Most people hold inconsistent beliefs and most people do so with 
relative ease. "Who but a Descartes would think possible the task of 
sorting out all of his or her beliefs? We unabashedly admit that we do not 
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know the whole range and all the implications of our beliefs; and we 
are not all of us good enough logicians to be sure that we would recognize 
inconsistencies among the beliefs of which we are aware••. (Hanson, 1986, p.109) 
If self-deception is an attempt to mask the irrationality of thought processes, 
self-deception then is practised by agents who are particularly keen on 
evaluating themselves as rational beings. Self-deception is, therefore, a 
strategy used only by rational and consistency-loving people who want to 
disguise the fact that they are falsifying things or holding incompatible 
beli-efs.- Paradoxically then, self-deception is seemingly a vice peculiar 
to rational beings, while the irrational majority are free from its temp-
tations. If one orients one•s beliefs on reality, one is rational, but to 
orient one•s beliefs solely on one•s desires is to make oneself susceptible 
to self-deception. Therefore, Kipp concludes (1980, p.312) desiring to 
believe oneself consistent when one knows one is not is, by definition, in-
compatible with really being rational and consistency-loving. Those who 
are quite ready to tolerate recognized irrationality and inconsistency in 
their beliefs are seemingly not those who want to disguise the existence of 
their irrationality by means of a self-deceptive project; but those who 
strive to be rational, consistency-loving beings are seemingly the ones who 
embark on an irrational project of self-deception in order to mask the 
existence of their irrationality, not only of their holding two opposing 
beliefs but also of their project to deceive themselves about the belief 
that they hold two opposing beliefs. To resolve the paradox of literal self-
deception, it is -necessary to show that a person might hold two opposing 
beliefs as well as to show how one of the two opposing beliefs (the favoured 
belief) is the result of a self-deceptive project. Self-deception is not 
merely a strategy for reconciling simultaneously held, conflicting beliefs, 
it is also strategy for deceiving oneself about one•s belief that one holds 
conflicting beliefs. Self-deception, therefore, seems to require primary 
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deception about some unwelcome belief and also secondary deception about 
the resultant unwelcome belief that one now holds two incompatible beliefs. 
This could lead to the danger of an infinite regress of deceptions. 
A further problem in the method of approach in the examination of self-
deception is our inability to look directly into another person's thoughts. 
We can merely deduce from his words and actions what his thoughts are~ and 
assume that he adheres to the same principles of rationality as we do. 
We cannot empirically observe and measure someone's thought processes and 
their contents directly. We can observe only his speech and behaviour. 
In order to explain and predict the behaviour, verbal and otherwise, of 
other _people, we attribute beliefs, purposes, motives and desires to them 
and describe these in the light of the most unified and intelligible scheme 
we can contrive. Even speech does not yield direct access into a person's 
belief-system for speech itself must be interpreted by both the speaker as 
well as the listener. But the multiplici.ty of mental factors that produce 
behaviour and speech makes interpretation extremely complex and difficult. 
The solution to this problem is "to assume that the person to be understood 
is much like ourselves ... We start out assuming that others have, in the 
basic and largest matters, beliefs and values similar to ours •.. (U)nless we 
can interpret others as sharing a vast amount of what makes up our common 
sense we wi 11 not be ab 1 e to identify any of their be 1 i efs and des fres and 
intentions, any of their propositional attitudes.•• (Davidson, 1982, p.302) 
Our ways of describing, understanding and explaining psychological states 
and events give rise to paradoxes of irrationality. In order to solve the 
paradoxes of self-deception, we can turn to the Theory of Mental Systems 
(see Chapters 5 arid 6) which postulates two semi-autonomous systems of the 
mind with a causal relation, but between which the logical relation has 
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failed. Although Freud looked for terms from technology and mechanics 
to apply to mental events we must ask just how far the workings of the 
mind can be explained by strict, deterministic laws (such as hold in the 
worlds of technology and mechanics) as long as the mental events are 
described in mental terms. Davidson points out that the realm of the 
mental cannot form a closed system(28). If we enter the mental realm with 
only the causal relation holding between mental events, and to a certain 
extent ignore the logical relations between the descriptions of those mental 
events, "we enter a realm without a unified and coherent set of constitutive 
principles: the concepts employed must be treated as mixed, owing 
allegiance partly to their connections with the world of non-mental forces 9 
and partly to their character as mental." (Davidson, 1982, p.301) 
Furthermore, the Theory of Mental Systems allows inconsistent or conflicting 
thoughts, beliefs and desires to exist in the same mind, while basic 
methodology aims at an interpretation that is consistent and intelligible. 
It is not too difficult to explain small deviations from reality, but when 
we are faced with serious digressions from reality and consistency, we have 
great difficulty in trying to describe and explain what is going on in 
mental terms. The problem of methodology encountered in the study of self-
deception can be summed up as follows: 
"The underlying paradox of irrationality, from 
which no theory can entirely escape, is this: if 
we explain it too well, we turn it into a concealed 
form of rationality; while if we assign incoherence 
too glibly, we merely compromise our ability to 
diagnose irrationality by withdrawing the background 
of rationality needed to justify any diagnosis at all." 
(Davidson, 1982, p.303) 
In other words, if an adequate analysis of self-deception is to be offered, 
it must steer a very delicately balanced path between rationality and 
irrationality. 
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The question I am going to turn to now is whether the above paradoxes 
are paradoxes in the philosophical sense, contradictions that cannot 
describe possible situations, or whether they are paradoxes in the literary 
sense, merely seemingly absurd statements that actually turn out to be co~ 
herent and to express genuine possibilities. The paradoxes, thus, point 
to a two-fold consideration: On the one hand, the paradoxes portray self-
.· deception in the literal sense as centring on conflicting beliefs and 
intentional irrational belief-formation and, on the other hand, the· agent•s 
evasion of acknowledging to himself what he suspects or knows to be true. 
The fanner consideration seems to point to the impossibility of literal 
·self-deception, whereas the latter consideration points to manifestations 
of this phenomenon in everyday life. Attributions of self-deception are 
common enough, but it does seem curious that people are so comfortable with 
this paradox and that they are not at all reluctant to employ a concept 
which seems so obviously incoherent.. The paradox of self-deception can be 
solved by either denying that literal self-deception is possible or by 
explaining it away by elaborate means, thus interpreting the tenn 11 Self-
deception11 as a metaphor. According to the literal interpretation of self-
deception, the agent must believe in the conjunction of two contradictory 
propositions since this interpretation of self-deception implies that the 
self-deceiver both believes that something is so, and at the same time 
persuades himself into believing that it is not so. Our rational faculty 
prevents us from believing the conjunction of two contradictory propositions 
and since the self-deceiver must believe in this, it is argued, literal 
self-deception is not possible. However, as I have noted before, I shall 
argue for the possibility of genuine self-deception, without claiming that 
the belief in inconsistency (as opposed to inconsistent beliefs) is a 
necessary condition for a full-blooded case of self-deception. On the other 
hand, the metaphorical approach is to examine self-deception as a form of 
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irrationality, and it is only the irrationality itself that matters, 
without the self-deceivei ever having to accept the falsehood of the· 
favoured belief that he manufactured for his own satisfaction. 
My approach will be to base self-deception on the model of other-deception, 
but on a sliding scale from 11 Weak 11 deception (in which the opposite belief 
is not necessarily accepted, or in which the true belief is either avoided 
or, because of the flexibility of the ways in which the evidence can be 
interpreted, disguised) to 11 hard 11 deception (in which we do have to deal 
with two opposing beliefs or conclusive evidence). I have shown that there 
are 11weak 11 , as well as 11 hard",.cases of other-deception (p.14) and these, 
are I think, in a general way analogous to 11 Weak 11 and 11 hard 11 cases of self-
deception. Perhaps it won•t be necessary to adopt the 11all-or-nothing" 
approach, to deny that literal self-deception is possible or to state that 
avoidance of the truth constitutes self-deception. In Chapter 4 I shall 
show how avoidance or disguising of the truth in acceptable terms is a form 
of self-deception, but in the later discussions on the various Theories of 
Mental Systems, which concentrate mainly on the possibility of "hard11 cases, 
I shall show that if deception is seen as the holding of two contradictory 
beliefs, literal self-deception is possible. However, I want to show that 
it is misleading to claim that the genuine, full-blooded cases of self-
deception are~ those that parallel the epistemology of 11 hard 11 cases of 
other-deception. The meaning of "literal" self-deception more often than 
not refers only to the problematic and paradoxical case of aB(p+-p). 
However, I want to argue that full-blooded self-deception can also refer to 
aBp+aB-p. Martin, who views self-deception as a set of related phenomena 
which are analogous to other-deception in most but not all ways, uses the 
example of ••self-taught" to illustrate the general, but not strict, analogy 
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between "self-deception" and "other-deception". He claims that the 
literal sense of "self-taught 11 is also paradoxical. 
"Teaching requires knowing something and being 
readily able to become explicitly conscious of 
it, whereas learning something entails just being 
ignorant of it. In order to be self-taught, a 
person would have to know and not know the same 
information and be readily able and not readily 
able to call it to consciousness. Even if this 
occured within a single person having a split 
personality, it would not, strictly speaking, be 
·one self teaching itself. Hence, the idea of one 
person being teacher and student with respect to 
the same information is incoherent, and self-taught 
individuals could not exist ... (Martin, 1986, p.20) 
The flaw in the above argument arises through a too rigid analogy in a too= 
limited situation of "taught-by-others" being applied to "taught-by-self". 
The model of teaching others is helpful in limited respects to thinking 
about self-taught, because 6oth activities are concerned with intentional 
action directed towards the acquisition of new knowledge. However, the 
helpful interpersonal model does not offer a complete understanding of the 
literal or standard meaning of self~teaching. 
Even if we were to adhere strictly to the literal sense of self-deception 
in the limiting case and to interpret the phenomenon in terms of a split 
self, where one self deceives another, we are still not using the term 
literally, unless we restate it as "selves-deception".· Furthermore, "when 
we speak of somebody•s having more than one self, this is quite clearly 
metaphorical ..• When one such self deceives another, then, this is still not 
literal self-deception: while •cteceive• can be literal, •self• becomes a 
metaphor... (Haight, 1980, p.36) 
Pears, in Motivated Irrationality, suggests that if the investigation of 
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self-deception starts from the apparent implications of the concept, 
these will have to be checked against the actual use of self-deception, 
and if the investigation starts from the actual use, the possibility exists 
that some of the applications may have to be adjusted so that they are more 
in keeping with the real implications of the concept. 
"We cannot take the concept of self-deception 
and assume, with many psychologists, that it 
must be in good working order because there is 
general ag.reement about its application. But 
equally we cannot take the apparent implication 
of this concept, that a person deceives himself 
with full knowledge of what he is doing, and 
argue, on the side of many philosophers, that, 
since this is impossible, there is no such 
phenomenon as self-deception. What is needed is 
a balanced judgement and a due regard for the 
claims of denotation and connotat1on." 
(Pears, 1984, p.2-3) 
Even if the claims of denotation and connotation are noted, self-deception 
still remains an irritating concept. Its denotation is far from clear, 
with vague borders between self-deception and, say, wishful thinking or 
self-deceptive akrasia. If its connotation is taken literally, the chances 
are that self-deception is not possible and it cannot, therefore, really 
have any denotation. Even if the word "self-deception .. with its strict 
and problematic connotation did not exist in our vocabulary, we would still 
be faced with the problem its actual denotation raises. It seems as though 
the problem goes deeper than the paradoxes of self-deception to the various 
forms of the paradox of irrationality. For Pears, the deep issue of self-
deception is the problem of irrationality: how can a person persuade himself 
that something is the case when all his evidence points to the opposite con-
clusion? The denotation of self-deception can include forming a belief 
based purely on desire, to forming a belief against the available evidence, 
to believing the conjunction of two logically incompatible propositions----
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the limiting case of self-deception which is necessary if the connotation 
is to be interpreted literally. 
Cases of other-deception were placed on a sliding scale in order of in-
creasing severity, from withholding evidence to fabricating evidence. 
Self-deception displays the same characteristic of developing complexity. 
Pears distinguishes four grades of self-deception, from 11 Weak 11 to 11 hard11 • 
(1984, Chapter V). The sliding scale distinguishes between avoiding or 
distorting or biassing already available evidence that may lead to a false 
but welcome belief (or for that matter, which may lead to the avoidance of 
a damaging but true belief) and manufacturing or fabricating a belief that 
goes against evidence already collected. Furthenno.re, I want to distinguish 
between evidence that allows a certain amount of 11 latitude11 of interpretation 
and conclusive evidence (e.g. mathematical evidence) that rules out an 
appeal to various possibilities. 
First of all, then, at the bottom of the scale is the 11 Weak 11 case in which 
there is balanced evidence for~ and not-£, and the self-deceiver accepts £· 
The person does appreciate the fact that he has evidence for both £ and for 
not-£, but this does not mean that he is entertaining a contradiction. He 
may, of course, be experiencing a conflict if the evidence for the two 
different beliefs are close to being in balance. For example, Tim is an 
artist who· has submitted his paintings to the Academy for acceptance and 
approval. If the Academy accepts his paintings, Tim will enjoy fame and 
public acclaim something he dearly desires. During the examination, one 
judge looks gloomily at the canvases, purses his lips and gives a decisive 
shake of the head. It is clear that he does not approve. From this 
evidence Tim forms the belief, "My painting is not accepted .. , (not-_e). 
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However, the other judge smiles enthusiastically, rubs his hands 
together and nods encouragingly at Tim. From this evidence Tim forms 
the belief, .. My painting is accepted.n (E)· There is equal evidence 
for both beliefs, but because Tim wants his painting to hang in the 
Art Gallery he firmly holds the latter belief, .E_, based on his desire for 
the acceptance of his art. This is still a case of irrationality, albeit 
a weak one, for a rational man would suspend belief. The self-deceiver, 
however, believes .E. firmly because he wants it to be the case that .E.· 
Tim forms a belief under the influence of a wish. 
The above case merges with a case of wishful thinking (for the distinction 
between the two phenomena see Chapter 2), and in orderto get a clearer 
case of self-deception, the irrationality will have to be increased, by 
supposing that his evidence points to the unwelcome belief. Here the 
person is faced with inductive evidence for not-J?_, but he accepts .E.· For 
example, when Tim meets with the members of the Art Academy there are three 
judges looking at his painting. He knows that in order for his work to be 
accepted, at least two of the judges must approve. However, judging from 
the disapproving looks on two or even all three of the judges' faces, Tim 
realizes that his chances of acceptance are virtually nil. However, Tim 
gambles on the slim chance that they might accept his painting, might 
change their minds when he has left, or might be putting on a public facade 
(they are, in fact, very enthusiastic about the painting but are skilfully 
hiding their emotions). The evidence is not totally conclusive and Tim, 
irrationally, stakes his chances on the latitude which the available evidence 
allows. (See Chapter 4 for further discussion of this form of self-deception. 
The next step is to postulate a case in which the self-deceiver's 
irrationality is more extreme, because his premises are sufficient to 
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establish the falsehood of the favoured belief by deductive necessity. 
Here the self-deceiver is confronted with decisive evidence for not-~, 
but he accepts£· The conclusive evidence does not allow the ••latitude" 
of interpretation in the previous case. The self-deceiver•s adopted 
belief is logically incompatible with the evidence he possesses when he 
forms the belief. Here we are dealing with a more controversial case. 
The question raised is, 11 If someone•s premises actually entailed the 
opposite conclusion to the one that he drew, how was he able to draw it?11 
(Pears, 1984, p.3fr) Since I am looking at intentional self-deception, the 
agent in this case is both competent and able to spot the irrationality. 
Pears cites the example of a competent accountant who, nevertheless, makes 
errors in his own favour when adding up his bank balance, but when he 
performs the same service for a friend, he makes no or f~w errors, or at 
least none that form a pattern with those he committed when he added up his 
own finances. (Pears, 1984, p.30). This sort of thing does happen, but by 
citing an example is in no way an indication that the problem of how it 
happens has begun to be solved. Pears suggests than an explanation would 
have to start from the fact that in a complicated case, it is far more 
difficult for the agent to achieve the same sort of commanding view of his 
premises and conclusion than he can achieve in the case of a simple contra-
diction. (Chapter 5 and 6 will deal with these issues). 
And at the top of the scale is the most limiting (and some would say, im-
possible) case of self-deception: he knows that not:.e., and yet the self-
deceiver accepts£· He believes or even knows that something is not so, 
and yet he adopts the belief that that very thing is so. If the connotation 
of "self-deception•• is taken literally, then this kind of case would involve 
the agent•s believing two contradictory propositions and his believing the 
conjunction of two logically incompatible propositions. (Chapters 5 and 6 
35 
will look at whether this is at all possible). Since this limiting 
case at the top of the scale happens to be paradigmatic of the paradox 
of self-deception, it is this case which has captured the attention of 
philosophers. 
* * * * * * 
In this chapter I looked at the various definitions of "deceive" and how 
the different meanings give rise to different emphases. If 11deceive" is 
taken as "cause to believe falsely that E_", we can include cases of un-
intentional deception.· However, the philosophically interesting case is 
that of intentional deception which rests on the stricter definition of 
"deceive", viz. "getting someone to believe something one knows to be false~~. 
And it is this form of deception, and thus self-deception, which will be in~ 
vestigated- the case which involves knowledge and intention (as necessary 
in the process of self-deception) and effect (as necessary for the.state of 
successful self-deception). 
The purpose of this chapter is to look at the central paradoxes embedded 
in the concept of self~deception when it is based on the model of other-
deception, and the problems involved in an investigation of the notion of 
self-deception. The paradoxes are usually approached in two different 
ways: Firstly, there is the opinion which claims that self-deception can be 
treated only as being metaphorical to other-deception. By abandoning the 
model of other-deception, these theories of self-deception circumvent the 
paradoxes. Literal self-deception, therefore, is not possible and the 
phenomena which we falsely call self-deception are really cases of irrational 
belief-formation, rationalization, failure to focus, etc. Since these cases 
very often don•t include inconsistent belief, or strong counter-evidence, 
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they are labelled as "weak" self-deception. These theories, however, 
fail to give an adequate account of how "hard" self-deception is possible, 
i.e. the case which involves inconsistent belief and conclusive counter-
evidence. A second approach to the paradoxes is to confront them squarely 
by claiming that full-blown self-deception is possible. In order to 
explain how "hard" self-deception is possible, these theories appeal to the 
assumption of mental systems, i.e. the division of the psyche into different 
mental groups. I am, however, going to follow a third approach which, 
instead of an "either-or" choice, is going to incorporate both the above 
opinions. There are degrees of self~deception, ranging on a sliding scale 
from "weak" to "hard" cases. This does not mean that the model of other~ 
deception is abandoned. Indeed, the analogy holds for there are also 
varying degrees of deception in inter-personal situations, from a withholding 
or manipulation of evidence to the fabrication of false evidence. 
Using the model of other-deception leads to three main paradoxes. There 
is~ first of all, the epistemological parado~ which looks at the problem of 
holding inconsistent beliefs. ·I shall show later that not all cases of 
inconsistent belief are, however, cases of self-deception. What is needed 
is an intentional element, the agent intends to deceive himself. This leads 
to the second difficulty, i.e. the psychological paradox which looks at the 
problem of the self-deceiver's necessary awareness and unawareness of what 
he is doing. I shall have to confine my study to the solutions of the 
epistemological and psychological paradoxes, for the scope of my study does 
not allow enough room to include a discussion of the ethical paradox. I 
have merely noted this moral paradox in order to illustrate the complexities 
housed in the notion of self-deception. 
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25. Cf.Miri (1973) who adds the condition that B must recognize A's inten-
tion that B must believe that the statement is true. This apart from 
seeming superflous, does not, however, explain cases of deception in 
which A states the truth but in such a cynical or joking manner so that 
B will not accept it as the truth. 
26. Brooks (1986, p.272) points out following Plato that (p+-p) is not 
necessarily an outright contradiction. We can have "John is both fat 
and not-fat". John may have a fat stomach, but his legs are thin, or 
John may be too fat for a jockey, but is thin for a member of his 
corpulent family. The term "fat" is, of course, flexible and it may 
be argued that a definite term like "dead" in "John is dead and John is 
not dead" will lead to a contradiction. However, I can reply that John 
is dead but his memory is kept alive by friends and family. 
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27. Priest (1986) argues that it may be rationally acceptable to 
believe in a contradiction. He cites Heraclitus, Plotinus, 
Nicholas of Cusa, Hegel and Engels as great rational thinkers who 
have consciously believed in expli<!it contradictions. "That a 
person may sometimes be able to accept a contradiction rationally, 
and that there is nothing in the domain of formal semantics ever to 
stop a person accepting a contradict~on, I do not dispute." (p.111) 
What he does, however, reject is that a person can always accept a 
contradiction rationally. He concludes that when evidence and 
argument build up, it may no longer remain rationally possible to 
believe in a contradiction. And it is exactly this stage which is 
of interest in the study of self-deception: the rational impossibility 
of clinging to a belief that is faced with overwhelming counter-evidence. 
28. See Davidson- (1970), (1982), (1985) 
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CHAPTER 2 
RELATED IRRATIONAL PHENOMENA 
Before going on to discuss what self-deception is, I want to discuss 
what self-deception is not. The following phenomena are like self-
deception, but are not the same as self-deception. Indeed, they may 
shade into self-deception, or self-deception may grow out of them, but 
in each case there is a reason for distinguishing that c~se of irrationa1ity 
from a case of self-deception proper. In this chapter I shall try to 
isolate the peculiar characteristics of self-deception which distinguish 
it from other forms of irrationality. 
The first phenomena from which self-deception must be distinguished is 
that of intellectual incompetence. In the discuss.ion of the psychological 
paradox .in the previous chapter, I touched on the necessary condit,ion of 
intellectual competence for a case of intentional self-deception. The 
paradox arises because the rationally competent agent intentionally and 
freely forms an irrational belief against the total weight of evidence 
available to him. The paradox would disappear if the person were 
hypnotized or drugged or failed to appreciate the impact of the counter-
evidence. 
If the agent did appreciate the impact of the counter-evidence, he would, 
as an i ntell ectua lly competent person, be forced to form (to some extent, 
at least) a conflicting belief to the one he favours. If there is no 
conflict generated by opposing beliefs, there is no need for self-deception. 
In the general analysis of other-deception in Chapter 1, I noted that the 
first condition for successful intentional other-deception is that A makes 
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a statement to B which A knows or believes to be false. If A lacks 
the awareness(1) that what he says or believes is false, A is not in-
tentionally deceiving, but is merely mistaken---a case of unintentional 
other-deception, e.g. when A inadvertently misreads a report in the 
newspaper. The intellectually incompetent agent who deceives himself 
(the meaning of "deceiven in this case refers to "causes himself to hold 
a false belief") fails to recognize the impact of the evidence or to see 
where the reasons point, whereas the intentional self-deceiver must know 
this only too well in order to know what to avoid or what to deceive him-
self about. The paradox embedded in intentional self-deception is that 
this very awareness and knowledge of the telling counter-evidence steers 
the agent on a path of self-deception-a path by means of which he can· 
"conceal" or "disguise" this awareness and knowledge from himself. More-
over, not only does he have to conceal the knowledge of the import of 
the evidence from himself, he also needs to screen from himself the knowledge 
of the irrational causation of the favoured belief, as well as the knowledge 
that he is practising self-deception. The paradox of intentional self-
deception, in other words, is that the self-deceiver deceives himself over 
the knowledge and awareness which is necessary for self-deception to take 
place. He devises a complex plan to embark on an irrational project, the 
project to hide or mark this awareness from himself. If he did not have 
the awareness, there would be no need for him to embark on a plan of self-
deception, since there would be nothing for him to hide or disguise. 
Just how he is able to put this "rational" plan, aimed at irrationality, 
to work will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
Without the agent's initial awareness of his own irrationality we are not 
faced with a paradox.(2) The intellectually incompetent person may fail 
to conform to our standards of rationality but his irrational belief may 
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seem perfectly 11 rational 11 to him. As I noted in Chapter 1, we can 
never have direct access to someone else's thought processes, but assume 
that they are similar to ours and we, therefore, impose general ·standards 
of rationality onto everyone. When someone's beliefs fail to adhere to 
these standards, we may label them as irrational. However, if the agent 
is not aware of the standards of rationality and not aware of the demands 
they make-on his thinking, we cannot accuse him of being internally 
irrational, because he is not flouting any of his 11 rational 11 standards. 
In the case of the intellectually incompetent person it is this very in-
tellectual incompetence which prevents him from becoming aware of his own 
irrationality. 
-
However the case of the intellectually incompetent person is still trouble~ 
some. We can ask the question, 11 How can the person genuinely fail to 
notice the incoherence of his beliefs or genuinely fail to notice the im-
pact-of the-counter-evidence?., But if the person never is aware (and 
never has been aware) that his beliefs are incoherent, he experiences no 
mental conflict, no incoherence or inconsistency in his belief-system. 
11 The sort of irrationality that makes conceptual 
trouble is not the failure of someone else to 
believe or feel or do what we deem reasonable, 
but rather the failure, within a single person, 
of coherence or consistency in the pattern of 
beliefs, attitudes, emotions, intentions and 
actions 11 • (Davidson, 1982, p.290) 
Internal inconsistency is a necessary condition for irrationality within 
one person. Without internal inconsistency, the agent's action or belief 
may be irrational from our point of view, but it need not be irrational 
from the agent's point of view. (p.297). We would not, for 
example, speak of a three or four-year-old as being guilty of intentional 
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self-deception. The child does not yet fully know the kind of rational 
standards that are adopted in our ways of thinking about the world; he 
is not yet intellectually competent to apply those standards. In the 
child's thinking, contradictions are accepted without mental conflict, 
logic is something not yet grasped, and language is not yet sophisticated 
enough to form complex beliefs into propositions. The child's beliefs 
(for example, in the existence of fairies) and actions may seem irrational 
from the adult's point of view, but·from the child's point of view there 
is no mental conflict between rationality and irrationality in holding 
those beliefs or performing certain actions. One must make "a strong 
distinction between lacking certain standards of reasoning and failing to 
apply them." (Davidson, 1985, p.141) A person who deceives himself into 
thinking that he is an excellent scientist will not be guilty of self-
deception if his standards of excellence in science are low as a result of 
being simply ignorant of what good scientific work is or simply because he 
has had no competition and, therefore, no realistic evaluation of his own 
work. It is only when rational standards have been adopted by the person 
that we can speak of him as being self-deceived when he deliberately 
flouts those principles which he has acknowledged to himself. The first 
characteristic of self-deception then is that the agent must be intellectually 
competent and able to detect and experience mental conflict, brought about 
by the conflict between the demands of rationality and the desire for the 
irrational belief. 
The second phenomenon I want to distinguish from self-deception is that 
of being in the grip of irresistable outside forces. I mentioned in 
Chapter 1 that the paradox of self-deception arises because the agent 
freely and intentionally forms an irrational belief. Furthermore, apart 
from being intellectually competent, he must also be able to avoid the 
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irrationality. "There is nothing surprising about a consciously 
irrational belief that is truly obsessional." ( Pears , 1 982 b , p • 16 2) 
If the self-deceiver has been overwhelmed by some alien pa·ssion, some 
powerful force which overcomes his reason, then it is implied that the 
self-deception is not intentional. Since the self-deceiver is not the 
agent of his action (including the action of forming the irrational 
·belief), he cannot be held responsible. ·Davidson refers to this as the 
Medea Principle in which the rational faculty and better judgment of the 
person succumbs to the irresistable outside force. 
"If the agent is to blame, it is not for what 
he did, but because he did not resist with enough 
vigour. What the agent found himself doing had 
a reason----the passion or impulse that overcame 
his better judgement- but the reason was not his .• 
. From the agent•s point of view, what he did was the 
effect of a cause that came from outside, as if 
another person had moved him." (Davidson, .1982, p.295) 
However, if self-deception is to take action in order to get myself to 
believe£ which J believe to be false, then the question can be raised 
whether my going to a hypnotist or my taking an amnesia-inducing drug may 
then qualify as a sub-species of self-deception. A person could rely on 
an outside force or agency to instill in him a false, but welcome belief. 
For example, Tim, as a result of a very reticent personality, has no 
friends. His belief, "I am inhibited" is grounded on an objective evalua-
tion of himself: his temerity to start conversations with strangers, his 
feeling of panic when someone approaches him, etc. He intentionally 
approaches a hypnotist to instill in him the opposite belief, "I am out-
going." Although Tim knows that at present there is strong counter-evidence 
to this belief, he hopes that this "implanted•• false belief may influence 
his actions. He banks on the chance that through these extrovert and 
spontaneous actions he makes many friends who in turn give him the self-
confidence he lacked before going to the hypnotist. He surmises that if 
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his actions do change as a result of the false belief, the future 
evidence (consequences of his changed actions) will allow him, quite 
rationally, to hold the belief that he is outgoing. Tim has fulfilled 
the conditions of intentionality (he deliberately approached the 
hypnotist) and he is also intellectually competent (he is all too aware 
of the irrationality of the implanting of the as-yet false belief). 
However, it is not clear whether Tim's subsequent action directed by the 
implanted belief is at all free or avoidable, the other necessary condition 
for self-deception proper. Although Tim intentionally approaches the 
hypnotist, it is the hypnotist who does the actual 11 implanting 11 of the 
false belief; it is he who manipulates the mechanisms of Tim's mind. 
Much has been written about the force of post-hypnotic suggestions, where-
by it is clear that the subject, even after coming out of the hypnotic 
trance, feels compelled to perform a certain action which was suggested to 
him while he was hypnotized. These kinds of cases are problematic, but 
I would not call them paradoxical. In cases of self-deception proper 
the agent • s rati anal faculty is defeated by that very rati ona 1 faculty 
itself or by a wish. There are no intermediate 11 Stage props .. or outside 
forces which help with or facilitate the usurption of reason. Self-
deception is not an ordinary case of irrational thinking. Irrational 
thinking may be caused by fatigue, shock, alcohol, brain damage or whatever~ 
but self-deception is caused by the agent himself without the help of out~ 
side forces. 
Similar to being in the grip of an irresistable outside force, is being 
deluded, that type of delusion that is typical of insanity. The schizo-
phrenic who hallucinates and is convinced that he is seeing mor.sters, in 
the teeth of evidence, may be self-deluded in the sense that he has beliefs 
that are false and unreasonable, but we would not accuse the schizophrenic 
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of practising self-deception. The deluded schizophrenic experiences 
no conflict; there is no struggle between the demands of his rational 
standards and his delusions; there are no contradictory beliefs as there 
are in self-deception. He seems to be the helpless victim of some 
powerful forces, whereas the self-deceiver is seen to exercise some control 
over his self-deception; he intentionally ~nd freely brings about his own 
delusion. Haight distinguishes self-deception from delusion by attaching 
an "air of responsibility or choice" to self-deception, which delusion 
lacks. (Haight, 1980, p.3) The self-deceiver 11 Seems to choose not to 
lknow the truth". (pA). In cases of intentional other-deception, 
the deceiver knows that he is deceiving and that he is responsible for 
the deception. This air of responsibility for the deception must, there-
fore, also be present in cases of intentional self-deception, since I am 
basing my notion of self-deception on that of other-deception. "If the 
false belief is brought about by brainwashing, post-hypnotic suggestion, 
or whatever, then we would not call the believer self-deceived, for 
responsibility for the false belief would not be present." (Foss, 1980, p.242) 
Moreover, self-deception is not merely clinging tenaciously to an unwarranted 
belief despite the recognition of counter-evidence. This is rather a 
case of sheer stubbornness. Self-deception, on the other hand, is different 
from pigheadedness in that the self-deceiver freely and intentionally 
chooses to employ a process of reasoning which .. reconciles" the counter-
evidence with the favoured belief. The agent himself is responsible for 
the employment of the process aimed at overthrowing rationality. So, a 
second characteristic of self-deception proper (as opposed to unintentional 
self-deception) is that the agent freely and intentiona·lly fonns his own 
irrational belief which gives rise to mental conflict. The agent is 
directly responsible for bringing about his own deception. 
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The third distinction I want to make is between self-deception and 
hypocrisy. Because both deception and hypocrisy are forms of pretence, 
it might be tempting to think that hypocrisy is a species of deception. 
This is, however, no~ necessarily so. Martin points out that a person 
can remain a hypocrite, without deceiving himself or anyone else. Martin 
notes (1986, p.44) that Senator Joseph McCarthy remained a self-righteous, 
pompous, intolerant hypocrite even after everyone saw through his hypo-
critical posturing. Hypocrisy is a form of pretence, u·sually a pretence 
of being better than one really is. There is no stipulation that this 
pretence necessa ri 1 y 1 eads to actua 1 deception. . The hypocrite may pretend 
to be better than he really is, without ever believing that he actually 
is better. 
In hypocrisy, A may act as though he believes .E_, but he can never really 
believe E.· 11 Hypocrites are self-aware in that they acknowledge to 
themselves their pretence, intentions, motives and strategies ... (Martin, 
1986, p.46) . The difference between a hypocrite and a self-deceived 
person is that in the former case the person is only the agent in the 
pretence, whereas in the latter case the self-deceived person is both 
agent and victim of his own pretence; he is taken in by his own deception. 
The self-deceiver comes to believe what he knows to be false, but when a 
person pretends to himself it is not true that he believes that .E_; he 
only make-believes that .E_; he only behaves as if he believed. When a 
hypocrite starts believing that what he is pretending about is true, he 
is tending towards self-deception, or is guilty of what Butler calls 
11 inner-hypocrisy... The hypocrite is engaged in dishonesty with himself 
while pretending to himself that he is not engaged in dishonesty. When 
the hypocrite reaches this stage, he is guilty of self-deception in that 
he is taken in by his own pretence. So another distinctive feature of 
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self-deception is that the self-deceiver does not merely behave as if 
he believes that£, he actually does believe that £.(3) 
Another phenomenon that is closely related to self-deception, especially 
in the philosophical investigations of irrationality, is akrasia. 
Akrasia can be loosely translated as weakness of will, but to highlight 
the equally paradoxical core of akrasia, Pears refers to it as "action 
done knowingly against one•s own better judgment ... (Pears, 1984, p.15) 
The akrates holds certain beliefs and makes a value judgment, and the 
next moment-he goes against his own judgment. He has reasons for judging 
a certain cause of action better than another, and then freely and inten-
tionally goes against these, and follows another course of action. The 
self-deceiver has certain evidence and facts from which he forms a certain 
. 
belief and then, freely and intentionally, he goes against the evidence 
-and forms a conflicting belief. 
I shall just look at some similarities between self-deception and akrasias 
but will then show how they differ from each other. The similar paradoxical 
core of both concepts seems to be that the irrationality is caused by the 
same culprit, i.e. a rebellious wish or desire in the agent, which gives 
rise to either irrational action or irrational belief-formation, or both. 
Self-deception, as irrational belief-formation, shares distinctive features 
with irrational action or akrasia. Pears even goes as far as saying 
that the problem of irrational action contains the problem of irrational 
belief-formation within itself. (Pears, 1984, p.25) He offers two reasons 
for this. First of all, the formation of an irrational belief is often a 
kind of action and secondly, irrational actions are often made easier by 
biasing beliefs. Audi too stresses the reciprocal relationships between 
self-deception and akrasia. He notes that we 11 become self-deceived partly 
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or largely through actions, and act as a result of being self-deceived." 
(1982, p.148) So akrasia can contribute to producing self-deception, 
and self-deception can help to perpetuate akrasia (e.g. by evading telling 
evidence). What produces the action or biases the belief is usually a 
rebellious desire. Pears illustrates the point with an example of a 
guest at a party who desires a third double whisky, but concludes, rightly 
so, that it won't be all right for him to drive home after six measures 
of whisky. However, the desire for the third drink biases his reasoning. 
Thus by removing an intellectual obstacle to its own fulfilment, the 
desire leads to the guest's concluding, against the weight of his evidences 
that a third drink will be all right. In other words, the rebellious 
desire causes the man to form the irrational belief that it is in order 
to drive home after three double whiskys. The desire, therefore, motivates 
the formation and acceptance of the irrational belief and this very same 
desire is then fulfilled by the action, i.e. the taking of the third drink. 
Both the biasing of beliefs (self-deception) and the irrational action 
(akrasia) are motivated by the same desire; both self-deceiver and akrates 
act intentionally on a favoured reason. 
A further similarity between, in this case, "weak" self-deception and 
akrasia is that they both operate in situations with latitude, situations 
in which there is either balanced evidence for .E. and for not-£, or in-
ductive evidence which tends towards not-E_ (Cases (1) and (2) on Pears• 
sliding scale in Chapter 1). Davidson (1985, p.139) generalizes self-
deception as a common situation in which the weight of the available 
evidence seems to point to the truth of some proposition, and the agent is 
inclined to treat this proposition to be true more likely than not. In 
a situation with latitude, the agent does not have absolute certainty of 
the truth of a proposition, nor absolute certainty that its negation is 
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also true. His desire for the favoured belief will incline him to 
seek evidence or emphasize certain facts which will support the favoured, 
but suspected false, belief. However, to operate in a situation with 
latitude is not to rob the agent's belief-formation or action of irration-
ality. The latitude excludes absolute certainty about the truths of 
opposing propositions, but it still entails a context of conflict. If 
the latitude in interpreting certain ambiguous evidence or values did 
away_with conflict, there would be no irrational belief-formation or 
i rrati ana 1 action. "The existence of conflict is a necessary condition. 
of both fgrms of irrationality." (Davidson, 1985, p.140) "Weak" self-
deception involves forming an irrational belief in the face of conflicting 
evidence, whereas akrasia involves an irrational action in the face of 
conflicting values. "Weak" self-deception is thus when the agent is faced 
with conflicting evidence for conflicting beliefs, having no certainty 
about the truth of either, but his desire for the favoured belief biases 
the evidence so as to seem to support the belief. Davidson compares this 
characterization of self-deception to that· of akrasia or what he terms 
"weakness of the wi 11" : 
"Weakness of the will is a matter of acting 
intentionally (or forming an intention to act) 
on· the basis of less than all the reasons one 
recogniz.es as relevant. A weak-willed action 
takes place tn a context of conflict; the 
akratic agent has what he takes to be reasons 
both for and against a course of action. He judges, on the basis of all his reasons, that 
one course of action is best, yet opts for 
another; he has acted 'contrary to his own best judgment'." (Davidson, 1985, p.139) 
So, even though self-deception and akrasia can appeal to latitude when 
interpreting ambiguous evidence or values, both are still irrational in 
that they operate in a context of conflict----between the demands of 
reason for the rational belief or the final value judgment, and the desire 
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for the irrational belief or action----and that in both cases 
irrationality triumphs. 
From the above, it may seem that self-deception and akrasia, although 
irrational, are not so irrational as to give rise to inexplicable 
paradoxes. After all, the akrates who takes a third whisky against 
his own better judgment is not guilty of any logical. inconsistency even 
though, according to Davidson, his unconstrained intentional action 
indicates that he judged it better to take another drink. "To explain 
his behaviour, we need only say that his desire to do what he held to 
be best, all things considered, was not as strong as his desire to do· 
something else." (Davidson, 1982, p.297) Although it is irrational for 
the agent to- go against his better judgment, he is not guilty of internal 
inconsistency. We cannot yet accuse the akrates who judges, "It would 
be better not to take another drink (first value-judgment); but another 
drink is desirable and I shall take a third whisky (second, perverse 
value-judgment)" of logical inconsistency. 
According to Davidson, what is needed to reduce the akrates' irrationality 
to logical inconsistency is for the akrates to adhere to a second-order 
principle, a higher-order judgment that he ought to act on his first 
va 1 ue-judgment -"I ought to act on my own better judgment, what I judge 
best or obligatory all things considered." Therefore, for the guest 
to be guilty of internal inconsistency, the kind that gives rise to prob-
lematic paradoxes, he would have to accept the following two principles: 
"I judge it best not to do!' but! is desirable and so I shall do~", 
as well as "I ought to act on my own best ,judgment". If that judgment 
is made, that he ought to act on his best judgment (i.e. the judgment 
that it is best not to take the drink) and if he then goes ahead and does 
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take the third whisky, then the akrates• irrationality turns into· 
"pure internal inconsistency". 
"A purely formal description of what is 
irrational in an aktratic act is, then, 
that the agent goes against his own second-
order principle that he ought to act on 
what he holds to be best, everything 
considered. It is only when we can describe 
his action in just this way that there is a 
puzzle about explaining it. lf the agent 
does not have the principle that he ought to 
act on what he holds to be best, everything 
considered, then thoug~ his action may be 
irrational from our point of view, it need not 
be irrational from his point of view ... 
(Davidson, 1982, p.297) 
Now, according to Davidson, just as the akrates is guilty of internal 
inconsistency only when he sins against his second-order principle, so 
the self-deceiver is guilty of internal inconsistency only when he sins 
against a similar second-order principle, the nonnative principle of the 
requirement of total evidence for inductive reasoning. (Davidson, 1985, 
p.140) When the agent is deciding among a set of mutually exclusive 
hypotheses, this requirement enjoins him to accept that hypothesis most 
highly supported by all available relevant evidence. To illustrate 
Davidson•s point, I want to return to the example I used in Chapter 1 to 
illustrate a 11weak" case of self-deception, the example of the artist, 
Tim, who submits his painting to the Academy for inspection. Although 
two of the three judges look decidedly grim and critical, Tim banks on 
the chance that they may change their minds, and he, therefore, forms the 
belief that his painting is accepted. It is irrational for Tim to do so, 
for his desire to have his painting accepted biases his reasoning and 
allows him to form a belief which he would not have formed in the absence 
of that desire. Although Tim is guilty of irrationality, we cannot, 
according to Davidson•s stipulation of a second-order principle, accuse 
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himyet of internal inconsistency. For Tim to be guilty of that, 
he will have to ho 1 d the second_.order pri nc i p 1 e of: 11 I ought to accept 
the hypothesis or belief most strongly supported by all the available 
evidence... Tim knows that all three judges must approve his painting 
before it is accepted; he is aware of the very strong evidence which 
leads him to form the belief that his painting is not accepted; yet 
his desire for fame leads him to form a belief that his painting is 
accepted, based on only part of the evidence (the sole. enthusiastic judge); 
however, he also holds that he must accept the belief most strongly 
supported by the evidence. If all the above apply to Tim and if he yet 
freely accepts only the favoured belief that his painting is accepted, 
Tim is guilty of 11 pure internal inconsistenct'. The person 11Whose thinking 
does not satisfy the requirement of total evidence may be irrational by 
one person's standards but not (if he does not accept the requirement) by 
his own standards 11 • (Davidson, 1985, p.141) So, like the akrates, the 
self-deceiver's belief may be irrational from our point of view, but i~ · 
does not necessarily mean that the self-deceiver is internally inconsistents 
i.e. irrational from his point of view. 11 All genuine inconsistencies are 
deviations from the person's own norms. This goes not only for patently 
logical inconsistencies but also for weakness of the will ••• and for 
self-deception... (Davidson, 1985, p.142) 
The similarities between akrasia and self-deception are, thus, that both 
agents act intentionally on a favoured reason; although latitude may be 
present, both agents operate in a context of mental conflict; for the 
irrationality of both self-deception and akrasia to harden into pure 
internal inconsistency, both agents must accept a second-order principle. 
It may seem that the one is merely a su~species of the other, but there 
are important differences which distinguish them from each other. For 
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Pears, at least, the irrationality of an action that fails to conform 
to the agent•s better judgment is very different from the irrationality 
of perverse belief-formation: 
n[Jhe irrationality of perverse belief-formatioill 
involves, in the limiting case, believing something 
impossible, but the irrationality of perverse 
action is quite different. The action is irrational 
because it is unreasonable and it is unreasonable 
only in the sense that it does not obey reason. It 
is not an element in the agent•s reasoning and so it 
cannot be faulted in anything like the way in which 
we fault the conclusion of a piece of theoretical 
reasoning or an inconsistent set of beliefs. The 
agent•s reasoning terminates with his singular value-judgment about his particular predicament and then 
his action is irrational only in the sense that it 
is not ruled by this edict of reason ... 
(Pears, 1982b.p.167) ' 
For Pear~ then, in self-deception there is a perversion within the reasoning 
·process, whereas in akrasia the action does not conform to the final value-
judgment reached by rational and logical procedures. Pugmire notes 
(1982. p.185} that Pears favours an account of akrasia.in which the agent 
deviates from the choice dictated by his values and in terms of which the 
agent•s deviation is seen as a rebellion against his practical reasoning, 
rather than an error within the agent•s practical reasoning itself.(4) 
For Pears (1982b, p.176) it is not possible for a sane person consciously 
to form a belief that goes directly against a perceived fact. It is, 
however, possible for him consciously to perform an action that goes 
directly against his own final value-judgment. The agent may remember 
his value-judgment, be aware of the demand that it makes on his action, 
have no doubt about the action that would meet this demand, and yet per-
form the opposite action. The akrates, therefore, can in full awareness 
act directly against his final value-judgment, but it is most unlikely 
that the self-deceiver can in full awareness form and hold a belief that 
goes directly against the evidence. The akrates is, of course, acting 
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irrationally, but we cannot accuse him of internal inconsistency. 
It is only when he has accepted the second-order principle that the 
question of possibility of· achievement is considerably curtailed. 
Self-deception and akrasia often reinforce each other, but they are not 
the same thing. The most striking difference between the two is that 
the outcome of akrasia is an action, while the outcome of self-deception 
is a be 1 i ef. 11 The prob 1 ems raised by weakness of wi 11 differ di sti ncti vel y 
from the problems raised by self-deception. The former problem is how a 
judgment can fail to lead to appropriate action. The latter problem 
concerns the way in which beliefs and judgments can be influenced by 
desires ... (Watson, 1977, p.326) Another characteristic of self-deception 
then is·that it is a perversion within the reasoning process which has as 
a result the formation of an irrational belief. 
The last phenomenon I want to distinguish from self-deception is that of 
wishful thinking. H~re, as opposed to akrasia, wishful thinking, like 
self-deception, has the outcome of irrational belief. In wishful thinking 
and in most cases of self-deception the belief is caused by a wish and it 
is this that makes these two phenomena irrational. A desire or wish is 
not a justified cause for a belief, except for beliefs such as the belief 
that you have that desire or wish. Szabados in his paper Wishful Thinking 
and Self-Deception examines the two related irrationalities of the self~ 
deceiver and the wishful thinker in detail. 
11 Both hold the belief they do hold largely 
because they want to believe that (p). The 
truth of the belief would make them-happy. 
They both have a personal stake in what they 
believe. In the absence of the motives that 
we ascribe to them, neither would believe what 
they presently believe. Both have motives, 
subjective reasons, for holding the belief that 
they do hold." (Szabados, 1973, p.204) 
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Wishful thinking is a case of believing something because the wishful 
thinker wishes it to be true. The wish is a reason for believing 
that£ and it provides the agent with a motive for acting in such a 
way as to promote having the belief that£· The wish, therefore, 
provides reasons of two kinds: firstly, the reason for believing that 
£and secondly, reasons for acting in such a way as to generate the 
belief that .E.· 
"The wish that .E. were the case ••. can easily 
engender a desire to be a believer in .E_, and 
this desire can prompt thoughts and actions that 
emphasize or result in obtaining reasons of the 
second kind. (There is nothing) necessarily 
irrational in this sequence. An intentional 
action that aims to make one happy or to relieve 
distress is not in itself irrational. Nor does 
it become so if the means employed involve trying 
to arrange matters so that one comes to have a 
certain belief." (Davidson, 1985, p.143) 
So, even though the belief is caused by a desire, the belief and the 
other consequences of that desire are not necessarily irrational. Merely· 
wishing something to be true is not on its own an obstacle to sanely 
believing it. For example, one of the most prevalent cases of wishful 
thinking is surely the wish that "X loves me". Emma's desire, that is 
the wish that Tim returns her love, causes her to want to believe that it 
is the case that Tim loves her. The negation of the belief in Tim's love 
would distress her too much, so she clings to the wishful belief which 
makes her happy. In other words, her desire for Tim's love is a reason 
for her belief that he loves her. Moreover, she may manoeuvre circum-
stances in such a way that may seem to support her favoured belief---she 
ensures that she always sits next to him at functions; she wangles in-
vitations to his parties; she engages him in conversation at all oppor-
tunities, etc. The fact that they are always together may, in turn, 
provide her with a reason for believing that he loves her. There is 
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nothing necessarily irrational in Emma•s cunning arrangement of matters. 
Emma is guilty of wishful thinking, but she actively tries to orchestrate 
circumstances in such a way as to provide rational support for her wish-
ful belief. What would make it irrational is if there is evidence 
stacked against the belief----if, for example, Tim has stated on many 
occasions that she should stop pestering him. 
In wishful thinking the person wishes that! were true and he believes 
that!' although he lacks good grounds for believing it. (Just how. the 
wish that! causes the belief that! via the Freudian shortcut will be 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5). The wish causes the belief 
where there is no evidence for the belief or, at the most minimal counter-
evidence. Bach states (1981, p.351) that wishful thinking need not 
involve any reasoning or semblance of reasoning. The wishful thinker 
imagines some state of affairs, likes what he imagines, wishes that it 
were the case, and supposes that it will come about. He does not try to 
justify this supposition, perhaps he is content with the lack of evidence. 
This would be a case of passive wishful thinking, where the desire is the 
reason for holding the belief, but there is no attempt on the part of the 
wishful thinker to act in such a way as to provide himself with a reason 
which "justifies" his holding the belief that!· Self-deception may 
start with the kind of wishful thinking of above, but what must be added 
to this case of wishful thinking to make it self-deception are grounds 
against !; the minimal counter-evidence grows into strong counter-evidence 
of which the person is aware and of the need to deal with it. Whereas 
the wishful thinker believes on too little evidence, the self-deceiver 
believes against over-whelming evidence. The wishful thinker does not 
actively pervert the rational procedures whereby truth and falsehood are 
established. He may actively try to orchestrate optimal conditions as 
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lending support for the favoured belief, but he still operates within 
limits of the rational procedures, exploiting them for his own use. 
However, as Szabados points out: 11 a crucial point of dissimilarity 
between wishful thinking and self-deceit is that in self-deceit the 
evidence is against the belief held. Once this is pointed out to the 
person involved; if he then proceeds to resist, by ingenious tactics, 
the natural implications of the evidence, we feel that he is self-deceivedH. 
(1973, p.205) I shall return to the example of Emma to show how wishful 
thinking differs from self-deception on the grounds of strong counter-
evidence. Emma wishes that Tim loves her. Her wish causes her to form 
the belief that Tim loves her. This belief is irrational in that it is 
caused by a wish and that there is no evidence on which the belief is 
based. However, there is no telling counter-evidence either: Tim is 
always friendly to everyone, including Emma; he does talk to her on 
occasion; he has never said that he does not love her. The absence of 
strong counter-evidence allows Emma the latitude in which she can form 
I 
the favoured belief. It is, of course, irrational for Emma to misconstrue 
the absence of strong counter-evidence as an indication of supporting 
evidence- the fact that he has never said that he does not love her, 
she concludes, must mean that he does love her. However, for Emma to 
be a candidate for self-deception, there is not merely an absence of 
strong counter-evidence, there must actually be strong eounter-evidence 
of which she is aware: Tim has refused all her advances; he never 
returns her telephone-calls; he has even asked her to stop bothering him. 
The evidence is now too strong to allow her to hold, fairly comfortably, 
the belief that Tim loves her. The 11 ingenious tactics 11 to which Szabados 
refers are the various self-deceptive projects on which she may now embark. 
The rational person would, of course, at this stage abandon his belief, 
but the self-deceiver tenaciously clings to his belief, while deliberately 
58 
ignoring the strong counter-evidence or explaining it away. The 
self-deceived Emma may maintain that Tim does really love her, but he 
is too shy to show his real feelings; or she may blame Tim•s antipathy 
on his parents who she claims have indoctrinated him against her 
because of her humble background; even when Tim announces his engage-
ment to someone else, she may state that this is merely a ploy on his 
behalf to appease his parents, but that he will soon elope with her. 
The difference between the wishful thinker and the self-deceiver is that 
the wishful thinker, in the absence of evidence, has only one belief, 
the irrational but pleasing belief, "X loves me". The self-deceiver, 
however, is faced with strong evidence which forces her, as a rationally 
competent being (the case of irrationality I am interested in is, after 
- all, that of the person who is competent and able to avoid the irrationality) 
to form the belief, "X does not love me". But she perversely holds on 
to the favoured belief, "X loves me". Whereas in wishful thinking the 
agent has one belief, the self-deceiver is faced with two contrary beliefs. 
Wishful thinking does not operate in a context of mental conflict whereas 
self-deception does; the conflict between the two contrary beliefs or 
the conflict between the favoured belief and the counter-evidence.(5) 
In wishful thinking there is no contradiction, whereas in self-deception 
there is a natural tension: "the sense of the evidence against! pulls 
one away from the deception and threatens to break down one•s defences; 
the motivation and weakness that sustain the deception pull against one•s 
grip on the evidence and threaten to overthrow one•s perception of the 
truth". (Audi, 1982, p.140) 
There are many cases of self-deception that have started as cases of 
wishful thinking which then grew 11 Stubborn and perverse".(Haight, 1980, p.2) 
Wishful thinking shades into self-deception, with no clear line between 
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them. It can be hard to say at what point the facts begin to show 
not just a lack of evidence for£, or minimal counter-evidence for£, 
but constitute evidence against it. Or, as Davidson would put it, it 
would be difficult to tell just when the evidence against the belief is 
heavier than that in favour of the belief. Pears points out (1974, p.103) 
that in wishful thinking the wish does not flout the precept 11 Accommodate 
your beliefs to your evidence... What it does flout is a different 
precept of reason: 11 Get all the available evidence you need11 • As a 
rational being it may be a form of irrationality to ignore one's suspicion 
that there might be counter-evidence, but the person who does not collect 
all the available evidence is not being inconsistent. This view of 
wishful thinking overlaps with a large area of self-deception, namely 
those cases of 11weak11 self-deception in which the ambiguous evidence allows 
the person to ignore those facts which he suspects might tell against the 
favoured belief. He accommodates his belief to only part of the 
I 
·evidence~this is made possible by the latitude of interpretation which 
the evidence allows-and deliberately ignores or refuses to investigate 
facts he suspects to be counter-evidence. He is, of course, being 
irrational, but not yet internally inconsistent. It is only when he 
collects all the available evidence, and is aware that he is forced, by 
the overwhelming facts, to form a contrary belief and yet stubbornly 
clings to the favoured belief, that the irrationality deepens. This 
would be Pears' point of distinction between the wishful thinker and the 
11 hard11 self-deceiver. The self-deceiver no longer is able to accommodate 
his favoured belief to his evidence. A further distinction between the 
two is that at this point the self-deceiver is forced to hold two contrary 
beliefs, whereas the wishful thinker holds only one belief. And yet, 
for the self-deceiver to be guilty of internal inconsistency, he would, in 
addition, have to flout his accepted second-order principle that he ought 
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to accept that belief most strongly favoured by the evidence. 
Davidson (1985, p.143) notes a further similarity between wishful thinking 
and self-deception in that both can at times be benign. The parent 
may think his child more intelligent than what the teacher or I.Q. test 
evaluate him as being. There are, of course, psychological results 
which support the finding that the child may in fact do better through 
being thought more intelligent. However, a case of self-deception will 
develop when the discrepancy between results and evaluation is just too 
great to sustain the belief in the child's genius. Davidson offers an 
example of"charitable self-deception aided by wishful thinking" in which 
a wife, in order to keep the family peace, may ignore the lipstick mark 
on her husband's collar. Both these cases of self-deception aided by 
wishful thinking have a motivational element at work: the parent hopes 
that his child is more intelligent than others think him to be and so 
motivates him to live up to this standard; the wife wishes to preserve 
the family stability. I mentioned earlier on that self-deception can at 
times be benign, but at times it can have also a destructive motivational 
element. It is this which is another difference between wishful thinking 
and self-deception. "In wishful thinking belief takes the direction of 
positive affect, never of negative; the caused belief is always welcomeo 
This is not the case with self-deception. The thought bred by self-
deception may be painful." (Davidson, 1985, p.144) Even if the depressed 
wishful thinker wants everyone to hate him and holds the erroneous belief 
that everyone hates him, he will still, however perverse it may seem to us, 
welcome the realization of this belief----it will make him happy if every-
one were to hate him. The self-deceiver's belief, on the other hand, 
may be painful to that person. The wife who has deceived herself that 
her husband is being unfaithful may find "evidence" everywhere which 
confirms her worst suspicions. 
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Another characteristic of self-deception then is that the self-deceiver 
is faced with conflicting beliefs, but accepts the favoured belief even 
though there is strong counter-evidence. According to Pears, one of 
the most distinctive differences between wishful thinking and self-
deception is the difference of the motivational aspect of all cases of 
wishful thinking and those cases of "cold" self-deception which are un-
motivated by desires. All cases of wishful thinking are motivated by 
desires, whereas there are cases of self-deception in which the irrationality 
of the belief is due to an intellectual perversion of reason, unmotivated 
by desires. Although Pears makes much of these "cold" cases, I do think 
that these cases constitute only a small minority. However, in the next 
chapter I shall look briefly at "cold" cases of self-deception. 
* * * * * * 
In this chapter I have tried to draw certain boundaries around the concept 
of self-deception. It has proved to be a difficult task for I have found 
that self-deception, like a corpulent lady, cannot be forced into an all-
confining corset, but bulges beyond the confines of the various theoretically 
imposed restrictions. On the one hand, self-deception shades into delusion 
in which there is a certain avoidance or perversion of rea 1 i ty. On the 
other hand, self-deceivers seem to be guilty of cunning pretence and 
hypocrisy. Self-deception differs from intellectual incompetence and yet 
self-deception itself involves the usurpation of rationality. Further-
more, self-deception is often used to facilitate akrasia and, conversely, 
akrasia is often called into the employ of self-deception. It seems as 
though wishful thinking is the start of many forms of self-deception, but 
it is difficult to identify the point at which self-deception ceases to be 
wishful thinking. Is it when there is strong counter-evidence, or is it 
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when the agent deliberately refuses to collect all available evidence? 
I do not pretend to have found all the answers to the many shifting 
subtle difficulties in defining a definite demarcation, separating self-
deception from other related phenomena. In fact, I suspect that if a 
too definite border strictly separating self-deception from these other 
phenomena is established, there may be the danger of the theory not 
being in keeping with the actual phenomenon. Self-deception is, in its 
very execution dynamic, constantly shifting and adapting. 
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Notes 
1. I have used the term "awareness" rather than "knowledge". 
"Awareness" allows more flexibility and latitude. It can 
incorporate all the notions of mere suspicion, belief and 
knowledge. Although "knowledge" is not the same as "certainty", 
it does, however, have a more rigid connotation than "awareness". 
2. Non-awareness of the inconsistency of his beliefs or of the weight 
of the counter-evidenc~ may, of course, be the result of successful 
self-deception. However, I hold with Pears that the self-deceiver's 
reason for initiating the project of self-deception is his uncom-
fortable suspicion, belief or knowledge of the inconsistency in his 
belief-system. 
3. In Chapter 4 I shall discuss a case of self-deception which does not 
involve the self-deceiver•s holding the belief that!; all he does 
is to avoid the sustained or recurrent thought that not-p. Although 
I do discuss it as a case of self-deception;. I regard if-as a 
peripheral case between self-deception and wishful thinking. The 
characteristics I am highlighting in this chapter refer to the typica1 
cases of self-deception. 
4. This differes from the views of both Aristotle and Davidson who see 
akrasia not as an action which fails to conform to the agent•s final 
value-judgment, but who see the akrates as being guilty of irrational 
reasoning which leads to an irrational final value~judgment. The 
action conforms to the final value-judgment, but because this is in 
itself irrational, the corresponding action is also irrational. For 
Davidson, the akratic "fault" occurs within the agent•s reasoning 
(it is incomplete) and not 11 between" his reasoning and his actions. 
This view brings the irrationality of akrasia much more in line with 
the irrationality of self-deception, since both are failures within 
reason itself. However, I wish to confine my study to self-deception 
proper, and wish to draw attention to similarities and differences 
with other related phenomena which demonstrate degrees of self-
deception, without being enticed into a full discussion of those 
phenomena themselves. 
5. It may seem that the conflict between the favoured belief and its 
counter-evidence necessarily entails a conflict between two contrary 
beliefs, the favoured belief and the rational belief based on the 
available evidence. However, as pointed out in note.(8) of 
Chapter 1, there are those who hold that self-deception does not 
necessarily mean that the opposite belief is formed. This form of 
self-deception will be more fully discussed under the concept of 
"evasion" in Chapter 4. 
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CHAPTER 3 
CAUSES AND STRATEGIES OF SELF-DECEPTION 
In this chapter I shall first look at the causes of irrationality in 
general, and then~more specifically at how these causes operate in cases 
of self-deception. In the previous chapter I noted some causes of 
irrationality, such as intellectual incompetence and being in the grip 
of some external force. Other causes of irrationality may include 
negligence, impetuosity, fatigue, etc., bringing about a case of incon-
sistency and irrational belief-formation. However, "it is not clear 
that there is a genuine case of irrationality unless an inconsistency in 
the thought of the agent can be identified, something that is inconsistent 
by the standards of the agent himself." (Davidson, 1985, p.138)(my emphasis.). 
I have already mentioned in the previous chapter the distinction made by 
Davidson between external irrationality, an individual •s failure to adhere 
to general standards of rationality, and internal irrationality, a failure 
of coherence and consistency within the individual •s belief system. 
Cases of external irrationality appear to be irrational to us, and cases 
of internal irrationality are irrational by the agent's own standards. 
Both cases are obviously irrational, a failure of reason, but only the 
cases of internal irrationality are paradoxical, exhibit an inner incon-
sistency, such as in some cases of intentional self-deception. What is 
important to note is that not all cases of self-deception necessarily 
entail inner inconsistency. In Chapter 1 I mentioned cases of "weak" 
self-deception in which the agent relies on the latitude the evidence allows 
in interpretation to support his favoured belief. He is, of course, being 
irrational for the rational person would first garner more conclusive 
evidence before forming his belief. If the self-deceiver does not hold a 
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higher, second~order principle such as the requirement of total evidences 
he does not violate his own standards and is, therefore, not guilty of 
inner irrationality. It is still a problematic case of irrationality, 
but the paradox has been considerably weakened. However, the case of 
self-deception that is of particular philosophic interest is, of course, 
that of- interna 1 i rrati ona 1 ity. Furthermore, it must be noted that 
"weak" self-deception may also display inner irrationality. In "weak" 
self-deception the agent, for example, evades the unwelcome belief that 
not-..E_; the action is not in itself necessarily irrational, but if he holds 
the second-order principle, the requirement of total evidence for inductive 
reasoning, and still avoids collecting suspected damaging evidence, he is· 
guilty of inner irrationality. So too the self-deceiver who has better 
reasons for believing that not-..E_, but accepts the belief that ..E_, will 
only be· guilty of inner irrationality if he, at the same time, holds the 
second-order principle that he ought to accept that proposition for which 
there are better reasons. This distinction between external and internal 
irrationality is of great importance, since some causes of external irra-
tionality (such as incompetence and fatigue) are not causes of internal 
irrationa-lity or necessarily of intentional self-deception. I shall 
examine other causes of external irrationality as listed by Pears (1984,ch.2) 
and will look at how these following causes can be operational in cases 
of self-deception. 
The first cause is that of misperception. It is easy to see how someone's 
misperception of, say, a price-tag may lead to the formation of a false 
belief that the Porsche costs only R1 ,000. This is obviously a case of 
mistaken belief, but not of inner inconsistency. For there to be inner 
inconsistency there must be two (or more) inconsistent beliefs and a second-
order principle which give rise to mental conflict. However, the correct 
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price-tag, i.e. R100,000 may never have been registered in the man's 
mind in the first place, and this would, therefore, be a case of mistaken 
belief and not of internal irrationality, since the correct price did 
not constitute "material already in the mind". (Pears, 1984, p.6) 
This is a clear case of misperception of evidence caused by short sight. 
This type of misperception due to a physiological defect cannot be a cause 
of intentional self-deception, since in the case of a mistaken belief due 
to misperception there is no furtherinput in the mind, which will challenge 
the person's erroneous belief. Since there is only the mistaken belief 
in the person's mind, there can be no mental conflict generated by an -
opposing belief. And in the previous chapter I have shown that mental 
conflict is a characteristic of intentional self-deception. If, however, 
the keen Porsche fan does not suffer from any physiological defect, and 
still misreads the price-tag because he wants it to be the case that the 
Porsche costs only R1 ,000 we have a case of motivated misperception, a 
case closer to self-deception and to which I shall return presently. 
The next cause is that of forgetting which seems to steer us in the 
direction of problematic irrationality because the information has been 
registered in the mind at some stage. However, before this forgotten. 
information can be used, either rationally or irrationally, it needs to 
be retrieved. If it is not retrieved, the information is not in the focus 
of attention and is, therefore, not available for processing. Penelhum 
notes that when the information is not registered in a person's mind or, 
in other words, if the person does not 11 know the evidence, we have not self-
deception but ignorance ... (1964, p.88) A case of genuine forgetting, then 5 
is not an example of self-deception. The point I am labouring here is 
that genuine forgetting and misperception due to a physiological defect 
can be causes of mistaken belief-formation. However, the agent who forms 
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and holds these mistaken beliefs may be judged by others as being 
irrational, but he is not irrational according to his own standards. 
In other words, instances of incompetence such as misperception and 
forgetting may be causes of external irrationality, but are not causes 
of internal irrationality. There is no evidence registered in the mind 
to challenge existing beliefs, no evidence registered in the mind that 
leads to the formation of a contrasting belief, and, therefore, no mental 
conflict. _That incompetence gives rise to irrationality is clear, 
but unmot_ivated incompetence (such as genuine forgetting or misperception 
due to a physiological defect) is not applicable to cases of intentional 
self-deception in which one of.the characteristics of the self-deceiver 
is that he is a rational being who is both able and competent to detect 
and avoid irrationality. 
However, what needs to be distinguished are cases of misperception of 
_evidence caused by short sight or genuine bad memory and cases of deliberate 
misperception of evidence or intentional forgetting. The interesting 
question which now arises is what generates the failure to know or have 
the evidence. If the person deliberately ignores or is motivated to 
disregard or repress unwelcome beliefs, we are much closer to a case of 
problematic irrationality and self-deception. What seems to generate the 
irrationality in self-deception is a rebellious wish, which leads to a 
desire-influenced manipulation of evidence. Freud has shown that a wish 
can often manipulate reason, and by forwarding this view, he has over-
thrown the traditional view of reason as a completely independent force, 
stronger in some people than in others; as a force that allows no inter-
fering with its inner working. Cases of motivated irrational belief-
formation and action, such as deliberate misperception and forgetting, which 
are caused by a wish are termed 11 hOt 11 cases of irrationality by Pears, 
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following a usage in psychology. In "hot" cases the agent's wish 
for something causes him to form an irrational belief through deliberate 
misperception or wilful ignoring of counter-evidence. 
As I have discussed in the section on wishful thinking in Chapter 2, a 
belief that is caused solely by a wish is an irrational belief, for a 
desire is a completely inappropriate cause for a belief (except for beliefs 
such as the belief that I have that particular desire). In a "hot" case 
of Self-deception, therefore, the cause of an irrational belief is the 
wish to believe that£· By forming an irrational belief, the self-deceiver 
typically relieves some of the stress of the painful thoughts caused by 
things beyond his control. Although motivated irrational belief-formation,. 
or self-deception, poses no great problem to the practitioner, it does pose 
a problem for philosophy. Philosophically, it needs to be explained why 
the self-deceiver's immediate goal is a belief; a belief, moreover, that 
seems very ··likely to be false in relation to the available evidence. 
Surely the self-deceiver's ultimate goal is the real thing? The dying 
cancer patient does not have as goal the formation of the belief, "I am 
not dying of cancer", but wishes rather that it were the case that he is 
. not dying of cancer. Pears asks the question (1984, p.11) of how anyone 
can aim at belief in the real thing instead of the real thing itself. 
The agent faced with unwelcome evidence has two choices: firstly, he can 
try to change the real world to such an extent that the altered world wi11 
produce the satisfying belief---this, however, normally proves too 
difficult a task, for how will the cancer patient make it the case that 
he is not dying of cancer?----or, secondly, if the task of changing the 
world is too difficult to accomplish, the agent's wish goes for the belief 
instead, that belief that will give pleasure, i.e. the belief, "I am not 
dying of cancer". Therefore, if to change the world to suit his favoured 
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belief proves too difficult, the agent can follow a short-cut and form 
the favoured belief without, or even against, the supporting evidence. 
The reason for forming the belief is his desire for the pleasure that the 
favoured belief will give him. When self-deception~ like wishful 
thinking, is governed by the pleasure principle, it goes straight for the 
belief if the real thing is too difficult to achieve. In this case, when 
self-deception is caused by a wish, the self-deceiver then is a person 
"who wrongly believes something to 1be"'true which he would not have believed 
to be true in the absence of the particular interest in the matter concerned 
that he. bas". (Gardiner, 1970, p.242) Although this definition illustrates 
the motivation of the self-deceiver, it does not offer a clear-cut 
distinction between self-deception and mere wishful thinking. As I've 
discussed in Chapter 2, the wishful thinker too forms a belief because he 
wants the pleasure that holding the belief will give him, but only the 
self-deceiver's wish goes further: it motivates the person to ignore wil-
fully or to avoid deliberately strong counter-evidence. Because the world 
is too difficult to change, the agent's wish goes for the promotion and 
acceptance of the favoured belief instead. Pears notes that the wish may 
have different goals: its goal is either to form the favoured belief in 
order that it will give the agent pleasure~ or it may have as goal simply 
to eliminate an uncomfortable belief, or its goal may be to make it easier 
for the agent to give in to a temptation (a desired action) by eliminating 
a belief that stands in the way. I shall examine the first two goals 
only, for the third leads into a discussion of akrasia which, although it 
shares many similarities with self-deception, is yet distinct from it as 
I have shown earlier on. I want to confine my study to self-deception 
proper. Not only are there different goals that the wish can have, but 
it can also operate either secretly or openly. It operates openly when the 
person acknowledges the preference for another goal, or it operates 
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surreptitiously by screening itself from the agent's consciousness. 
But the question of just how the wish operates will have to be suspended 
for now. I shall return to the actual mechanisms whereby a wish causes 
a belief in Chapter 5. What I want to point out here is the fact that 
a rebellious wish is a cause of self-deception. 
In order to illustrate the above cause of "hot" cases of self-deception, 
I shall ~se Pears' example of a girl who has a lot of evidence that her 
·lover is unfaithful, but she does not believe it. (1984, p.44) This 
constitutes a case of what people will term typical self-deception. Let 
· me first show how misperception and forgetting in this case need not 
necessarily make the girl guilty of practising self-deception, even though 
-she is holding an irrational belief in her lover's faithfulness. When 
she entered the restaurant where her lover was entertaining another woman$ 
she may not have recognized him for she may have left her spectacles at 
home. -Even though she still firmly holds the belief that he is faithful, 
she cannot be accused of self-deception, for the counter-evidence is never 
registered in her mind. On the other hand, she may have recognized him 
- with the woman, but because her work schedule since the encounter has been 
so overloaded, she has genuinely forgotten that she had actually seen him 
with her rival. Again, she cannot be accused of self-deception, for the 
memory has not been suppressed deliberately because of its fearful impli~ 
cations, but it has truly slipped her mind. The information, although 
once briefly registered, is now forgotten. We, as spectators, perhaps 
assess her belief as irrational but we cannot assess it as part of an in-
tentional. project of self-deception: the girl is not experiencing a mental 
conflict between two contradictory beliefs, nor does she experience a 
mental conflict that needs to be resolved somehow between the evidence and 
her belief. There is no deliberate perversion within the reasoning 
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process since she has not registered the evidence as evidence of her 
lover's unfaithfulness. 
But the more interesting case is, of course, if she does not want to 
acknowledge her lover's unfaithfulness, or if she wants to believe that 
he is faithful because it is too painful to face the opposite possibility. 
This_is a "hot" case of self-deception. In the first case the wish has 
as goal the elimination of the uncomfortable belief or suspicion that he 
is not faithful. The wish can lead her to deliberately avoid evidence_ 
.that may support this distressing suspicion, and by motivated evasion of 
damaging evidence the distressing belief now stands unsupported and is, 
therefore, eliminated. Another way in which the wish to eliminate the 
unwelcome belief operates is to suppress it into the unconscious, a form 
of motivated forgetti~g. On the other hand, the wish can_have_a~ its 
goal the_actual formation of an irrational counter-belief, one that will 
give her pleasure. Th.e pleasing belief that her lover is faithful is 
caused by_ the wish which perverts her reason and allows her to form the 
irrational belief. 
In the above discussion, the motivation for self-deception is provided by 
a wish for some desirable goal. But there need not always be a desirable 
goal. Pears notes that self-deception can be caused also by fear or 
jealousy. This supports Davidson's observation, noted in the previous 
chapter, that self-deception need not always be benign, which distinguishes 
it from wishful thinking. These emotions often lead the self-deceiver to 
form unpleasant beliefs against the available evidence and the promptings 
of reason. It seems strange that the wish should aim at an intrinsically 
unpleasant belief, one that causes distress. Fear may make someone run 
away; the fear causes him to want to run away; he wishes to avoid an 
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unpleasant situation. Similarly, when jealousy makes someone retaliate, 
it causes him to want to do so; he wishes to eliminate a rival. It 
is easy to see how fear or jealousy causes people to want to act in a 
certain way, but it is difficult to see how fear or jealousy causes people 
"to want, in the ordinary open way, to form exaggerated beliefs," (Pears, 
1984, p.43), moreover, an ~xaggerated belief that will bring about pain. 
Fear and jealousy can cause self-deception, but if self-deception involves 
a wish causing a belief, then it is difficult to see the justification 
for postulating a wish in the cases of fear or jealousy. Pears notes 
(1984, p.43) that"(i)f it does involve a wish in these emotional cases, it 
is not a wish that is felt by the subject. We would have to postulate 
that it is kept in the background and operates surreptitiously." :The 
self-deceiver is not aware that the object of the wish is the formation 
of the intrinsically unpleasant belief. He is not aware of the operation 
of the wish but may, of course, be aware of the ulterior goal of the wish, 
i.e. his safety or the elimination of a rival. The first step that needs 
to be taken by the wish in order to achieve its ulterior goal is the for.-
mation of the necessary belief. But in cases of fear and jealousy-
motivated self-deception, this does not happen. In these cases there is 
a wish for the ulterior goal "but nature takes over at this point and sets 
up an emotional programme that ensures its achievement. The plan is 
nature's and not the person's, and that is why the formation of the in-
trinsically unpleasant belief is not felt to be the object of the wish". 
\ 
(p. 44) . However, to shift the burden of the paradox from person 
to "nature" does not simplify the problem. At a later stage I shall 
return to this question of the self-deceiver's reliance on the "discreet 
operation" of the wish. What is of importance at this stage is that in 
cases of desire-motivated self-deception the wish forE has as its inter-
mediate goal the belief that£, the "messenger with good news", when E is 
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too difficult to bring about in the real world. However, in cases of 
fear or jealousy-motivated self-deception, the person is not aware of 
the operation of the wish that forms the intrinsically unpleasant belief 
that£, but is aware only of the ulterior goal, a goal that will produce 
satisfaction. 
So far it seems as though failures of rationality are produced either by 
a rebellious wish or by incompetence. Pears notes (1984, p.9) that 
-another possibility has come to the fore in the last twenty years. 
Cognitive psychologists have devised experiments which show that, even 
when no wish is operating, a failure of rationality need not necessarily 
be produced by incompetence(1). Even though the agent is perfectly 
capable of processing the information correctly and is also aware of the 
principles for correct processing, he can still make errors in rationality. 
The cause for these errors in rationality is that "reason itself has 
. certain bad habits that produce them ... ( p. 9). It would, therefore, 
be a mistake to attribute a failure of rationality to either incompetence 
or a wish. Pears terms these errors which have a purely intellectual 
source as 11 Cold11 cases of irrationality. In desire-motivated or 11 hOt 11 
cases of irrational belief-forma~ion the cause of an irrational belief 
is the wish to believe that .E.· A desire is an inappropriate cause for a 
belief (except for beliefs such as the belief that he has that desire) and 
it is, therefore, irrational. However, in 11 cold 11 cases of irrational 
belief-formation the cause of the irrational belief is generally appropriate, 
but the operation is faulty. The reasoning itself is pure, but its 
operation is incomplete. Thus, in "cold" cases, reason has it own 
perversions. 
"Just as Freud had shown that many faults 
attributed to incompetence or chance are 
really motivated, so too these experiments 
74 
have identified a further range of faults 
that neither belong to the province of chance 
nor are the result of ordinary incompetence. 
For people make them without the incitement 
of any wish in areas in which they are quite 
capable of proceeding correctly and even-
understand the principles of correct procedure. 
Of course, we may, if we like, classify them 
as a special kind of incompetence, but the 
important point is that they are not the kind 
of incompetence that we attribute to a person 
who finds a task beyond him". (Pears, 1984, p.45) 
An example of a "cold" case of irrationality would be a case in which 
the agent gives salient evidence more weight than it is worth, or he 
may not know how to deal with statistical evidence, or he may attribute 
a person's behaviour to a particular disposition.when its real source is 
. ' 
something quite different, or he may obstinately hold on to a hypothesis 
even though evidence is telling heavily against it. It may be argued~ 
of course, that in this last case the person's wish that his hypothesis 
wi 11 be proved correct wi 11 motivate him to "mi sperceive" the evidence 
and will, thus, allow him to cling to the initial hypothesis. The 
scientist may wish to prove his hypothesis correct so that he will be 
respected for his intellectual astuteness. His desi·re for academic 
acclaim is a personal wish probably accompanied by emotion and, therefore~ 
"hot". Perversions of reasons do not, therefore, necessarily exclude 
any wish. Once again, there seems to be no definite boundary and 
exclusions: rather than a clear-cut difference between "hot" and "cold 11 
cases, there seems to be a gradation here. 
"There must be many cases in which they ("hot" 
and "cold" causes) co-operate in the production 
of error and some in which the co-operation is 
unnecessary, because each would have been 
sufficient by itself, in much the same way that 
a man facing a firing-squad can be killed by 
two simultaneous bullets in the heart". 
( p. 8) 
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The interpretation of the desire-motivated belief of the scientist 
holding onto his hypothesis despite strong counter-evidence is applicable 
since there can also be a possible interpretation of the irrationality 
in terms of a 11 Cold11 cause. For example, a medieval astronomer fonns 
the hypothesis that the earth revolves around the sun, even though the 
available evidence (Ptolemy's 11 established11 epicycles, the daily obser-
vation of the "moving .. sun, etc.) tells heavily against it. When one 
proof fails, he turns to another way of proving his initial hypothesis 
correct. When this fails he tries out yet a different experiment, but 
he has no personal stake in the outcome. But would we label this scientist 
as irrational? Is he guilty of a perversion of reason? Surely not. 
This brings me to an interesting issue. Some philosophers(2), will 
argue that the medieval scientist may have been unreasonable, a man of 
blind faith, but certainly not deceived. 11 (T)he person who believes in 
the face of adverse evidence might just be right. If that is so, then 
he is neither deceived nor self-deceived ... (Foss, 1980, p.238) Howevers 
self-deception and the self-deceptive project cannot be in a state of 
suspension until the success or failure of the belief is established. 
11 0eception 11 describes also what someone is engaged in doing, whatever the 
outcome. The verb 11 deceive 11 can, thus, be used in two different ways: 
the one way will include the eventual success of what the deceiver is 
doing, but the other way has a more restricted application in which the 
implications of success are in abeyance. This second way focuses ex-
clusively on the process in the deceiver's mind. So, whatever the out-
come, the deceiver is engaged in a deceptive project. Here the success 
of the project is in suspension, for the deceiver may fail to put the 
belief across, or the belief he puts across may turn out to be true 
(unbeknownst to the deceiver at the time of his deception.) But he is, 
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nevertheless, intent on deceiving the other person. In this restricted 
sense of "deceive" are there then grounds for accusing the medieval 
·scientist of being guilty of "cold" self-deception, even though his belief 
in the truth of the first hypothesis turns out later to have been 
justified? I think not because there is a shift in emphasis in the 
intention of the agent. The astronomer's intention is not to deceive 
others or to convince them to believe in the truth of his hypothesis. I 
think his intention is rather to pursue a cultivated hunch and to establish 
the truth of his hypothesis first for himself before trying to convince 
others. So it seems that the intention of doggedly trying to prove this 
hypothesis is the distinguishing factor between self-deception and blind 
faith (or scientific stubbornness). If the intention is to find proof 
to establish the admittedly then-implausible hypothesis, he does not seem 
to be guilty of self-deception. However, if his intention is to influence 
the thinking of his fellow scientists (or to influence his own thinking in 
a certain way as opposed to the objective pursuit of truth) regardless of 
whether the hypothesis turns out to be true or not, we may have a case of 
self-deception. 
I want to return to the other "cold" perversions of reason: the agent's 
susceptibility to salience. The competent agent is led astray in that 
the evidence against the plausible belief is more vivid or salient than 
the evidence for it (or evidence for the implausible belief is more vivid 
than the evidence against it). Just as reluctance to abandon a first 
hypothesis does not always involve a personal wish, so susceptibility to 
salience as a "cold'' perversion of reason need not necessarily involve an 
emotion. "It would be an obvious mistake to suppose that people attach 
too much weight to salient evidence because they prefer it, or prefer to be 
swayed by it." (Pears, 1984, p.10) 
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A third bad tendency that reason exhibits in the construction of 
beliefs is the habit of attributing a person's behaviour to a different 
disposition than the actual one. Pears (1984, p.46) notes that this 
intellectual perversion may take two forms. The first one is that of 
a mistaken attribution of a particular behaviour to a particular disposition. 
For example, Tim wants to buy cigarettes. He knows that the corner cafe 
stocks his brand and so he walks to the cafe and buys a packet. His 
reasoning and actions are rational. As a spectator, I may, however, 
erroneously attribute this behaviour to the above, rational disposition. 
Perhaps Tim is so distraught that he picks up a packet of cigarettes merely 
at random and is not even aware of the brand he has chosen. The real 
source of Tim's behaviour is something different to what I attribute his 
behaviou.r: I attribute rationality where no rationality exists and thus 
form the mistaken belief that Tim buys that particular brand because he 
1 i kes it. 
The second form of the error is the failure of the spectator to take account 
• 
of the circumstances of the action. I may attribute Tim's action of 
buying that particular brand to an obvious disposition----Tim's preference 
for that particular brand, when in fact his action may have issued from a 
less obvious disposition. Perhaps Tim has secretly given up smoking, 
but he buys those cigarettes because he knows that I smoke that particular 
brand. Tim's action is quite rational, but I made the mistake of attri-
buting it to a different di-sposition and, therefore, form the mistaken 
belief that Tim buys the cigarettes because he wants to smoke them. 
A fourth form of a perversion of reason is that of impartial rationalization. 
The rationalization may be an honest attempt, free from guilt, shame or 
personal gain, to explain a certain act. This "cold" rationalization is 
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not powered by any personal motive, for the self-deceiver may rationalize 
his own behaviour with the same complete impartiality with which he 
rationaJizes other people's behaviour, but which will lead him to form 
a mistaken belief. For example, the athlete whose prowess is failing 
may blame his poor performance on too many carousing late nights. When 
a fellow competitor also delivers an uncharacteristic poor performance, he 
may ascribe it to the same reasons as those for his own decline in achieve= 
ment. In other words, he rationalizes his opponent's defeat in exactly 
the same way as his own----or as he would his own, to exclude the obvious 
possibility' that he does so in order to give more credence to the ration= 
alizat-ion of his own defeat. 
lt is clear how these 11 Cold 11 perversions of reason may. lead to the formation 
of erroneous beliefs and, also of irrational beliefs, but how do these 
various 11 cold11 causes apply to self-deception? I shall return .to the 
example of the girl who has a lot of evidence that her lover is unfaithfuls 
but she does not believe it. When she recognizes her lover with another 
·woman, she may mistakenly attribute his intimate lunch-date with a woman 
to a mere'business committment, something which his job often demands. 
He is, in fact, exploiting her tendency to make this attribution error, and 
he is always careful to plan his illicit encounters over lunch-time so that9 
if confronted, he can appeal to the purely business requirements of his 
job. So, even though she is aware of his numerous lunch dates with the 
woman, she attributes his behaviour to the demands of his job, when in fact 
his lunch date issues from a different disposition. Her interpretation 
of the situation need not be motivated by personal desire, for she would 
have interpreted the behaviour of her friend's husband in exactly the same 
way. 
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Pears makes much of these 11 Cold11 cases of irrational belief-formation, 
but I do think that the central and most dominant cause of self-deception 
is that of a desire or a wish. It is no coincidence, I think, that self-
deception is usually practised in situations that have a high emotive 
factor: in situations of love, self-esteem, maternal feelings, fear of 
failure, etc. In later discussions of 11 weak11 and 11 hard11 cases of self-
deception I shall concentrate on desire-motivated caies, i.e. 11 hot 11 cases. 
In the following section which deals with the most common strategies of 
self-deception, I shall look at how these strategies aim at the desired 
belief, a belief backed by the agent's emotive involvement. 
Pears suggests (1984, p.61) three different strategies employed in self-
deception. Either self-deception operates directly on the contents of 
the mind in that it biases the processing of what is already in the mind, 
or it filters input into the mind, or there is the strategy operating 
through output, acting as if something were so in order to generate the 
belief that it is so, that is to act as if the desired belief were true. 
This last strategy is that of self-deception in the employ of akrasia, or 
what Pears terms self-deceptive akrasia. These three strategies do not 
necessarily operate separately, but they may also be employed as mutually 
reinforcing strategies. But more of this later on in the chapter. I 
have already made passing references to these various strategies of self-
deception, but I now want to look at them in more detail. In Chapters 4~6 
I shall be referring back to these strategies, when I discuss the 11 Weak 11 
and 11 hard 11 cases of self-deception which rely on either one or more of the 
following strategies for their success. 
The first strategy, and the most common in cases of "weak" self-deception, 
is that of self-deception operating through input. In Chapter 1 I looked 
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at various ways in which one person can deceive another and showed that 
depriving another person of relevant evidence is sometimes a way of 
deceiving him. Using this as a base for self-deception, I can say that 
controlling the input of information into one's own,mind counts as a 
strategy that may lead to self-deception. This strategy aims at preventing 
the evidence, which the agent suspects may be damaging to his favoured 
belief, from being registered in the mind and the key problem of internal 
irrationality is thereby avoided, provided the agent does not adhere to 
the se~ond-order principle of the requirement of total evidence, as 
discussed in the section on akrasia in the previous chapter. By deliber-
ately selecting evidence that supports the favoured belief or by wilfully 
avoiding suspected counter-evidence or even by highlighting the minimal 
evidence which will deflate the unwelcome belief, the self-deceiver care-
fully- selects the input into his mind. Pears maintains that if there is 
a paradox in self-deception when it is done in this way through filtering, 
"it will be the paradox of irrational action, because it is a kind of 
akrasia to avoid maximizing relevant evidence and to go for unfair examples". 
(1984, p.63) This paradox, however, applies only to the self-deceiver who 
knows he has better reasons (already registered in the mind) for accepting 
the negation of the proposition he accepts and who knows he ought to accept 
that proposition for which there are better reasons. For the self-deceive~ 
who filters reasons only for the acceptance of the proposition into his 
mind, and who avoids input of better reasons for accepting the negation of 
the proposition, the difficult problem of inner irrationality does not 
arise since "better•• reasons have not had a chance to be registered in the 
mind and he can happily accept the proposition on the basis of only the 
selected reasons which are registered in his mind. But matters are not 
as simple as that. I shall have to deal with Sartre•s point that in order 
to avoid the truth, the agent has to know very exactly just what that truth 
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is. However, I shall leave this problem aside for the time being, but 
shall return to it in Chapter 5. 
Sartre•s observation shows that evasion of relevant data implies purpose= 
fulness; it is not merely a random avoidance of information conducted in 
a haphazard way. The filtering of input or evasion of certain information 
implies -avoiding something by using skill, cunning and strategem. The 
practitioner has a suspicion or intimation that something unpleasant will 
be uncovered if he were to exercise his attention, reasoning or information-
gathering skills in a certain direction or on a certain topic. It is on 
the basis of this suspicion that he proceeds with avoidance tactics. Th~ 
strategy operating through input filters incoming information 11 into the 
mind-by avoiding looking for evidence where it seems likely that it will 
go against the favoured belief and by looking only where it seems likely 
that the evidence will support it ... (Pears, 1984, p.63) 
How will this strategy be employed by the girl who believes her lover to 
be faithful, despite strong counter-evidence? Her wish fer the faithfulness 
of her lover causes her to wish to believe that he is faithful. She forms 
and accepts this welcome belief. However, he has come home very late on 
various occasions, makes strange mumbled telephone calls, and has been seen 
with another woman at a certain cafe. The girl suspects that there is a 
possibility that he is not faithful and suspects that she may find something 
unpleasant if she were to delve too deeply. She is not prepared to under-
take an investigation into her lover's activities for this action carries 
with it the risk of discovering that he is not faithful. (It could, of 
course, also show that there is nothing suspicious about his activities, 
that the meetings are legitimate business meetings and that he is, in fact, 
quite faithful.) So whatever the outcome, she is not prepared to embark 
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on that first step. She thus avoids the cafe so that if there is a 
chance of her lover being there, she won't surprise him----the strong 
counter-evidence of his fidelity thus never arises for it is never allowed 
an opportunity to be registered in her mind. When he comes home late, 
she doesn't question him, in case he may say something she doesn't want 
to hear. Apart from avoiding likely damaging evidence she may also seek 
to promote supportive evidence for the favoured belief. She may seek 
out special occasions or do certain things which she knows makes him 
appreciative towards her. His appreciation of her culinary skills may 
then be seen by her as supportive evidence of his love and, therefore, his 
faithfulness. She is, thus, controlling the input into her mind and 
avoiding input that may lead her, as a competent rational being, to form 
and accept the unwelcome belief that he is not faithful. She avoids certain 
input because she wants to believe that her lover is faithful. By employing 
the strategy of selective input the self-deceiver either avoids the evidence 
for the unpleasant belief that not-.2_ or stresses the evidence for the welcome 
belief that£ without having to form and hold both beliefs, since to have 
a mere suspicion that not-..e. is not necessarily to have a strong belief 
that not-..e.. The girl is guilty of "weak" self-deception. Although her 
behaviour of not questioning her lover's dubious excuses, and of not con-
firming her suspicions may be judged irrational by us, it need not necessarily 
be internally irrational, or a genuine deviation from her own norms. However, 
if she holds the second-order principle, the principle of the requirement 
of total evidence, yet still refuses to acknowledge damaging evidence or 
deliberately seeks only evidence that supports her favoured belief, then 
she is guilty of inner inconsistency. In other words, if, as a rational 
competent being, she does hold this principle and yet flouts it by deliberately 
avoiding evidence for not-.E., then we are faced with the paradox of internal 
i rra tiona 1 i ty. 
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The·second strategy of self-deception operates through output. This 
brings us closer to self-deceptive akrasia., in which the agent acts as 
though the desired belief were true. The strategy generates the belief 
by a rather complex causal linkage, a mechanism by which the belief 
that one holds a belief makes itself true. Pears describes the workings 
of the mechanism in the following way: 
11 Because beliefs normally monitor themselves 
accurately, it is arr almost irresistible assumption 
that, if one believes that one holds a belief, that 
must be because one really does hold it and it is 
monitoring itself in the. usual way .••• The next 
thing that happens is that we rationalize the assump-
tion that the belief is monitoring itself in the 
usual way by actually acquiring the belief. This 
objective rationalization is possible only when the 
rationalizing object is in the mind. 11 (1984, p.59) 
This strategy of self-deception reverses the usual order of things, because 
the person acts in order to produce the belief that would normally support 
the action. In Fingarette•s account of self-deception (1969, ch.4), the 
strategy of behaving as if one already had the desired belief occupies the 
central place. To behave in such a way is to stimulate or fortify the 
belief on which it would be based in a rational structure. The complex 
causal linkage of the normal flow from belief and desire to action is re-
versed ·and the reversal is exploited by this particular strategy of self-
deception. ·Davidson (1985, p.143) points out that when we say 11 Charles 
has a reason to believe that £.11 , the meaning of 11 reason 11 is ambiguous; 
it can refer either to: 
(1) evidence one has for the truth of a proposition (a cognitive reason) 
or 
(2) it provides a motive for acting in such a way as to promote having 
a belief (an evaluative reason). 
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In the strategy which operates through output, the agent relies mainly 
on the second type of reason. In self-deception the wish that£ were 
the case can easily give rise to the wish to believe that£, and this 
desire in turn can lead to thoughts and actions (reasons of the second 
kind) aimed at or resulting in obtaining reasons of the first kind, 
cognitive reasons for holding that belief. For example, I am frightened 
of the dark, but wish that I were not scared while walking along the 
gloomy forest path. I am motivated by the desire not to be scared, so 
I whistle in order to keep the fear at. bay. I say, I can•t be frightened, 
look at the carefree way in which I whistle. In other words, my action 
provides evidence (a cognitive reason) for the belief that I am not 
frightened. The action in the first place has been ~otivated by the 
desire (I acted on something already in the mind) and the action, in turn 9 
provides evidence for the belief (I acted in order to put something in the 
mind). What must be distinguished is the two-fold role of the action: 
acting as a result of the desire to appear at ease, and acting in order 
to provide evidence for the belief that I am not scared. Furthermore, 
the action, motivated by the desire, can have as its aim either to suppress 
an unwelcome belief and to prevent it from arising (e.g. the girl who 
overburdens her already heavy workload so that there is no time to reflect 
on her lover•s infidelity) or to foster a belief (e.g. the girl who con~ 
stantly manoeuvres herself into her beloved•s company and so deduces from 
the fact that they are always together that he must love her). As 
Davidson notes, there is nothing necessarily irrational about performing 
an intentional action that aims to relieve fear or distress or to arrange 
matters so that one comes to have a certain belief. If one were to 
arrange matters in such a way as to instill a certain belief in someone 
else, the action may be regarded as immoral---especially if one knew or 
suspected the belief to be false---but it is not necessarily an irrational 
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action. So too, Davidson maintains, when one does this to one's 
future self (as in trying to instill in myself the belief that I am 
not scared, even though my knees are shaking at the time) the action 
is not necessarily irrational. What does make it irrational is if one 
continues to cling to the fostered belief even though one continues to 
think that the evidence against the belief is better than the evidence 
in its favour. Of course, if the desire produced the belief without 
providing any evidence in favour of the belief (albeit 11 evidence11 of 
one's cal~u~ated action), the belief is irrational. 
11 0ne usually does something because one has a 
reason for doing it, but in this kind of case 
the agent does something in order to give himself 
what woul~ have been a reason for doing it. The 
structure exploited by this strategy, though irra-
tional, is a familiar feature of our lives. There 
is the 'sour grapes• reaction of those who miss 
something good and what some call the 'sweet lemons' 
reaction of those who get something bad. This is 
the territory of cognitive dissonance ... 
(Pears, 1982, p.279) 
The operation of the mechanism of this strategy can be compared to the 
similar operation of a sense-perception mechanism. 11 (P)eople often 
think that they can see something that is not there for them to see, 
because they have inferred that it must be there, and then in a certain 
sense they really do 'see' it... (Pears, 1984, p.59) In other words, 
people often think that because they have acted in a certain way, they 
must have had a belief which gave rise to the action in the first place. 
By thinking that they had a belief on which the action was based, they 
then come to acquire that belief. 
Pears substantiates this view by referring to the experiments done by 
cognitive psychologists, in which students were asked to tell a lie, for 
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which they would receive payment. The assumption was that they were 
all opposed to lying, but the money was the motivating factor for akrasia. 
The assumption that they are all opposed to lying is an important one. 
It implies that the students strive to be moral. They, therefore, 
experience cognitive dissonance when their action of lying is in direct 
conflict with their accepted code of ethics. If they had no such code 
of ethics, the telling of the lie would not bother them in the first place, 
and there would thus be no need to embark on a self-deceptive project. 
The students who lied experienced cognitive dissonance after they had told 
the lie; they experienced two things which they found hardto accept 
together, i.e. the telling of the lie for money and the belief that lying 
is wrong. One way in which students tried to reduce the cognitive 
dissonance was that they altered their beliefs about the wrongness of 
telling the lie before they told it. Another possibility exists: the 
students told the lie against their own unbiased better judgement and 
altered their beliefs about the wrongness of lying only after they had 
told it. Cognitive psychologists term this approach to the lie as a 
11 Change of attitude... However, as Pears points out (1984, p.58), what 
strictly speaking occured was a change in factual belief, which produced 
a change in attitude towards the particular lie but not, of course, towards 
lying in general. The students rationalized after telling the lie by 
emphasizing the mitigating circumstances and said to themselves that the 
lie was, therefore, not a serious one. Apart from rationalizing, they 
also backdated their new belief and attributed it to themselves when they 
told the actual lie. By backdating this belief, the students in retro-
spect succeed in making for themselves the telling of the lie a "rational" 
act, rather than an akratic act, an irrational act against their better 
judgement. So not only did they have a new attitude to the particular 
lie, they also had a new belief about that attitude. The distinction that 
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Pears makes here is, of course, the distinction between holding a 
particular belief and believing that one is holding a particular belief. 
By referring to these experiments, Pears wants to stress the somewhat 
unfamiliar causal link in which action leads to belief. "It is normal 
for belief to lead to action, but it is possible for action to lead to 
belief." (Pears, 1984, p.60) 
Two distinguishable stages in the "output strategy" or"recoil strategy 11 , 
as Pears terms it, are noted: 
(1) The self-deceiver acts and by acting makes himself believe that he 
has the belief that justifies his action, and next 
(2) by believing that one holds a justifying belief, this latter belief 
becomes a permanent feature in his life. 
Subsequent actions will, therefore, re-inforce the self-deception. How 
will the girl use this strategy to deceive herself? She may be making an 
error about herself by inferring that, because she is continuing the 
relationship, she must believe that he is faithful. As a rational being~ 
she can make sense of her own behaviour only by representing it to herself 
as rational behaviour. She attributes to herself the belief that he is 
faithful; a belief that makes her action of continuing the relationship 
rational. Because she believes that she has the belief of his fidelity, 
this latter belief becomes a permanent feature in her life. Her continued. 
relationship, of course, reinforces the belief and in a case like this 
the later admission of the falsehood of the justifying belief will be more 
painful the longer the self-deception continues. She, of course, did not 
hold the justifying belief at the time when the self-deception was being 
initiated, because what she actually did was to continue the relationship 
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in spite of the belief that he was not faithful. A paradox I noted 
in Chapter 1 is that self-deception i~ a vice peculiar to people who 
strive to be rational; to people who wish to mask the irrationality or-
their belief or action from themselves. Just as the students who wish 
to evaluate themselves as moral agents expe~ience cognitive dissonance, 
and as a result embarked on a self-deceptive project, so the girl who 
wishes to evaluate herself as a rational being has to find a way in which 
her irrational action will be masked in a cloak of rationality. Her 
wish to rationalize her action generates the belief that wo1Jld normally 
support that action. Whereas in the employment of the first strategy, 
self-deception operating through input, the girl makes a mistake in inter-
preting her lover's behaviour, in the case of the second strategy she 
makes a mistake in interpreting her own behaviour. 
An additional illusion to this strategy is that when she achieves the· 
belief that she believes£, it will seem to her as if she is monitoring 
it directly, whereas it is inferential. A difficulty arises, however: 
"It might be objected that people cannot really make mistakes about their 
own beliefs; they can lie when they report them, but they cannot make 
mistakes about them.'' (Pears, 1984, p.48) Pears points out that this 
is not necessarily so. One common mistake the girl has made is a mistake 
about her past belief----nobody can doubt the possibility of this kind of 
mistake being made about a belief of some time back. Secondly, she can 
make mistakes about her own intentions. Often people say sincerely that 
they intend to do something when in fact they do not, as shown clearly by 
their actions. So, one can make mistakes about one's own beliefs, en-
suring the success of this strategy, and of self-deception in general, 
in everyday situations. 
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The third strategy operates directly on the contents of the mind. It 
biases the processing of what is already in the mind. 
"When the processing of information already in 
the mind is biased, there is seldom anything 
that the self-deceiver does in order to bias it. 
Sometimes, no doubt, he will avoid working out 
the implications of a belief, but usually the 
biasing is the direct effect of the wish and 
there is nothing that could be regarded as a plan ... {Pears, 1984, p.61-2) 
The normal processing of the contents of the mind follows the following 
sequenc~: achievement, belief in achievement and satisfaction. The 
wish, howev~r, exploits this sequence when actual achievement is too 
difficult to bring about. As I discussed in the section of a wish as a 
cause of self-deception, the biased sequence is as follows: the wish for 
achievement, the wish to believe that one has achieved, the belief in 
achievement and satisfaction. The wish aims at satisfaction and when 
actual achievement is not possible, the wish aims at the belief in achieve-
ment that will satisfy. The belief, therefore, is the "messenger with 
good news... The self-deceiver does not formulate a plan, but relies on 
the "boyanci' of the wish to generate the belief that will satisfy. The 
11 discreet operation" of the wish to believe that E keeps the self-deceiver 
ignorant of his own self-deception. However, if there is some plan which 
.. 
the self-dece.iver formulates, it will have to be ascribed to a sub-system 
within the person- a sub-system that will note the weaknesses in "the rest[' 
of the person and devise strategies to exploit them. This possibility 
wi 11 be dea 1 t with in the Theory of Sys terns in Chapters 5 and 6. 
A last note I want to add is that strategies are not always separately 
employed. Often two or more strategies are used to reinforce the irrational 
belief or action. The girl might be using the strategy of continuing to 
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act as if she believed him faithful in order to generate or fortify the 
justifying belief, but her action, on the other hand, may show selected 
avoidance of certain 11 danger areas 11 , such as the cafe or refraining 
from questioning him about his whereabouts. 
The self-deceiver employs the above strategies in order to mask some un-
pleasantness or to generate some satisfaction by holding a welcome (albeit 
irrational) belief or by avoiding an unwelcome belief. This is one 
striking difference between self-deception and other-deception. An other= 
deceiver can deceive someone else for no ulterior motive whereas the self= 
deceiver always does have an ulterior motive. 11 1t is •••• not clear 
what could be meant by or what justification there could be for, speaking 
of somebody as deceiving himself if it were at the same time contended 
that what he was said to be deceiving himself about was a matter of total 
indifference to him, in no way related to his wants, fears, hopes and 
so forth: could we, e.g., intelligibly talk about 'disinterested' or 
'gratuitous' self-deception?11 (Gardiner, 1970, p.242). Pears too feels 
that it is impossible for a person to deceive himself purely for the sake 
of deceiving himself. The reason for this is 11 the ineradicability of 
the desire for the truth of one's own beliefs 11 , whereas 11 the desire to 
impart truth to others is not ineradicable ... (Pears, 1984, ~.42). Although 
the truth of a person's beliefs is not always the ultimate goal, it does~ 
however, retain some attraction when he is forming the belief, especially 
since the self-deceiver with which I am concerned is a rationally able 
and competent person. 
Moreover, the strategy of self-deception which operates through output, 
acting as though the belief were true in order to make himself believe that 
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he has the belief, seems to have no exact parallel in the case of 
other-deception. The other-deceiver can hardly perform his victim's 
actions for him, and even if the other-deceiver acts as if the belief 
that he wants his victim to hold were true, it is the action of the 
deceiver that is rationalized and not the action of the victim.(3) 
Pears, however, feels (1984, p.62) that the parallelism between other-
deception and self-deception need not be so exact in order to justify 
the classification of the strategy which operates through output as a • 
method of self-deception. 
Kipp notes a further alleged difference between self-deception and other~ 
deception: "Normally, when attempted other-deception has obviously failed 
to dupe its intended victim, the deceiver resigns himself to admitting 
that the game is up, and abandons his project; but when attempted self-
deception has obviously failed in a similar way, the deceiver character-
istically intensifies his pretence, and persists in the game with desperate 
grotesqueness." (1980, p.313). I would certainly agree with Kipp that 
this does happen in most cases of self-deception and other-deception, but 
it does not necessarily happen in all cases. For example, the convicted 
criminal may persist in proclaiming his innocence even though he himself 
knows that he is guilty and his guilt has been proved beyond doubt to the 
judge. "The game is up", and yet he clings to the irrational belief that 
if he persists for long enough, the judge will believe him. Or the self-
deceiving terminally ill cancer patient may, after being confronted with 
further conclusive proof, accept that he is dying of cancer. Of course, 
when ••the game is up" there is no longer deception, other or self, but 
the main point I want to stress is that Kipp is not justified in regarding 
the above as a definite difference between self-deception and other-deception. 
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Kipp, however, does note a more striking difference between self-deception 
and other-deception: that of primary and secondary deception. In order 
to illustrate this point I shall return to the general definition of 
other-deception as offered in Chapter 
(1) A gets B to believe that R 
(2) A suspects/knows that R is false. 
A, the deceiver, knows the truth, yet intentionally gets B to believe the 
opposite. We have here primary deception only: the deception of B. 
A need not deceive himself about anything. He knows the truth; he knows 
that he intends to deceive B; he knows that he tells B something that is 
false. There is no mental conflict or inner irrationality here. However, 
when A deceives A, he knows the truth and yet persuades himself of some-
-thing which he knows is false (the epistemological paradox as discussed 
in Chapter 1). But, Kipp maintains, there is a further requirement for 
successful self-deception: the self-deceiver must not only reconcile 
simultaneously held, conflicting beliefs, i.e. aB£+aB-R (primary deception) 
he must also deceive himself about the belief that he holds conflicting 
beliefs, i.e. aB(aB£+aB-£) (secondary deception). Therefore, self-deception 
seems to require primary deception about some unwe 1 come belief, as we 11 as 
secondary deception about the unwelcome belief that he holds two incompatible 
beliefs. Again, I disagree with Kipp that this is a difference between 
a 11 conceivable forms of self-deception and other-deception. In 11 Weak" 
forms of self-deception successful deception can take place without 
necessarily forming the opposite belief. Successful self-deception may 
be attained by merely avoiding the unwelcome belief without necessarily 
holding an opposite belief.(4) The question of secondary deception does, 
therefore, not arise. It may be argued, of course, that the self-deceiver 
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must, in a way, be unaware of the fact that he is deceiving himself, if 
his deception is to be successful. He is, therefore, deceiving himself 
about deceiving himself, which is a form of secondary deception. This 
may well be so, but the point I am making is that Kipp•s formulation of 
secondary deception, i.e. the deception about the belief that one holds 
conflicting beliefs, is not applicable in cases of "weak" self-deception. 
However, in cases of "hard" self-deception, the agent does hold conflicting 
beliefs and. for this kind of self-deception to be successful, secondary 
deception does seem to be a vital requirement. 
The above differences between self-deception and other-deception raise 
the question of whether the model of other-deception can then be used as 
a basis for self-deception. I do not, however, regard these small 
differences as constituting a threat to the justifiability of using the 
other-deception model. After· all, as I mentioned before in Chapter 1, a 
step-by-step analogy is not possible, for the logic of other-deception 
does not march exactly in step with that of self-deception. But what I 
am aiming for is to examine "analogies and similarities with cases of 
deception ~roper that are sufficient to make the reflexive extension of 
the concept appear, within limits, reasonably appropriate. But the instances 
themselves will form a variegated spectrum, and the analogies can in any 
event never be more than partial ones". (Gardiner~ 1970, p.243). 
In Chapter 1 I looked at the various problems and paradoxes that arise when 
self-deception is modelled on other-deception. For fear of repeating 
myself, I shall highlight the four main paradoxes as noted by Pears 
(1974, p.98). So, before looking at ways in which to explain how self-
deception is possible, I am going to note only the main problems which all 
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credible interpretations of self-deception must address. 
(1) I believe£, but at the same time I believe that not-£. It 
seems as though the self-deceiver must believe in a straightforward 
contradiction. As Szabados points out: "The self-deceiver, as 
deceiver, must be aware of the truth; as deceived must be unaware 
of the truth". (1974, p.52) So if A deceives himself, "it seems 
that he must be motivated by his belief that £.so that he is aware 
that£. and this awareness leads him to get himself to believe 
that not-~. The belief that£. and the belief that not-~ are not 
occuring at different times in disparate areas of his intellectual 
concern but are intimate parts of the same endeavour." (Brooks, 1986~ 
p.245-6). An assumption of this paradox is that the original belief 
should persist right up to the end of the process of deception which 
has as its goal the installing of the opposite belief, as well as 
assuming that it happens within the same mind (to exclude cases of 
schizophrenia or, rather, multiple personality). As Sartre states 
the paradox: " ..•• I must know the truth very exactly in order to 
conceal it more carefully-and this not at two different moments, 
which at a pinch would allow us to re-establish a semblance of 
duality-but in the unitary structure of a single project." 
(Sartre, 1958, p.49) 
This first paradox is really that which has attracted the bulk 
of philosophical interest. It encompasses most of the problems 
encountered in the discussion in Chapter 1 on the epistemological 
paradox. 
(2) The second paradox moves onto the problem of the psychological para-
dox as discussed in Chapter 1: I cannot intend to screen something 
from consciousness if the intention is motivated and guided by the 
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continuing awareness of that very thing. In otherwords, I cannot 
intend to do what I know I cannot do. If it is impossible for 
me to believe in the conjunction of two contradictory propositions, 
then I cannot intend to believe in such a conjunction. Since I 
know that the conjunction of incompatible beliefs is impossible, I 
\ 
cannot plan to bring about this imposs·ible combination. 
(3) The third paradox follows from the second. Since it is impossible 
for me to accept the conjunction of two contradictory beliefs, I 
must somehow keep them apart in my mind. The theory of Systems 
approaches the problem by allocating the two contradictory beliefs 
to two separate systems (in early Freudian terms these would constitute 
the conscious and the unconscious). This solution, however, gives 
rise to the third paradox: I cannot divorce my belief that not:E_ 
from the rest of my thoughts. In order for the plan to be motivated 
and guided, an awareness of the initial belief is needed. If I do 
not have the belief not-.e_ (either I have failed to form it or I have 
forgotten it), I ·cannot take preventative steps. Being self-deceived 
implies an indentification of its cause. I believe .2. because I 
believe not-..£.. The unwelcome belief, not:-.E_, sustains the favoured 
belief, E· But then we have the ~aradoxical situation where the 
unwelcome belief is a causal condition of a belief that contradicts 
it. It is because I am aware of the unwelcome belief that the need 
for self~deception about the favoured belief arises. 
(4) The fourth paradox is an extension of the third ---not only the 
belief, but the whole plan must be concealed from my thoughts and 
beliefs. If the plan itself is incoherent and impossible to put into 
practice, it cannot be made possible merely by being screened off 
from consciousness so that there is no identification with its cause. 
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I shall take these four paradoxes to cover the main problem areas in 
self-deception. Although, as I have shown in Chapter 1, there are 
numerous other paradoxes, I believe that any coherent theory of self-
deception will have to deal adequately with these four paradoxes at 
some stage before it can be accepted as a plausible theory. This then is 
the formulation of the problem to which the rest of this study will be 
addressed. 
The paradoxes and their solutions can be approached in two tradi·tional 
ways: one· can deny that literal self-deception exists and that the para-
.. 
doxes, therefore, do not arise; or one can. assert·that there is such a 
thing as literal self-deception.with all its accompanying_ paradoxes. If 
. -
one were to hold that literal self-deception is impossible, then those 
issues which we label 11 Self-deception11 are merely-metaphors which denote 
the employment of various psychological devi.ces which enable the "self-
deceiver .. to hold on to his favoured belief (or to avoid an unwelcome one). 
If self-deception is merely a metaphor, then those phenomena which re-
semble a type of deceiv.ing of oneself are falsely called self-deception. 
Often in these cases the question of the belief that£ and the belief 
that not-£ does not arise, or, if there is anything resembling the 
beliefs that£ or not-£_, these are beliefs that. in no way entail certainty 
about either bel ief.-more a-ppropriately, these are 11Subjective incl inations 11 
to seek, favour or ,emphasize available evidence that either underscores 
the favoured belief or undermines the unwelcome belief. On the other 
hand, one can boldly assert that literal self-deception is possible and 
that the resultant paradoxes can be explained. Now it seems as though 
only this last view uses the notion of other-deception to explain self-
deception and that the former view of 11 weak 11 self-deception rejects the 
model of other-deception. 
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When I refer to the two different solutions to the four paradoxes, I do 
not imply that by accepting one solution, the other must be rejected. 
In fact, much of the debate on the question of self-deception seems to 
be locked in this either-or stalemate.{S) I want to show that instead 
of the acceptance of one solution excluding the other, the two solutions 
are complementary to each other: the first solution is more applicable 
to cases of self-deception in which there is a certain amount of latitude~ 
and the solution of the theory of systems is more applicable in severe 
cases of self-deception. I have already referred to this "sliding scale" 
of severity and will look at the solutions applicable to the different 
degrees of self-deception. 
* * * * * * 
In this chapter I have examined the various causes of self-deception and 
although forgetting, misperception and cold perversions of reasons do 
constitute causes of self-deception, I shall concentrate in the rest of 
the study on the rebellious wish as the main cause of self-deception. 
Although I regard desire~motivated self-deception as the central form of 
self-deception, I referred to examples with other causes to show the 
different forms of self-deception operating on the periphery of irrational 
belief-formation. Pears especially is interested in these, what he 
terms "cold", cases of self-deception, but I shall concentrate on the "hot" 
cases which, to my mind, are the central ones. 
The "tools 11 or strategies which the self-deceiver employs also vary, and 
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either one or a combination of strategies may be employed by the self-
deceiver in his quest for the favoured belief. Again, the strategy 
that operates through output does not constitute the central strategy of 
self-deception, although it is often used to re-inforce an already held 
irrational belief. The strategy which operates through input is the 
central strategy employed by the self-deceiver in 11 Weak 11 cases of self-
deception, whereas the strategy which works on what is already in the mind 
seems to constitute the main strategy in 11 hard11 cases of self-deception. 
Of course, these· strategies are not always used in isolation, but· are 
often used in various combinations to contribute to the success of the 
self-deceptive project. 
However, the strategies employed by the self-deceiver are not always the 
same as those used by the other-deceiver. Other differences between self-
deception and other-deception seemed·to threaten the plausibility of using 
the model of other-deception for self-deception~ However, since these 
differences are minimal, 1 want to retain the other-deception model which 
clarifies, more than complicates, the notion of self-deception. By using 
the model of other-deception, four main paradoxes of self-deception arise 




1. The results and implications of the experiments conducted by 
Festinger's school of cognitive dissonance will be discussed more 
fully in Chapter 4. 
2. J. Penelhum (1964) and Canfield and Gustavson (1962). 
3. It may be argued that post-hypnotic suggestion is a counter example: 
the victim acts on the suggestion and then rationalizes his action 
and not that of the hypnotist. However, as noted in Chapter 2, 
hypnotic suggestions do not fall within the scope of intentional 
deception-what the victim must rationalize is his free and 
intentional action. 
4. C.F. Bach (1981) for whom self-deception entails avoiding the unpleasant 
thought£_, without the agent having to form the opposite belief not~.E_o 
5. E.g. Kipp (1980) who postulates two opposing teams, i.e. the minor 
stream with dry reasonableness on its side, which tends to deny that 
self-deception is possible, and the major stream with bold provocativ@~ 
ness on its side, which claims to know that self-deception exists. 
"If self-deception is something very similar to other-deception, it 
seems to imply paradoxical states •••• If, on the other hand, self-
deception is something very different from other-deception, it seems 
to run the risk of not being 'deception• at all ••• Among theorists 
who wish to avoid the paradoxes without having recourse to question-
begging concepts like unconscious believing, half-believing, unnoticed 
-believing, or multi-selved believing, it is usual to renounce any close 




THEORIES OF 11 WEAK 11 SELF-DECEPTION 
I concluded the last chapter with the view that an 11 either-or11 approach 
runs the risk of excluding a vast range of cases of self-deception. On 
the one hand, if self~deception is totally divorced from the notion of 
other-deception in order to circumvent and deflate the paradoxes, self-
deception seems to run the risk of not being deception at all, and it 
will hold little interest as a speculative problem. If, on the other hand~ 
- . 
self-deception is interpreted strictly according to the model of other-
deception, it seems to imply paradoxical states like knowing and not knowings 
i.e. literal self-deception. These two extremes occupy opposing ends of 
the scale: on the"weakest" end the word 11 Self-deception 11 refers metaphoricany 
to a cluster of phenomena that we falsely call self-deception, and which 
are really types of wishful thinking. On the 11 hardest 11 end the word 
11 Self-deception 11 refers literally to the paradoxical state of a person not 
only holding consciously two contradictory beliefs (i.e. aB.E_+aB-.E_) but 
requires that the self-deceiver must also consciously conjoin two contra-
dictory beliefs (i.e. aB(.E_+-.E_)). This, however, seems an impossible feat 
for any sane person. 
In this chapter I want to show that 11 Self-deception 11 is not merely a meta= 
phor for irrational belief-formation, but that a person can deceive himself 
without necessarily being confronted by the insolvable paradoxes. According 
to my sliding scale of other-deception, a genuine, full-blooded case of 
self-deception does not necessarily mean a lie-to-oneself (i.e. based on 
case (6) of other-deception). Proper self-deception can also be based on 
cases (1) - (5) of other-deception and self-deception can thus entail the 
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avoidance of certain suspected counter-evidence, the finding of pseudo-
reasons for a favoured belief, etc. In Chapter 1 I referred to Pears• 
sliding scale of cases of self-deception, and in this chapter I shall 
concentrate mainly on the first two cases: 
1. Balanced evidence for£ and not-£, accept£· 
2. Inductive evidence for not-£, accept£· 
3. Deductive evidence for not-E_, accept £· 
4. Not-£, accept E.· 
How interpretations of cases (1) and (2) confront (or, rather avoid) the 
paradoxes will form the main part of this chapter, and cases (3) and (4) 
will be dealt with later. 
First of all,; shall examine how cases (1) and (2) are analogous to cases 
of other-deception, since these serve as my model for cases of self-deception. 
Cases (1} and (2) of self-deception are analogous to cases (1) - (5) of 
other-deception as set out in Chapter 1, i.e. from unintentional other-
deception to the manipulation and explnitatiorr of available evidence in 
order to instill a false belief in the other person. 
11 Interpersonal deceivers evade acknowledging to 
others something they know, believe, suspect, 
feel, and so on. Often they engage in pretence, 
withhold their emotions, prevent others from having 
explicit consciousness about something, keep others 
ignorant, or persuade them to hold false beliefs. 
There are analogies here with self-pretence, 
emotional detachment, systematic ignoring, willful 
ignorance, and rationalization." 
(Martin, 1986, p.20) 
When A withholds evidence from B so that B is led to form a false belief 
that .E_, A has deceived B, i.e. has intentionally caused B to form a false 
belief. Just so, if A avoids evidence he suspects may prove to be 
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damaging to his favoured belief and, through deliberately not collecting 
all the facts, A holds a false belief that£, we must accuse A of self-
deception. He has intentionally caused himself to hold a false belief. 
It certainly is a "weak" case of self-deception, but since there are also 
"weak" cases of other-deception, we are entitled to attach the label of 
self-deception to the former. Self-deception in only its extreme form 
is a "lie to oneself" (case (4) of self-deception and case (6) of other-
deception), but there are many different ways of deceiving others than 
lying to them, just as there are different forms of self-deception which 
do not entail this limiting case of lying to oneself. It is for this 
reason that the "either-or" choice is a postulation of an erroneous approach. 
Within the different forms of self-deception there are no definite exclu-
sions, but rather graduations of degrees of irrationality. 
Before looking at the specific forms of self-deception as mentioned above, 
it may be appropriate to look. at the general shift in emphasis in "weak11 
self-deception in order to get around the paradoxes. In "weak" self-
deception, the inner tension experienced need not always be a matter of 
beliefs. According to Martin (1986, p.27) inner division can include 
ambivalent emotions or attitudes, conflicting desires, self-contradictory 
inclinations to believe, etc.(1). Whereas "hard" self-deception centres 
on false beliefs, "weak11 self-deception includes a wider variety of forms 
of self-deception. Martin and Fingarette hold that intentional self-
deception can also involve the purposeful or deliberate evasion of full 
acknowledgement of something to oneself. The manoeuvres of the self-
deceiver in this case are not centred on belief formation. This view will 
be examined a little later on. 
As with other-deception, self-deception typically involves concealing a 
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truth or one•s view of the truth, but the concealment can take many 
forms. It may seem that the very notion of truth will steer us directly 
back to the epistemological paradox, involving true and false beliefs, as 
well as the psychological paradox in which the motive for self-deception 
is the rational person•s desire to be rational and to hide his irrationality 
from himself by embarking on an irrational project. However, this paradox 
is based on the notion that beliefs are truth centred in that 11 they involve 
efforts to acquire knowledge. Yet none of us is so completely dedicated 
to truth that we do not have competing intentions and motives as we form 
our beliefs. We seek the truth; we also seek to adopt beliefs that make 
us happy, support our self-esteem, provide a comfortable worldview, and 
align with our basic loves and committments. Self-deception is often a 
special case of forming and holding beliefs on the basis of mixed concerns." 
(Martin, 1986, p.26). This, of course, does not mean that the self-
deceiver is totally blind to the influence of his bias or that he has no 
notion of the truth which he is trying to evade or hide. A self-deceiver 
usually forms and holds a favoured belief by intentionally disregarding 
counter-evidence, but the self-deceiver can also intentionally ignore the 
biasing influence of his wish, or intentionally avoid making enquiries 
which he suspects, or even knows, are appropriate. Although the self-
deceiver in this case is aware of evading the truth, it does not imply an. 
impossible paradoxical situation, since he is not exactly sure what the 
truth is. Therefore, rather than the problematic conflict between true 
and false belief, what we have in this case amounts to an absence of true 
beliefs and, hence, an absence of contradiction. However, the characteristic 
of mental conflict is still present, although not as acutely felt as in 
more severe cases of self-deception. There is no contradiction of beliefs, 
but there is inner tension between holding the favoured belief and constantly 
avoiding evidence that may undermine that belief. Although he does not 
105 
know that not-£, he avoids not-£. In saying this, we need not describe 
the self-deceiver as .. intending to believe what he knows is false... It 
is enough to describe him, in this 11weak 11 case, as intending to disregard 
evidence, to emphasize other evidence, to avoid enquiries, to evade self-
critical scrutiny of possible biases, etc. 
The emphasis in 11 Weak 11 self-deception, therefore, shifts to a watering-
-- -down-of irrationality. The paradox is considerably weakened if the view 
is held-that people are not always dedicated to the truth, but that their 
desires for a certain state of affairs takes precedence over the actual 
truth. Furthermore, if there is uncertainty about just what the truth 
is, it can lead to a suspicion rather than a belief about the actual 
·state of affairs, or even, as some philosophers claim, entail an absence 
of true beliefs. Other philosophers again evade the paradox by inter-
preting self-deception not at all in terms of beliefs, but rather in terms 
of 11 refusal- to spell-out one•s engagement in the world 11 , 11 Self-acknowledge-
ment11 or 11 attempts at self-modification 11 (2). This chapter will deal with 
desire-goaded 11weak 11 forms of self-deception (including such forms of 
self-deception as evasion, jamming, failure to focus, mental distance, 
biased thinking, role-playing, rationalization, etc.) and how the interpre-
tations of these aim at overcoming the paradoxes, especially the epistemo-
logical paradox which seems to underlie the others. 
Since the first case of other-deception is unintentional deception, I shall 
first of all look at cases of unintentional self~deception and look at 
various criteria which distinguish these from cases of intentional self-
deception. Obviously, unintentional self-deception does not raise the 
psychological paradox of intending to deceive oneself, but I shall show how 
unintentional self-deception does not raise the problem of the epistemological 
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paradox either. Mele's approach (1983) to resolving the epistemological 
paradox is to reject the assumption that knowledge is a prerequisite for 
all forms of deception. (3) · Mele, of course, does not deny that knowledge 
or true belief is a prerequisite for intentional deception, but he does 
not agree that it is a prerequisite for all deception. "(S)urely A may 
induce a false belief that£ in B, and thus deceive him in this sense, 
without knowing, or even believing, that .e. is false?" (Mele, 1983, p.366). 
Mele adds that A may indeed believe .e. to be true, and he may have intended 
to communicate it to B by telling him that .e_. A has deceived B, but it 
is not an intentional deception, i.e. A did not deliberately set out to 
deceive B. However, Mele's observation that a true belief may be a pre-
requisite for intentional de<;eption raises an interesting point. How 
then· are we to classify the case in which A does intend to deceive B by 
telling him that .E_, but unbeknownst to A .E. is, in fact, true. Thus, if 
the deception of B is successful, B will come to believe truly. This, 
I think, is a case of intentional deception and although it does not in-
volve factual knowledge of the truth of .E_, the case still involves knowledge 
and "true" belief of some sort- knowledge which A thinks is factual, 
i.e. he sincerely thinks that not-.e. is true, and he treats not-.e_ as a 
. "factually true" belief. So Mele's statement is a little ambiguous since 
we can have a case of intentional deception that does not include a true 
belief. So it seems rather that what the agent sincerely thinks is a true 
belief and a deliberate attempt to deceive with respect to this belief are 
prerequisites for intentional deception but not for all deception. The 
distinction may be presented as follows: 
1. A believes falsely that _e.-A communicates .e. to B-B believes 
falsely that .E.· . 
This is a case of unintentional deception in which A caused B to be in 
error with respect to .e_. 
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2. A believes falsely that ..2. -A communicates not-_E to B -B believes 
truly that not-_E. 
This is a case of intentional deception in which A deliberately gets 
B to believe the opposite of what A knows (or, rather accepts) to 
be true. 
Mele•s interpretation of 11 deception 11 refers to the loose definition of 
11 deceive 11 i.e. to cause someone to be in error with respect to ..2.· A•s 
action which causes B to believe falsely that ..2. is not a case of intentional 
deceiving, but it is a case of deceiving nonetheless. 
Mele labours this last point for he aims to show that the 11 vast majority 
-
of cases of self-deception are not cases of intentional deceiving ... 
(1983, p.366). He is quick, however, to note that the suggestion then 
that self-deception should be modelled after unintentional other-deception 
runs the risk of oversimplifying matters. Unintentional other-deception 
may be quite accidental, whereas self-deception seems to be motivated by 
the agent•s wishes. Self-deception, therefore, is not accidental but, 
he stresses, 11 the non-accidentality of self-deception does not imply that 
the person must intentionally deceive himself. To be sure, self-deceivers 
often do engage in intentional behaviour with the result that they become 
dece.ived with respect to ..2.; but .•• they rarely act with the intention of 
deceiving themselves ... (Mele, 1983, p.367). What does not happen, there~ 
fore, in the typical case of the girl who persuades herself that her lover 
is faithful is that at one time she had the explicit intention o{ 11 getting 
myself to believe what I know or believe to be false... Mele•s point is 
that the self-deceiver does not aim at deceiving himse.lf; he has no in-
tention of deceiving himself. He may, of course, engage in intentional 
behaviour to find pseudo-evidence to support his favoured belief, but there 
is no explicit intention for deception as such. 
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I think Mele is quite correct in pointing out that the self-deceiver 
rarely has the explicit intention to deceive himself, but Mele is guilty 
of failing to distinguish between primary and secondary deception. 
Primary deception entails deception about .E_, whereas secondary deception 
entails deception about the process of deception itself. Self-deceivers 
typically use self-deceptive strategies to evade or hide from themselves 
the fact that they are using self-deceptive strategies, in other words, 
self-deceivers deceive themselves (secondary deception) about their self~ 
deception (primary deception). In doing so they may use the same tactics 
at a second order level with respect to the primary use of the tactics. 
The target of primary deception is the main thing the person is deceived 
about, whereas the target of secondary deception is any related thing the 
person deceives himself about as a means of evading or falsifying the 
primary target. The self-deceiver thus has the intention to believe that 
.E. and his actions are guided by this intention (e.g. to evade certain 
counter-evidence, etc.), but he need not necessarily have the additional 
intention to deceive himself about his own self-deception. 11BUt there 
can also be further motives for the secondary evasion which need to be 
concealed. In particular, it can be less than flattering to recognize 
that we have been deceiving ourselves and to admit to the reasons we have 
done so ... (Martin, 1986, p.18). I do agree with Mele that few self-
deceivers have an explicit intention about deceiving themselves about their 
own deception, but it is wrong to label this case then as unintentional 
self-deception. Most self-deceivers engage in intentional behaviour, but 
this behaviour is aimed at avoiding not-.E_ and at forming the belief that .E.~ 
rather than the self-deceptive process itself. The deliberateness with 
which the self-deceiver goes about his active search or willful avoidance 
will make no sense if he does not have the intention to seek out or avoid 
telling evidence. 
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However, if we employ the loose sense of 11 deceive 11 it is easy to see 
how one can be the cause of one•s being in a state of error with regard 
to .E_, be it either through negligence, fatigue, impetuosity, misperception, 
an inability to think things through, etc. The prob 1 em, however, arises 
that these forms of unintentional self-deception are not easily distinguish-
able from cases of pure mistakeness or incompetence. For example, if the 
aforementioned girl has no intention of deceiving herself about her lover•s 
faithfulness, but she does believe in his fidelity nevertheless, the 
irrational belief may be purely due to intellectual incompetence. I am 
sure that Mele is aware of these obvious objections that can be raised 
and ~e is_, therefore, quick to note that intentional deception is 
11admittedly, the central case of deception 11 , but not all cases of deception 
are cases of intentional deception, he adds. I do grant that, but I dis-
agree_ with his view that unintentional self-deception forms the vast 
majority of cases of self-deception. Certainly, there are few cases of 
intentional secondary deception, but the majority of cases are of intentional 
primary deception. As I have shown in Chapter 1, unintentional other-
deception does exist, as does unintentional self-deception, but these 
constitute a small minority of cases on the periphery of the kind of decep~ 
tion that is of philosophical interest. 
Before going on to discuss the central case of self-deception, viz. that of 
intentional self-deception in which the agent engages in intentional action 
in forming a belief or finding or avoiding evidence for a certain belief, 
I want to note a distinction made by Palmer and Champlin (1977) that not 
all cases of deceiving oneself are cases of self-deception. In other words, 
not all self-reflexive deception is intentional. They hold that to deceive 
someone can be to do no more than to get him to mistake appearance for 
reality. Palmer offers the example of an inexperienced gardener who 
I ' ·. I 
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\ deceives himself but is no self-deceiver. 
) 
After consulting his newly-
acquired gardening books, the gardener digs up all his snapdragon seedlings 
in the mistaken belief that he has positively identified them as weeds. 
The essential ingredient which. distinguishes deceiving oneself (that is, 
unintentional self-deception) from self-deception (that is, intentional 
se1f-dece~ti6n).is, according to Palmer and Champlin, "dishonesty with 
oneself." - To substantiate .this claim, Champlin offers an example of in-
. -tentional other-deception which may lead to. unintentional self~deception: 
-A camouflage expert hide~ a gun so skillfully that not only does he fool 
the others into thinking it a clump of bushes (he; of course, intended to 
deceive the others), but he is even taken in· by his own handiwork, (he 
-unintentionally deceived himself). But it would not be natural to call 
this a case of self-deception, according to Champlin, since the camouflage 
expert is not being dishonest with himself when he was deceived by his own 





intentional self-deception steers us into interpreting self-deception as a 
moral notion. He compares the difference between intentional and uninten-
tional self-deception to the· difference between murdering and killing. 
11 Murder is something youcommit; ••• self-deception is something you are 
guilty of." (1977, p •. 291). Dishonesty with oneself certainly does seem 
to be an ingredient in intentional self-deception, but I feel the distinction 
is certainly not the most important one. Champlin appeals to dishonesty 
with oneself on which he bases his view of self-deception, but the concepts 
he uses are obscure. Even if dishonesty with oneself entails an "interior 
dialogue" and self-deception is, therefore, a kind of "lying to oneself", 
it doesn•t explain just how self-deception works or how it solves ttie para-
doxes. Mele (1983, p.375), in fact, offers an example of a person lying 
to himself and who is, thus, being dishonest with himself, but the case still 
does not seem to be typical of self-deception proper. The example is of a 
·-------~ ----- -· -··-·- -· 
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stuntman who prepares himself for a feat which he knows to be exceedingly 
dangerous. He may tell himself that there is nothing to fear, with the 
hope or intention of inducing in himself the belief that there is nothing 
to fear, even if it is only for the crucial moment. 
The above interpretations of unintentional self-deception have all relied 
on a loose definition of "deceive" (i.e. "to get oneself to mistake 
appearance for reality" or "to cause oneself to be in error with respect 
to £.11 ) but the meaning of the word has a stricter application when used in 
intenti~nal self-deception, i.e. "the action of deceiving oneself". What 
then is the distinguishing ingredient between the loose definition and the 
stricter one, or between unintentional deception and intentional deception? 
' 
w-hat distfnguishes unintentional self-deception from intentional self-
deception then seems to be an absence of knowledge of the true belief, the 
absence of the deliberate attempt to deceive oneself either at a first or 
second-order level, and the absence of deliberate dishonesty with oneself. 
It is clear that these three criteria for unintentional self-deception evade 
the main paradoxes. Firstly, the epistemological paradox is avoided since 
in unintentional self-deception there is only one belief-one in which the 
agent is in error----but one belief, nevertheless. The opposite belief, 
be it that the lover is in fact unfaithful, or that those seedlings are in 
fact snapdragons, is not registered in the mind. In unintentional self-
deception we, therefore, do not have to deal with the epistemological para~ 
dox of trying to explain how the self-deceiver can believe E. and believe 
not-E_ at the same time. The second criterien cuts out the psychological 
paradox because in unintentional self-deception the question of intending 
to deceive oneself is not raised. The third c~tterion removes the emergence 
of the ethical paradox in that the self-deceiver is wholly victim. I 
agree with Foss (with my modifications in parentheses) that intentional 
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"self-deception, like deception of another, has knowledge as a pre-
requisite: one deceives himself that .E. ... knowing (or believing) .E. 
to be false." (1980, p.242). One cannot knowingly deceive unintentionally. 
According to Foss, "one must know one is deceiving, and that requires 
knowledge of what is really the case (or knowledge of what one thinks is 
the case)" ( p.242). Whereas unintentional self-deception does not 
invoke the epistemological paradox of .E. and not-..e., it seems as though in-
tentional self-deception will have to confront it, i.e. knowledge of the 
false b~lief and knowledge of what is really the case. 
I shall now look at various accounts of intentional self-deception which 
deal wi·th the paradoxes by either watering them down (e.g. the agent is 
not absolutely certain that .E. and that not-..e.) or evading them altogether 
·(e.g. self-deception does not necessarily entail the simultaneous holding 
of two contrary beliefs). One way of evading the paradox of .E. and not-..e. 
.in a case of intentional self-deception is to appeal to the lapse of time. 
When A lies successfully to B, it doesn't necessarily mean that B immediately 
believes what A tells him. B may just think about the plausibility of 
what he has heard from A, without as yet accepting it as true and thus 
believing it. Similarly, when the stuntman forms the belief that there 
is nothing to fear, he tells the lie with knowledge that fear is warranted. 
This does not, however, necessarily imply that he believes that .E. and 
believes that not-..e. at the same time. Even though he tells himself that 
there is nothing to fear he may not form the corresponding belief until 
some time after he has told himself this. "The more I keep telling myself~ 
the more chance I have of coming to believe it" --this may even be a 
conscious strategy employed by the stuntman. He may come to abandon the 
true belief in the meantime. Demos offers (1960, p~591) the example of 
a young unattractive and lonely man who is only too aware of his inadequacies. 
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He, however, makes up for these by thinking of himself as a lady-killer. 
With time, he even comes to believe this and frequently convinces himself 
and others of his numerous romantic adventures. So, in lying to himself~ 
he has changed his initial belief that caused distress, to one that now 
gives him pleasure. This points to the emphasis in "weak" self-deception 
in which there is an absence of the true belief and, therefore, an absence 
of contradiction. In order to generate a paradox in cases of successful 
reflexive lying, the liar must believe the lie immediately. If he believes 
the lie at the moment when he lies to himself, we can no longer appeal to 
the passage of time during which the true belief is eventually abandoned. 
Whether this case of "hard" self-deception is ever instantiated will be 
exam1ned in the next two chapters. 
I have mentioned earlier on that in cases of "weak" self-deception, the 
self-deceiver often deliberately evades some truth or certain issues or 
evidence. I shall now look at evasion as a form of self-deception, but 
it is not easy to see how deliberate evasion can solve the epistemological 
paradox, especially if we add the Sartrean stipulation that in order to 
evade the truth, the self-deceiver must know very exactly just what it is 
that should- be avoided. To deceive oneself is typically to evade the 
truth or what one would view as truth if one were to face an issue squarely. 
One way around the problem posed by Sartre is to deny that the self-
deceiver must know very exactly what he is avoiding. This approach relies 
on a re-description of what 11 knoW 11 entails when the agent must 11 know11 
that not-~ but believes that~· There are two different re-descriptions 
of 11 know11 • First of all, know need not imply certainty. According to 
this description of 11 know••, the self-deceiver may have a mere suspicion that 
some evidence on closer inspection may be damaging. I have already referred 
to this account in Chapter 2 when I examined the strategy that works through 
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selective input in the mind, and an account to which I shall return 
later in the chapter when I discuss the self-deceiver•s appeal to 
latitude. The second re-description of 11 know 11 is based on the notion 
of awareness. Martin suggests that the self-deceiver need not know 
the truth in the sense that he is constantly aware of it. 11 Acts of 
deceiving-oneself consist of the actions involved in forming and sustaining 
projects of evasion. A project of evasion can be carried out using an 
assortment of_ strategies and patterns of behaviour, but the project and 
its unifying inten·tion do not involve continuous mental activity. 11 (Martin, 
1986, p.13). Martin compares this project of-evasion to the project of 
avoiding someone•s company: one does not constantly think about avoiding 
that person, but one employs a variety of dodging tactics on different 
occasions, like avoiding going to parties at which he is likely to be, or 
glancing away when he enters the room, or not responding to his conver-
sation or conversation about him, etc. These tactics do not require 
constant awareness of that person, but when one is confronted by that person 
or by an aspect related to him, one simply turns one•s attention away. 
Bach also appeals to the notion of evasion to describe self-deception but~ 
unlike Martin, he tries to free self-deception from paradox by arguing that 
self-deception involves a chasm between what one believes and what one 
thinks, and that self-deception should be interpreted in terms of action~ 
rather than belief. 11 Self-deception is not essentially a matter of 
belief at all. 11 (Bach, 1980, p.353-4). He argues that the self-deceiver 
may have the hidden belief that not-£ without actively entertaining the 
thought that not-£. Therefore, if the thought that not-£ never arises 
or crosses his mind, he will have no reason to deceive himself about the 
truth. The self-deceiver desires that£ while having the belief that 
not-£ (albeit not consciously entertaining the belief) and what he does 
115 
is "to avoid the sustained or recurrent thought that not-.E_".(4) 
However, before going on to the way in which the self-deceiver evades the 
sustained or recurrent thought that not-£, it is necessary to look at the 
distinction Bach makes between belief and thought, and on which he relies 
in order for his definition to hold. 
According to him, beliefs are states, whereas thoughts are occurences. 
He notes that we have countless beliefs which we are not currently holding 
in the focus of our attention. We even have beliefs whose content we 
have never had in mind until now, e.g. that kangaroos are bigger than 
cockatoo~. "It is enough that beliefs not be confused with occurences 
of the corresponding thoughts, i.e. the belief that not-.e_ with the thought 
that not-£." (1980, p.355). This distinction allows for the fact that a 
person need not have thought everything he believes as well as the fact -
that his thoughts do not invariably correspond to his beliefs. Of 
course, Bach is not denying the obvious fact that usually what a person 
thinks, and thinks he believes, is in fact what he believes. What Bach 
is insisting on is that we cannot assume a person always believes what he 
thinks he believes, for then we would be ruling out the possibility of 
error about one•s beliefs. He insists that the possibility must be 
allowed of thinking that not-.e_ without believing that not-.E_. For example~ 
a person is presented with persuasive arguments for and against .E.· When 
he hears the first, he thinks that .e_, but on hearing the second, he is 
more impressed and thinks that not-£. Reconsidering the first argument~ 
he finds it still compelling and fluctuates between thinking that .E. and 
thinking that not-E_. He, in fact, does not know what to believe. 
However, Bach maintains that we can•t describe this case as alternatively 
believing and disbelieving that£ or even as believing .E. and believing not-E_, 
since no position has been settled on. The person has not yet chosen one 
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belief, although he is constantly thinking of the alternatives. Bach 
offers the example of the person who has a fear of flying (1980, p.357). 
This person believes that flying is safe (at least, as safe as driving a 
motor car) and yet everytime he has to fly he experiences acute· anxiety. 
Eventhough realizing the irrationality of his thought, he cannot help 
thinking that flying is dangerous. 
Before going on to look at Bach's view of evasion in more detail, I want 
to note a similar distinction to that of· Bach. Instead of distinguishing 
between believing that£ and thinking that£, Cohen makes a distinction 
between believing that£ and accepting that£· 
11 Very often we accept what we believe and believe 
what we accept. But a person who does not fully 
,believe that£ can nevertheless.accept that E .... 
Equally, a person can fully bel1eve that£ w1thout 
fully accepting it ••• Again, accepting that£ 
is no reason at all for believing that£· But 
having a belief that£ is normally some reason for 
accepting that£, even though it may well not be 
the only, or the best, reason or even a sufficient 
one. 11 (1986, p.92-93) 
The first case of accepting but not fully believing that R may refer to a 
subjective state of conviction. For example, a person has a hunch that 
Mr X is in fact a swindler although al1 the presently available evidence 
and the socially accepted opinion is that Mr X is an honest pillar of the 
community. In the case of a person fully believing something without 
accepting it, Cohen uses the example of a juror who believes and is convinced 
due to a personal acquaintance that his witness is untrustworthy, but he 
rejects the use of this belief as a premise for certain proofs. In fact, 
he feels that he should put this belief out of his mind when he is judging 
the case in court. 
I shall now return to develop Bach's account of self-deception as evasion. 
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After noting the distinction between the belief that and the thought 
that, Bach concludes that "the self-deceiver, believing that not-E_ 
while desiring that .E_, need not ••. try to get himself to believe that .E.· 
That is neither his objective nor essential to it. It is enough that 
he not .(sustainedly or repeatedly) thinks what he believes, for what 
matters is what occurs to him." (1980, p.357). ·Whereas Martin's view 
of "weak" self-deception entails an absence of a true belief, Bach's view 
proposes an absence of a false belief. It is enough for Bach that the 
self-deceiver who desires a certain state of affairs should avoid thoughts 
about his belief as to the real state of affairs. According to Bach the 
self-deceiver does not aim at forming an irrational belief, or does not aim 
at fooling himself into believing-something false. What happens is that 
his desire for .E. motivates him to avoid thoughts generated by the belief 
about the truth, not-.2_. Here then is a simplified analysis of self-
deception: 
1. A desires that .E. 
2. A believes that not-E_ 
3. 1 + 2 combine to motivate A to avoid (and he does avoid) the sustained 
or recurrent thought that not-E_. 
By simplifying his analysis, I have laid Bach open to perhaps unjustified 
criticism, but I have done so to highlight two issues, viz. the problem of 
how A's desire that .E. and his belief that not-E_ can combine to motivate him 
in sustaining his self-deception, and secondly, the different ways in which 
A avoids the sustained or recurrent thought that not-E_. 
Turning to the first problem then of how the desire that .E. and the belief 
that not-E_ combine to cause A to avoid the thought that not-_e_ (at least on 
a sustained or recurrent basis). It might be proposed that the desire and 
118 
belief jointly constitute a reason to avoid the thought that not-£ 
but it is still difficult to see how they can constitute a reason for 
the person to act on. If the self-deceiver reasons as follows: "Although 
I believe that not-.e_, since I desire that£, I will avoid the thought 
that not-.e_ whenever not-E., comes to mind," we are returned to the very para-
dox we wish to avoid. Bach•s way out of the dilemma is to state that 
although the self-deceiver•s desire and belief do not constitute a reason 
on which the agent acts in order to avoid the unwelcome thought that not-.e_, 
. they do comine to motivate him to avoid that thought. The fact-that he 
cannot bear the thought that not-E., is not his reason for avoiding it. 
The self-deceptive process motivates him to find reasons for rejecting not-.e. 
or reasons in favour of accepting£· "The self-deceiver•s desire that E. 
and his belief that not-£ combine to cause him to accept reasons for avoid-
; ng the thought that not-£'• ( p. 366) . However, to say that he is 
motivated to reach the conclusion he does is not to explain just how he does 
so. Bach•s unsatisfactory reply to. this very real gap in his theory is, 
"However, we may reasonably suppose, considering his motivation, that he 
would have reached this conclusion somehow." (p.366). The self-deceiver 
is motivated to rationalize his behaviour by finding a reason for it; for 
example, the malingerer has a desire to avoid responsibility which, in turn, 
motivates (and eventually causes) him to find a more acceptable reason, 
like ill health, to rationalize his staying in bed. The self-deceiver is, 
of course~ not forced (e.g. by unconscious defence mechanisms) to avoid 
the thought that not-.e_, only motivated to avoid it. He can become un-
deceived at any time. If, however, he is confronted with what he is doing 
and denies it, he is doubly motivated: motivated to avoid the thought that 
not-.e_ (primary deception) as well as being motivated to avoid awareness of 
what he is doing (secondary deception). On the secondary level of deception 
his desire for the success of his self-deceptive project and the belief 
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that he is practising self-deception combine to motivate him to find 
.. secondary .. reasons for his behaviour, in order to rationalize his own 
behaviour. ..Although the self-deceiver does what he does intentionally 
he does not do it under the description of deceiving myself: or anything 
of the sort. Rather, he is motivated to avoid the thought that not-.2_ 
but is unaware (or denies the impact of) this motivation and of his un-
characteristic violation of his own rational standards ... (p·.368) .• 
The puzzle, however, remains of how one can be caused to accept reasons one 
would normally reject. Although Bach does not attempt to provide a detailed 
solution to the puzzle, he maps his view onto that of Pears by stating that 
the- self-deceiver relies on 11 the boyancy of his wish 11 (Pears, 1984, p.110) 
to sustain and defend the irrationality of his actions. (Pears• view will 
be examined in Chapter 5). 
I now want to turn to the second issue raised by Bach's analysis, viz. the 
different ways in which A avoids the sustained or recurrent thought that 
not-.e_. 
The first tactic is that of simple evasion. This is perhaps the simplest 
of the psychological devices that Bach mentions in that it involves no 
more than evading the thought that not-.2_ by thinking of a single reason 
against not-.e.. The reason is not conceived as proving or disposing the 
self-deceiver to make a temporary judgment, it is simply a reason for 
getting his mind off not-.e.. The reason he has settled on need not be a 
convincing one - all it needs to do for it to be accepted as a reason is 
for the self-deceiver to stop thinking any further on the issue. If he 
does think further on the issue and the alleged reason for it, he may have 
to resort to rationalization---- a tactic which will be examined later on 
in this chapter. For Bach, simple' evasion is merely 11 turning one•s 
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attention away from some touchy subject", ( p.360) so that one 
evades having to admit to oneself what one believes. Bach compares this 
self-deceptive process to procrastination. "Such self-deceptive evasion 
is to thought as procrastination is to action. In procrastination one 
avoids action by thinking of a reason against it, however weak that reason 
may be, and then turns one's attention to something else". ( p.361). 
For example, the girl's desire for her lover's faithfulness and her belief 
that- he is unfaithful motivate her to accept a reason for evading the 
whole .ques-tio~ of her lover's infidelity. She may accept her busy work 
schedule as a reason for avoiding the whole issue and if her friend should 
invite her for lunch at the cafe her lover frequents, the girl may plead 
too much work and so avoids being perhaps confronted with damaging evidence. 
The self-deceiver's reason may seem contrived, but more efficient than the 
pseudo-reason itself is the thought that there is some such reason ~ 
identifying it is unnecessary. Just the thought that there is such a 
reason serves itself as a reason. "Most efficient is the thought that 
not-£ is not worth thinking about. What better reason not to think about 
it?" (p.361). 
The second psychological device Bach mentions is that of "jamming", which 
is also a kind of evasion of the truth and of the belief that not-£. 
This consists of cluttering one's mind with considerations in favour of £o 
Whenever the issue of not-.E_ comes up, the self-deceiver focuses his 
attention on .E_, as a result of his desire that .E_, and imagines what it 
would be like if .E. were true or he vividly imagines desirable consequences 
of .E.· He may run through evidence favouring .E. and perhaps even go so far 
as to provide himself with instant "evidence .. forE· This can be done 
either by acting as if .E. were the case (the self-deceiver employs the 
strategy that operates through output - see Chapter 3) or by convincing 
121 
others that E. and then taking their word for it, or both. By such 
means as these the self-deceiver, when confronted with not-E_ which 
threatens to bring to his attention his belief that not-£., clutters up 
his mind with the thought that .2_, and so 11 jams 11 or prevents his belief 
that not-E_ from coming into his focus of attention. Bach offers the 
example of a young man who resents having to care for his aged mother. 
The fact -that he experiences feelings of extreme intolerance and resent-
ment is evidence enough for the belief that he hates her (the belief 
·that not-E_). However, he does not want to hate her (the desire that£.) 
and -so, whenever the subject of his resentment crops up (his mother brings 
it up often enough), he clutters up his mind with nice thoughts about his 
mother, brfngs her roses, pays her camp 1 iments (especially when others are 
present), etc., so that there is no room in his attention for the thought 
that he hates her. 
Both in the tactics of evasion and jamming, the self-deceiver has the 
belief that not-E_ as well as the desire that E.· These two aspects do not 
necessarily give rise to a contradiction and Bach offers two ways in which 
the paradox is avoided. Firstly, the self-deceiver need not come to 
believe that .E. (the desire. that .2. which motivates him to avoid not-£_ is 
enough), thus we are not confronted with two conflicting beliefs, the basis 
for the epistemological paradox. Secondly, the self-deceiver is not aware 
of his belief that not-E_ when he doesn•t think about this unwelcome belief, 
and so the self-deceptive tactic is to avoid the thought that not-E_ which 
will bring to his attention the belief that not-£_. If the self-deception 
is successful, the belief that not-£_ does not come to mind and there is, 
therefore, no paradox of how the self-deceiver can believe .2. and believe 
not-E_ at the same time. Bach•s analysis is not without its attractions, 
but it does not cover all cases of self-deception, e.g. when a person is 
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confronted with such conclusive evidence that he cannot sanely evade 
I 
or ignore the issue. Furthermore, the analysis does not offer a com-
prehensive account of the mechanics of avoiding the thought that not-£. 
Is it conscious thought to avoid not-£? If so, then both the thought 
that not-£ and the thought to avoid not-E_ must be in the focus of attention: 
a seeming return to the paradox. Is it an unconscious thought to avoid 
not-£? If so, then how was this thought suppressed into the unconscious 
and how does it manipulate the consciousness of the person? That the 
person avoids thinking about the unpleasant truth in a self-deceptive 
project is obvious enough, but just how it happens is not so obvious, that 
is if Bach's view of self-deception is accepted. 
I now want to turn to another interpretation of self-deception which hopes 
to avoid the paradoxes, viz. failure to focus which also encompasses one-
sided evidence gathering and biased thinking~ The tactic of failure to 
focus in self-deception is very similar to Bach's evasion in that both 
employ the strategy of filtering what gets into the mind... Here the self-
deceiver's wish that! may lead him to fail to focus his attention on 
evidence which· he has for disbeliev-ing that£ or· for believing that not-_E.. 
Whenever the self-deceiver becomes aware of contrary evidence, his attention 
is diverted to other things. This diverting of attention may be either 
intentional or unintentional. For example, whenever the girl •s attention 
is attracted to evidence of her lover's unfaithfulness, she may .tell her-
self that it is a waste of time to consider this evidence, since her lover 
is just not that sort of person to do such a thing. This, of course, is 
very similar to Bach's account of simple evasion-an intentional diver-
ting of attention by thinking of a reason against the suspected unwelcome 
belief. The desire for his faithfulness may be so strong that whenever 
she is confronted with evidence for the belief that not-£, she automatically· 
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shifts her attention to other issues. The small difference of this 
account to that of Bach's is that whereas. Bach's self-deceiver avoids 
the thought that not-£_ by thinking of one reason against it or by 
cluttering up his mind, this failure to focus means that the self-deceiver 
shifts his attention to other things. By always shifting the attention 
to other things, this process eventually becomes automatic. The desire 
to believe that .2. is so powerful that it influences the workings of her 
mind by either shifting thoughts away from the dangerous evidence for the 
belief that not-£_ or by preventing her mental processes from "thinking 
through" the implications of the evidence which seems to support the belief 
that not-£_. According to Mele (1983, p.372), she does not intentionally 
aim at failing to focus on the evidence, but the desire for pleasure in 
the belief that her lover is faithful "automatically" shifts her thoughts 
from the unpleasant suspicion that he may be unfaithful. An obvious 
objection is immediately evident: just how does this "automatic shifting11 
work? To this central question Mele offers no answer, but he tries to 
circumvent the epistemological paradox by maintaining that failure to 
focus on the evidence for not-£_ does not in any way imply that the self-
deceiver already holds the belief that not-£_. For example, the hapless 
girl may have had a disastrous love affair in the past and has vowed that 
she will never again try to find out whether her future lovers are faithful 
or not. She prefers not to know what he does when he is out late---
ignorance is more pleasurable than knowing (whatever the outcome). This 
does, of course, evade the paradox posed by Sartre that one must know the 
truth very exactly in order to avoid it. The girl has no exact knowledge 
of the truth but avoids that entire area which may prove to be distressing. 
For Bach, the belief that not-£_ only comes to attention when the self-
deceiver has the thought that not-£_, whereas in this account the belief 
that not-£_ is absent altogether. In this way, failure to focus circumvents 
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the epistemological paradox of .E. and not-E_, in that the belief that 
not-.E_ need not even arise. However, this view -that the failure to 
focus on evidence for not-.E_ in no way implies that the self-deceiver 
holds the belief that not-.E_ ---may solve the paradox of holding two con-
flicting bel-iefs, but the account at the same time robs self-deception 
of its distinctive characteristic-that of mental conflict. It is 
difficult to see how the above interpretation of self-deception differs 
from that of wishful thinking. Furthermore, this interpretation, like 
Bach's, cannot account for the case in which the evidence for not-.E_ is 
so strong-that it cannot be ignored by a sane, rational person. 
Coupled to failure to focus is the psychological device of one-sided 
evidence gathering, employing the strategy which operates through input 
and which, therefore, results in biased thinking. However, one-sided 
evidence entails that the practitioner holds the belief that not-.E. and· 
it is-the very knowledge of the truth of this belief that steers his manip-
ulation and exploitation of the data. There are eight different ways in 
which the biased practitioner can deal with evidence: 
1. to look for or highlight evidence that supports the favoured belief 
that .E. 
2. to look for or highlight evidence that refutes the unwelcome belief 
that not-.E. 
3. to avoid or ignore evidence that refutes the favoured belief that .E. 
4. to avoid or ignore evidence that supports the unwelcome belief that 
not-.E. 
5. to interpret certain evidence as not counting against the belief that 
.E. when in actual fact it does. 
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6. to interpret certain evidence as supporting the belief that£ 
when in actual fact it does not. 
7. to interpret certain evidence as counting against the belief that 
not-R when it actual fact it does not. 
B. to interpret certain evidence as not supporting the belief that 
not-R when in actual fact it does. 
The slight difference in approach to evidence in 1 - 4 and 5 - 8 is that 
irr tbe first four ways the self-deceiver looks for (or ignores) certain 
evidence and once he has found it (or successfully avoided it) h~ uses it 
(or the absence of it) as is. In the latter four ways the self-deceiver 
is confronted with certain evidence which he then changes and misinterprets. 
For example, a theologian holds a. certain political view and wants to 
believe that this view is 11 ordained by God 11 • He consequently scours the 
Biblical texts for evidence, overlooking obvious evidence to the contrarys 
.and finally succeeds in finding obscure ambiguous (albeit not to him) 
evidence to 11 support11 his belief that E· Or he may use some well-known 
passage in the Bible and give it a 11 novel 11 interpretation, an interpretation 
that will, of course, lend support to the belief that£· Whichever way he 
deals with the evidence (ignoring/highlighting or distorting evidence), he 
is guilty on at least two counts of irrationality: firstly, he is irrationa.11y 
11 hypersensitive 11 to certain obscure details, or irrationally 11 blind11 to 
counter evidence, or irrationally misinterpreting evidence (primary deception); 
and secondly, as a trained historian, he should be well aware of the ille-
gitimacy of this 11 method 11 of research, i.e. he should be aware of his own 
irrationality (secondary deception). The biasing agent is, of course, his 
wish for the belief that£· In order to promote the favoured belief that£ 
(or to refute the unwelcome belief that not-_e) the wish directs the self-
deceiver•s interpretation of evidence in such a way that only selected 
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evidence which is wanted by the wish is allowed into the mind. Once 
the one-sided evidence has been registered in the mind, biased thinking 
takes over. 
Biased thinking is often taken as being the same as one-sided evidence 
gathering, but there is a difference. The latter device operates on inputj 
whereas biased thinking works on what is already in the mind. The two 
strategies as well as the two psychological devices are mutually re-inforcing. 
The a9ent concentrates on selecting only that evidence which he wants, which 
in turn ~ives rise to biased thinki~g within the mind. One~ the agent has 
the bi~sed belief he will then direct his attention only to that evidence 
which supports it. Whereas the one-sided evidence gatherer approaches 
data mainly in ways 1 - 4, the resultant biased thinker interprets the data 
mainly in ways 5-8. (As I have me~tioned, the two devices_are mutually 
reinforcing and there is, therefore, no specific separation in the ways 1 - 8. 
The different approaches are often used interchangeably). 
Bach points out that self-deception is not simply a case of biased thinking: 
"When we charge someone with bias or prejudice, we imply that his thinking 
is adversely affected by his sentiments, which render it peculiarly inflexible, 
but we do not imply either that any special effort is being made (bigotry 
can be effortless) or that there is something uncharacteristically irrational 
in the person's thinking." (Bach, 1981, p.352). The distinction then 
between plain biased thinking and self-deception seems to point to the role 
the agent plays in bringing about his irrational belief. In plain biased 
thinking the agent plays a fairly passive role ---his intellectual processes 
are inflexible, or he is intellectually incompetent to appreciate the impor-
tance of counter-evidence. However, in self-deception, the agent seems to 
play a more active role---his desire motivates him to actively misinterpret 
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the evidence to suit his own desired belief, or to ignore damaging 
evidence or to look for supportive evidence. The self-deceiver, under 
the influence of a wish, makes a deliberate effort to support the irrational 
desire-goaded belief, through the distortion of his rational processes---
an action which, in a rational person, gives rise to the psychological 
paradox. The theologian is not merely politically biased-he actively 
hunts for evidence to support his desired belief and devises elaborate 11 nove1 11 
interpretations of the data. Of course, the more active a rOle the agent 
plays in avoiding or distorting the evidence, the more radical the degree 
of se-lf-deception. To be totally 11 blind 11 to certain damaging evidence, in 
such a way that does not seem possible, is a far more severe form of self= 
deception than the person who pays scant attentfon to evidence of which he 
should really take note. Elster cites a case in which millions of people 
were, to an extent, self-deceived in that they deliberately refused to 
confront threatening evidence. During World War II millions of Germans 
deliberately overlooked the extermination of the Jews: 
11 (T)hey must have observed that their Jewish 
acquaintances disappeared, and they must have 
known that this had some gruesome explanation, 
but as long as they managed to remain ignorant of 
the details they could say to themselves that they 
were genuinely unaware of what went on ... 
(Elster, 1979, p.178) 
This is an example of one-sided evidence gathering (case 4) which does not, 
however, lead to biased thinking since it is calculated to keep them in a 
state of ignorant bliss. This is not a paradoxical case of self-deception, 
since they did· not have certainty of the facts. Instead of the belief that 
not-£, they may have had a suspicion that not-£. If they did have knowledge, 
it was knowledge that such facts did exist, but they had no knowledge of the 
contents of those facts. If we are to accuse the Germans of irrationality, 
we can do so in Davidsonian terms, in that their irrationality lies in their 
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refusal to collect all available evidence, but not in their holding two 
incompatible beliefs. (Those Germans who knew the contents of the facts 
and yet deceived themselves about the holocaust are, of course, guilty 
of a more radical type of self-deception, a type that would need to employ 
a more radical psychological device if the self-deception is to be 
preserved. These more radical types of psychological devices will be 
examined as the discussion moves along the sliding scale of self-deception). 
Another explanation of how it is possible for a person to have two con-
flicting beliefs within the same belief system is that of mental distance. 
It aims at providing a solution to the following problem: the agent is 
motivated by his belief that not-£, is therefore aware of not-£, and yet 
this awareness leads him to persuade himself to believe that£· The case 
of having incompatible beliefs can, to a certain extent, be compared to 
that of having incompatible desires. Of course, we all experience con-
flicting desires in our life ( 11 1 want that dress 11 , 11 1 don•t want to pay so 
much for it11 ) and we may even experience incompatible desires ( 11 1 want to 
drink 11 and 11 1 don•t want to drink11 -I am thirsty but the only liquid 
available is cold, unsweetened coffee). The case of incompatible desires 
need not constitute a paradox (see footnote (1)), but the case of incom-
patible beliefs is somewhat more problematic since beliefs aim at the truth. 
If there are inconsistent beliefs within the same belief system it means 
that not all the beliefs can be true. A rational person, aware of the 
inconsistency, will change his beliefs to fit the facts. However, the 
self-deceiver does not reach this stage. He keeps the two inconsistent 
beliefs in his belief system but, as a rationally competent person, he 
cannot allow himself to become aware of the inconsistency, something that 
would be all too obvious if he should try to conjoin consciously the two 
incompatible beliefs (a seemingly- impossible task) or even if he held both 
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beliefs in the same focus of attention. How he can circumvent becoming 
aware of the incompatibility within his belief system is to keep the two 
incompatible beliefs apart. The agent does not, of course, do this 
consciously (that would defeat the self-deceptive project before it 
started), but the agent•s wish to believe that£ ensures that the belief 
that£ and the belief that not-£ are kept apart through mental distance. 
For e~ample, an educator believes that corporal punishment is bad and 
during lectures he argues most sincerely and convincingly against corporal 
punishment. Yet, when he is at home, he frequently gives his naughty 
young son sound hidings. This example does not show how the incompatibility 
disappears, but shows that people can, quite sincerely, hold two incompatible 
beliefs. The form of the epistemological paradox which is applicable here 
is: aBp+aB-p, with mental distance separating the two.(S} What allows the 
rational educator to keep the beliefs apart can be an inability or disin-
clination to think things through (this then is rather a case of irrational 
belief-formation than of self-deception} or his desire for£ which motivates 
him to keep the belief that£ and the belief that not-£ apart (a case of 
self-deception). If, however, after someone has pointed out this incon-
sistency, he still clings to both beliefs, we are faced with a more 
problematic case of self-deception in which he would not only have to 
conceal from himself the belief that not-£ when he is at home, and to conceal 
from himself the belief that£ when he is lecturing (i.e. primary deception) 
but he will also have to conceal from himself the belief that he is holding 
two incompatible beliefs (i.e. secondary deception). Using the strategy 
which operates on material already in the mind, he may resort to self-
deceptive tactics like rationalization in which a pseudo-reason is fabricated 
in order to rationalize his action of beating his son. This notion of 
mental distance does not so1ve the epistemological paradox ---it merely 
shows that the self-deceiver can hold two incompatible beliefs in the same 
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belief system, but the above interpretation does not show how mental 
distance functions, i.e. the mechanics of mental distance. Problematic 
questions arise: how does the wish manage to keep the two beliefs apart? 
and is there, on a second-order level, another belief that one must hold 
the two beliefs apart? However, I shall not dismiss the notion of 
mental distance altogether. In, Chapters 5 and 6 I shall again refer to 
mental distance, but in the employ of a more radical type of self-deception 
(cases 3 and 4) and shall look at the mechanics which keep the two incom-
patible beliefs apart. 
Haight argues that whether A can simultaneously believe that£ and believe 
- that not-£ depends on: 
....... whether A can do two different things at 
the same time, each of which counts independently 
as actual belief. For example, if merely acting 
as if were enough to count and so was sincere and 
intelligent assent even when unspoken, A would need 
only to act as if £with a sincere mental reser-
vation that not-£ and the thing would be done ... 
(1980, p.18) (4) 
Here self-deception moves into the realm of rOle-playing which is an all 
too familiar form of 11Weak 11 self-deception, like the unsavoury character 
who acts as if he is (and he sincerely believes himself to be) the hero of 
every female•s fantasies. The fact that he is spurned by every woman he 
meets does not seem to deter him in the slightest nor to change his irra-
tional belief. Self-deceptive rOle-playing does not refer to doing a 
job (like an actress who 11 lives 11 herself into the character she is portraying) 
or to amuse oneself or others. Self-deceptive rOle-playing employs the 
strategy that operates through output, 11 the backward connection .. , and has 
as its aim to inculcate a certain belief in the player which will override 
other beliefs that we think he must have and should acknowledge. At the 
beginning of Chapter 1 I listed various 11 typical 11 cases of self-deception, 
131 
including the one of the physicist who refuses to acknowledge that his 
research in nuclear arms contributes to warfare in general. He may 
justify his belief by evaluating himself purely in the role of a scientist---
i.e. a discoverer of knowledge. He may identify himself as nothing but 
a scientist, which then absolves him of the political or so~ial repurcussions 
of his research. Or, at least, he identifies himself solely in terms of 
his scientific rOle as far as the ethics of his work are concerned, i.e. the 
advancement of knowledge. By acting the rOle of the scientist purely 
concerned with intellectual discovery, he may come to get the belief that 
his responsibility as a scientist is solely that of intellectual discovery, 
regardless .. of the consequences of that discovery. 
Of course, one of the best known examples of self-deceptive role-playing 
is that of Sartre's waiter (1958, part I, ch.II, sec.2). The man plays 
the socially expected rOle of a waiter while he is attending to the diners. 
The man is dictated by the part he and society see him in. Since he-has 
not freely chosen to play this role as he does, his behaviour carries a 
stamp of artificiality-he is a little too quick, too eager, too solicitous. 
This kind of role-playing denotes an aspect of bad faith, or self-deceptions 
since the waiter believes that he is determined by the role socially 
assigned to a waiter. In fact, according to Sartre, he could at any 
moment choose to behave otherwise, but he manages to obscure himself from 
the truth, namely that at any moment he could stop behaving as he does. 
He evades the responsibility of 11 being-in-itself11 - he denies that he can 
be other than he pretends to be. Instead, he sees himself as caught in 
the role of a waiter in the mode of ••being-what-he-is-not... His desire to 
escape his responsibility motivates him to form and accept the comforting 
belief that he is nothing but a waiter, a role in which the patterns of 
behaviour are socially determined. And by behaving like a waiter should, 
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he provides support for the belief that he is nothing but a waiter, 
a self-deceptive belief which absolves him from taking responsibility 
for his own actions. Since this is a role forced on him, he also 
absolves himself of the responsibility for choice and, he believes, of 
the capacity for choice. With no capacity for choice, he is no longer 
troubled by the irrationality of his actions, since it is not something 
he has brought about; it was forced on him. The waiter, therefore, 
escapes from the anguish of the responsibility that his acts are totally 
hiw own, via bad faith, by inventing some k·ind of psychological determinism 
which forces him to act as he does. Phillips makes (1981, p.30ff} an 
interesting observation. According to the Sartrean view then, an effective 
waiter is necessarily a victim of bad faith in that the job prescription of 
waiting on tables necessarily involves duties which make it impossible for 
the waiter to be himself--- e.g. to be courteous when, in fact, he is 
annoyed; he has to smile when, in fact, he dislikes the customer, etc. 
There can, therefore, according to Sartre•s argument, be no authentic choice 
to be a waiter. 
The tactics of both mental distance (keeping two conflicting beliefs apart) 
and role-playing can be employed at the same time by the self-deceiver. 
These two tactics are not always separate, but are often used by the self= 
deceiver to re-inforce his irrational belief and behaviour. The combination 
of the two tactics re-inforce the irrationality as follows: because he 
believes that R he acts in a certain way, and because he acts in a certain 
way it must mean that he believes that R· The role-player can draw upon 
two different belief systems, each role calling upon and generating a 
specific belief system. Of course, the bulk of the belief systems overlap, 
e.g. he believes that he lives in Cape Town regardless of what role he is 
playing (whether that of faithful husband or that of carefree bachelor), 
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but through role-playing he can keep the irrational action coupled 
with the irrational belief apart from the other role coupled with the 
conflicting belief. The same criticism of mental distance applies to 
role-playing in that there is no explanation of how the schism between 
two roles is maintained, or of the mechanics of a possible dominance by 
the prefered rOle. (A complete take-over by the irrational role, however, 
seems to steer us into the designated area of multiple-personality, such 
as the well-known cases of Eve and Sybil). The role-player, however, has 
the added advantage over the self-deceiver who employs only mental distance 
as a self-deceptive tactic: through behaving as if the irrational belief 
were true~ the role player re-inforces his belief and supplies himself 
with concrete evidence (i.e. his actions) that supports the favoured 
belief, draping it in an artificial cloak of rationality. 
It is interesting to note the idea of role-playing in its extreme form, 
i.e~ split personality. Haight cites instances (1980, p.133ff) where one 
of the "selves" of the split personality had privileged access to the other 
"self" but not vice versa. In such a case it is, of course, possible to 
conceive literal self-deception in its most problematic form, i.e. one 
self deceiving the other by manipulating its consciousness.· Here we en-
counter two "selves" housed in one body. Since the two "selves" seem to 
have two different personalities and belief systems, the one not having 
access to the other, it is easy to see how self A1 can deceive self A2. 
A (comprised of A1+A2), therefore, can believe that Rand can believe that 
not-.E_.(6) Because "multiple personalities" are far removed from typical 
cases of self-deception, I am not going to deal with the obvious objections 
that can be raised about split personalities (e.g. can the two "selves" 
really count as "a" self that deceives 11itself"? and is the belief that .E. 
in the consciousness of A1 or in the unconscious of A2 when A2 is 
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"operating"? etc.). We may learn something from these psychological 
exceptions about the nature of self~deception, but what is of real 
interest is the fact that rational, sane beings are able to deceive them~ 
selves. 
I shall now return to the theory of cognitive dissonance that I first 
mentioned in the previous chapter. Although cognitive dissonance is in 
itself not a psychological device for self-deception, it is of importance 
for it is a motive for self-deception, an especially strong motive for the 
use of selective exposure to information (the same as one-sided evidence 
gathering) and for rationalization. Before looking at the important 
device of rationalization, I shall therefore return to the findings of the 
Festinger school of cognitive dissonance and will show how rationalization 
has been employed by the subjects in the experiment in order to reduce 
cognitive dissonance. 
" (Cognitive dissonance is) the jarring relation 
that holds between beliefs, or between beliefs 
and actions, when they belong to an irrational 
sequence • • . According to dissonance theory, if 
a person says something he feels is untrue, he 
experiences dissonance: the cognition 'I said x• 
is dissonant with the cognition 'I believe not-x•. 
In order to reduce dissonance, he might attempt-
to convince himself that what he said was not so 
very untrue." (Pears, 1982, p. 280) 
If we return to the experiment in which the students had to lie (see 
Chapter 3), it seems that the students, in order to reduce dissonance, look 
for justification of their saying~· The results of the experiment show 
that the greater the justification (e.g. a great deal of money was paid for 
telling the lie) for saying the opposite,~, to what they believe, not-~, 
the less dissonance between the act of lying and the belief that the lie 
is a serious one. Interpreting the cognitive dissonance theory in this 
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way seems to steer my discussion in the direction of akrasia, acting 
against one's own better judgment (the jarring relation between final 
judgment and action), whereas I am really concerned with self-deception, 
the jarring relation that holds between beliefs. However, the above 
experiment is applicable to self-deception as well. First of all, the 
students experienced dissonance due to the conflict between the belief 
that lying is wrong and the awareness of having told a lie. To decrease 
dissonance they may proceed in two different ways: first of all, they 
could 11 SUppress 11 the awareness of their akratic act. This, however, is 
a drastic tactic, one whose success is not guaranteed-the awareness may 
surface at any time, doubling the dissonance experienced: that is, the 
dissonance created by the 11 re-surfaced 11 awareness of the akratic act as 
well as by the awareness that he was trying to suppress the awareness of 
having told the lie. This form of self-deception which employs the 
psychological device of suppressing an unwelcome belief is certainly not 
impossible, but it constitutes a more problematic case of self-deception 
which will be discussed later. The other approach to decreasing dissonance 
is to tackle the other part of the conflict, viz. the belief that lying is 
wrong. 
The student's desire to believe that he has not done wrong (or that what 
he has done is not so very wrong) motivates him to look for reasons that 
will justify him to change the belief that lying is wrong. To change the 
belief does not necessarily mean to negate it. Change can imply a 
modification of the belief. The great deal of money that was paid is the 
justification he concentrates on in order to change the belief that lying 
is wrong to the belief that some lying is not so wrong. He may reason that 
the money he received will be put to good use (e.g. a donation to a morally 
worthy cause) and since the consequences of the lie are good, the lie 
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itself cannot be all bad. The initial belief "lying is wrong" which 
brought about dissonance has been camouflaged into the belief "some 
lying is not so wrong", thereby reducing the dissonance brought about 
by the awareness of his akratic act. It may be argued that what happens 
here is merely that a large temptation excuses a wrongful action. 
However, there is a difference. By merely appealing to the -large temptation 
of the money, the student may excuse his behaviour, but he doesn't try to 
change his belief that he did wrong. He exonerates himself from responsi~ 
bility by casting the large temptation in the role of an outside force---
one that overwhelmed his better judgment. The self-deceiver, on the other 
hand, tries to reduce his cognitive dissonance by changing his belief 
that he did. wrong. The reduction in dissonance can be set out as follows: 
1. He holds the belief "lying is wrong" 
2. He has the awareness "I lied" 
3. As a rational person he, therefore, concludes, "I did wrong." This 
conclusion is in direct conflict with 
4. the desire to believe, "I am a good person" and he, therefore, 
experiences great dissonance. 
In order to reduce the dissonance he embarks on a self-deceptive project: 
5. by exposing hims.elf to selective infonnation sources, he deduces 
from the biased evidence the belief "lies with good consequences are 
not wrong" 
6. He re-evaluates 11 1 lied 11 to 11 1 told a lie that will have good 
consequences 11 
7. and reaches the conclusion, 11 1 did not do wrong 11 , an opposite belief 
to the one in (3) and one which is not in conflict with 
8. the desire to believe 11 1 am a good person 11 , and so the dissonance is 
greatly reduced. 
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According to Pears, the really uncomfortable dissonance is that created 
by the akratic act, i.e. the act of lying and the belief that the lie 
is a serious one. 11 The strategy of self-deception in such a case is to 
reduce the really uncomfortable dissonance by creating a less uncomfor-
table dissonance, which is, in any case, concealed from the subject 
because-self-deception is usually a self-covering operation.•• (Pears, 1982a, 
p.2BO). For Pears, then, the most important device is that of self-
deception in the employ of akrasia, that is to reduce dissonance. This 
first part is, therefore, primary deception. But a problem is immediately 
apparent: as a rational being he is aware of the jarring relation that 
holds between h.i.s belief and action and tries to mask this 11 irrational 
sequence11 with a rational facade. To bring this about he calls on the 
services of self-deception, especially those of rationalization. But the 
self-deceptive project can have the opposite effect on him: instead of 
decreasing dissonance between the action and belief, it can increase 
dissonance between his beliefs. As a rational person, the self-deceiver 
must be aware of the jarring relation that holds between his beliefs-----
between his information about the circumstances of the lie and his mini-
mization of its seriousness. In other words, the dissonance experienced 
as a result of his awareness of his self-deception calls for a secondary 
self-deceptive project to reduce dissonance caused by awareness of the 
first project. For Pears, however, this awareness constitutes the 11 less 
uncomfortable dissonance, 11 a dissonance that is dissipated by secondary 
deception, 11 a self-covering ope~ation. 11 
Now that cognitive dissonance, as a motive for rationalization, has been 
discussed, it is necessary to look at how the self-deceiver goes about 
looking for justification of his irrational belief or his akratic action. 
Rationalization can take various forms: the self-deceiver may 11 fool himself 11 
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about his real reasons for an act by evading the real reasons, or he 
may try to justify a belief or act by finding 11 good reasons 11 for it, 
by fabricating pseudo-reasons. In the latter case, he, therefore, looks 
for 11 rational 11 justification by constructing a pseudo-reason that supports 
his favoured belief. He can look for these pseudo-reasons either by 
the aforementioned process of selective exposure to information, or he 
may fabricate a pseudo-reason that is totally unfounded by any evidence. 
Either way, the method of obtain.ing the pseudo-reasons is irrational. 
However, rationalization can extend to the general case of a person's 
explaining away what he would normally regard as adequate evidence for a 
certain proposition, but, as Bach points out (1980, p.358) there is 
nothing intrinsically irrational about explaining away evidence against 
what we already believe. Bach notes that 11 this is part and parcel of good 
scientific method -theories should not be discarded without a fight-
and of everyday" thinking as wel1. 11 (p.358). We often look for errors in 
11 recalcitrant experiences .. rather than adjust our beliefs immediately and 
without question, but the boundary which separates this rational practice 
from the irrational practice of the same method is vague. Perhaps the 
work of intrinsic irrationality can be found in the practice of explaining 
away evidence against a belief purely because the evidence weighs against 
what one desires, especially if in the absence of that desire one would 
adjust one's belief to the evidence. 11The rationalizer does not disregard 
the evidence against what he desires but explains it away by constructing 
hypotheses that render it compatible with what he desires ... (p.359). 
The rationalizer's "reasoning11 aims at convincing him that he is justified 
in holding the belief that£· As a rational person, he knows that one 
does something because one has a reason for doing it, and by evading the 
real reason, he is able, through rationalization, to provide himself with 
another more acceptable reason for his akratic action or irrational belief. 
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Typical rationalizations include 11 Sweet lemons .. , e.g. a girl, whose 
hero left her for another, marries 11 the next best11 and exaggerates his 
merits to show others and to convicne herself that she really got what 
she wanted. Another typical form of rationalization is 11 sour grapes 11 
in which the girl may play down her attraction to the hero to such an 
extent that she persuades herself that she never wanted to marry him in 
the first place and that she is actually glad to be rid of him. The 
rationalizer may also blame circumstances (e.g. the bad workman who blames 
his tools for his own shoddy work) or other people (e.g. the ~tudent who 
fails his driving test blames the examiner for his failure by claiming 
that the examiner had a personal grudge against him). 
Pears notes a phenomenon that arises from the cognitive dissonance theory, 
viz. that 9f 11 Spreading11 • (Pears, 1984, p.57). When someone has come to 
- -
a conclusion after long deliberation between two 11 Close run .. beliefs, he 
is likely to feel uncomfortable about the precariously held final choice. 
In order_ to rid himself of this uncomfortable feeling, he may exaggerate 
the considerations that favoured it and minimize the considerations that 
counted against it. Although this form of rationalization is very similar 
to that of 11 sour grapes 11 and 11 Sweet lemons11 in which the person has to 
make the most of something that was forced on him, 11 Spreading 11 differs 
slightly in that it is aimed at reassuring the person that he was not mis-
taken in the choice he made voluntarily. 
The cognitive dissonance I am interested in, especially as a motive for 
rationalization, is the tension, amounting to inconsistency, amongst a 
person•s beliefs and attitudes. Even though all the above forms of ration-
alization seem to involve fooling oneself about one•s real reasons or fab-
ricating pseudo-reasons for the akratic act, rationalization aims at making 
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the belief about the reason for the action more acceptable to the self-
deceiver. The self-deceiver does not fool herself about the nature of 
the actual action- she does not deny that she no longer has her "hero"-
but she fools herself about the belief about the reasonibr the termination 
of the relationship. Pears notes that another way of reducing the 
dissonance is not only to rationalize the belief about the reason for the 
action, but also to rationalize the belief about the actual nature of the 
action. The self-deceiver can change his belief after the action and 
then-evaluate his action in terms of the new belief, leading him to change 
his mind about the wrongness of the action. (The step-by-step analysis 
of how he accomplishes this was noted earlier on.) In the example of 
the students, a more drastic form of rationalizing the belief about the 
nature of the action, a form of "white washing" the lie, was the claim by 
the students that they had actually held the changed belief before they 
told-the lie. The students• wish to be rational is the motivating factor 
for this more drastic form of "white washing". It is this very wish to 
be rational that directly produced the belief that they had been rational 
by acting in accordance with an already held belief, and not a belief that 
was formed after the act. 
I have devoted quite a large section to cognitive dissonance and the self= 
deceptive tactic of rationalization in order to decrease dissonance, but 
how exactly do these issues confront the paradoxes of self-deception? 
Other theories of self-deception explain away the epistemological paradox 
through e.i ther an absence of the true be 1 i ef that not-..e. (e.g. evasion, 
jamming, failure to focus) or a lack of certainty about the truth of the 
belief that not-£, or falsity of the belief that E. (brought about by a 
refusal to collect all the evidence) or by keeping the belief that not-..e. 
and the belief that E. apart in the mind so that the self-deceiver need not 
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become aware of the contradiction within his belief system (through 
mental distance and rOle-playing). Rationalization, however, aims at 
changing the belief that not-~ so that it is more in line with the belief 
that .E.· The closer the belief that not-~ (e.g. 11 lying is wrong 11 ) can be 
brought to the belief that~' the less apparent and uncomfortable the con-
tradiction (e.g. 11 Some lying is not so wrong 11 ). Through selective exposures 
he finds justification for changing the belief that not-~.· Again, I want 
to stress that rationalization is not usually used as an isolated tactic 
of self-deception. More often than not, in real-life situations, ration-
alization is backed up by other self-deceptive tactics like evasion, mental 
distance, failure to focus, etc. 
I want to illustrate this point with an example from Gide's Symphonie 
Pastorale. Palmer (1979b, p.88ff) also refers to the pastor who deceives · 
himself into believing the opposite of what he knows to be the truth. 
The pastor is in love with the blind girl Gertrude who has been placed in 
his care. After returning from a concert with her, he is reproached by 
his-wife that he does things-for Gertrude which he would never have done 
for his own children. He deceives himself by thinking that his wife's 
reproach was unfair because she knew perfectly well that the other children 
were occupied in some other way, and Amelie, his wife, has no interest in 
music in any case. The pastor deceives himself as follows: his wife's 
alleged indifference to music and his children's prior engagements are 
actual facts which he construes as the reasons for failing to invite them 
when, in fact, the real reason is that he wished to be alone with Gertrude. 
His failure to invite his family along (which points to his wanting Gertrude 
to himself and his feelings of love for her) is rationalized by claiming 
that because the others were busy and uninterested in music he did not invite 
them and there was, therefore, nothing else for him to do but go alone with 
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Gertrude. The pastor, thus, provides himself with another more accept-
able reason-the rationalized reason-for his action. Rationalization 
in this way reduces cognitive dissonance in that the pastor persuades him-
self that his actiun of failing to invite the others (or rather his belief 
about the action) has a justified cause. Rationalization is normally 
used by the self-deceiver after the action has been done or after the evi-
dence has been confronted, but the self-deceiver can also "backdate" the 
newly rationalized belief about the reason for the action to before the 
action took place so that this "justified" belief would make the action 
. appear to_be rational. The pastor evades questions that might make him_ 
aware of the real reason for fa:iling to invite them (i.e. the desire to be 
alone with his beloved), by filling his mind with other considerations. 
He admits that after the concert he forgot to buy the cotton reels Amelie 
had requested but, he tells himself, he is more vexed with himself for this 
small oversight than she could ever be. Had not his conduct been beyond 
reproach? By cluttering his mind with these sanctimonious observationss 
he deceives himself by ignoring the painful questions which, had he been 
honest with himself, he would have put to himself. He ignores questions 
about the nature of his relationship with Gertrude or whether it was right 
to make the visit in the first place. The parson, by concentrating on 
"safe" issues, blinds himself to certain things that are obvious to the 
reader, as well as blinding himself to certain things that should be obvious 
to him. Martin points out that most people have some concern for goodness 
but that often other motives or desires prompt actions inconsistent with that 
concern. Rationalization "provides an easy way to engage in wrong doing 
while making our sins 'sit a little easy' on our minds." (Martin, 1986, p.35) 
I now want to turn to Fingarette's account of self-deception which, he 
believes, escapes the paradox. He proposes a different approach to the 
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analysis of self-deception, "one which does not centre on the co-existence 
of inconsistent beliefs, and indeed does not centre on the understanding 
of self-deception in tenns of belief at all." (1982, p.212). Fingarette 
is not the first to approach human judgment in terms of volition. Hume, 
as cited by Cohen (1986, p.93), states that "belief is more properly an 
act of the sensitive, than of the cogitative part of our nature ... 
Fingarette argues, in outline, as follows: many of the foregoing accounts 
are misleading because they are couched in the wrong terms. They are 
couched in what he calls "cognition-perception" tenns. The epistemological 
paradox arises because self-deception is defined as "believing what one 
knows to be false", or "consciously holding two conflicting beliefs at the 
·same time but deliberately not seeing one of them", or "a conflict state 
in which one partially satisfies the criteria for both belief and disbelief 11 , 
or "buried knowledge." Instead of asking questions about a self-deceiver 
like "If, in his heart the self-deceiver 'knows• does he really know?", 
i.e. questions in cognition tenns, Fingarette suggests that we should ask 
"How is he engaged in the world? 11 and "Does he express this engagement 
explicitly?", i.e. questions in volition-action terms. Fingarette suggests 
that, while the concept "consciousness" can be retained, it should be split 
from the cognition-perception family of concepts, and be treated as 
part of the "volition-action" family. Consciousness for Fingarette should 
be thought of as an active mental skill rather than a passive mental mirror. 
Consciousness, then, is the exercise of the skill of "spelling out" some 
feature of the world as we are engaged in it. Fingarette concludes that 
11 it is when we judge that there is purposeful discrepancy between the way 
the individual really is engaged in the world and the story he tells him-
self that we have the complex but common form of self-deception in which we 
are interested." (1969, p.63). In other words, the self-deceiver is en-
gaged in the world in some way, and yet he refuses to identify himself as 
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one who is so engaged; he refuses to acknowledge the engagement as his. 
For Fingarette, therefore, self-deception turns upon the personal identity 
one has accepted of oneself, rather than the beliefs one has. 
Before going on to look at Fingarette•s account of personal identity, I 
want to note Hanson•s explanation of self-deception which takes as its 
star~ing point Mead•s idea than an individual perspective is tenable only 
if it functions within a set of perspectives found in the conduct of the 
community. . For Hanson, attributions of self-deception are connected with 
breakdowns or difficulties in the organization of perspectives, especially 
tensions between an individual•s perspective and that of _!he community. 
For Hanson, therfore, as for Fingarette, self-deception centres on personal 
perspectives rather than on intellectual beliefs. "If the self-deceiver 
is described as one who holds inconsistent or incompatible beliefs,_ the ___ _ 
special puzzle of self-deception is lost; or, rather, self-deception is 
not captured in the description, as its puzzle has not been found: Who 
but a Descartes would think possible the task of sorting out all of his or 
her beliefs?11 (Hanson, 1986, p.109). Very few people are skilled enough 
logicians to recognize inconsistencies within their belief systems, or to 
know the full extent of the implications of their beliefs. This observa-
tion seems to return us to Davidson•s point which I noted earlier on: i.ec 
the distinction between internal and external irrationality. Hanson•s 
self-deceiver may be externally irrational, but it is only when the agent 
is aware not only of the beliefs but also of the fact that they, together, 
are inconsistent, that we have the special and problematic case of inner 
i rra tiona 1 i ty. 
Fingarette states that a personal identity is established in some respects 
through the individual •s avowing or accepting certain engagements as his. 
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The self is a synthesis, an achievement by the individual, something he 
has "made". Fingarette substantiates the creation of the self as a 
synthesis by tracing specific forms of engagements in the world by the 
developing child. From rudimentary engagements such as opening a door, 
etc., he later, as the engagements become more complex, learns about 
emotions and morals. The engagements blend into one another as a 
"coherent self" emerges. 
"Certain forms of engagement or even some 
particular ones are taken up into the ever-
forming, ever-growing personal self, and they 
· are modified as they become more and more an 
integral part of this •synthesis•. • ••• To 
take something into the self is an •act• which 
our notion of personal identity presupposes •••• 
If there were no such thing as a person•s ack-
nowledging some identity as his and certain en-
gagements as his, and disavowing other identities 
and engagements, there would be neither persons 
·nor personal identity." (Fingarette, 1969, p.86-87) 
According to Fingarette, self-deception then occurs when the person•s en-
gagement is unacceptable to himself or when· the engagement conflicts with 
his "self-synthesis". If he were to avow it as his engagement, it would 
lead to intensely disruptive and distressing consequences. Since the en-
gagement is utterly incompatible with the currently achieved synthesis of 
self the agent has, the engagement is an autonomous project; one that 
seems to exist in a certain isolation from the self. The engagement must 
be divorced from the complex unity of the personal self, otherwise the 
person•s usual reasonableness and values would have a tempering effect on 
the engagement. Fingarette•s explanation of self-deception, therefore, 
is that it is a refusal to avow one•s engagement in the world, due to a 
painful conflict between one•s moral image of oneself and the actual pattern 
of one•s conduct. To resolve the conflict, while continuing the course 
of action in which he is immorally (according to the self-synthesis) engaged, 
the self-deceiver denies that it is his engagement. He protests that the 
• Q 
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person thus engaged is not the 11 real" he, thereby 11 0Stracising a part 
of himself by regarding it as an alien force. On this model, self-
deception is accomplished by means of self-amputation ... (Abelson, 1977, p.98) 
Having disavowed the engagement, the self-deceiver is then forced into 
protective, defensive tactics to account for the inconsistencies in his 
engagement in the world as acknowledged by him. Fingarette states that 
the self-deceiver develops a 11 Cover-story11 • Initially, as he comes near 
the danger zone or 11 hidden area 11 in question, there will, during the nonna1 
spelling out of his engagements in the world, be 11 breaks11 or 11 gaps .. - o_f non-
spelling out. The covering up of his own refusal to spell out (i.e. he 
does not spell out why he is not spelling out) is secondary deception. 
Spelling out takes place because of the presence of certain reasons an·d 
non-spelling out takes place because there are reasons against doing so.· 
It seems then that Fingarette 1 s skill of spelling out has a daunting task 
in self-deception: not only must the skill be able to spell out reasons 
for not spelling out a certain engagement, it must also be able to cover the 
gaps that will appear in his normal spelling-outs, whenever he gets too 
close to the distressing engagement that is hidden from the rest of the self. 
In other words, the skill of spelling out must be able to spell out why it 
is not spelling out. Fingarette has to explain not only how the self-
deceiver does not 11 Spell out .. his engagement, but also how he has somehow 
rendered himself incapable of doing it. The answer to this is that the 
skill in spelling out must be self-covering, i.e. it must enable the individual 
successfully to avoid spelling out its own exercise involved in assessing 
the reasons against the spelling out of the engagement in question. For 
otherwise, the whole exercise will be self-defeating. 
11 I find there is a strong and preponderant reason 
for not spelling out-even to myself-that I 
have been a failure in realizing a certain ambition. 
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Consequently I adopt the policy of not spelling 
this out. What is more, this policy obligates 
me as well not to spell-out my having made such 
an assessment of the situation and my having 
adopted this tactic. For, obviously, to spell-
out my assessment would be to spell-out that I 
consider myself a failure, and that there are 
reasons for not admitting this even to myself ••• 
And to spell-out the policy adopted as a result of 
the assessment would be to spell-out the fact that, 
though I have been a failure, my policy now is not 
to spell this out even to myself. In either case--
whether I spell-out the assessment or the policy"-
it would amount to a clear abandonment of the 
-would-be pol icy." (Fingarette, 1969, p.49) 
Self-deception then consists in a self-covering exercise of the skill of 
spelling out in deliberately avoiding spelling out a particular engagement 
of the individual. The self-deceiver uses this skill "as inventively as 
possible in order to fill in plausibly the gaps created by his self-covering 
policy •••• Cut of this protective tactic emerge the masks, disguises, 
rationalizations and superficialities of self-deception in all its forms." 
( p.50). 
Fingarette's theory has certain attractions. It seems to offer a solution 
to the epistemological paradox in that the availability of the skill of 
spelling out enables the individual not to be explicitly conscious of certain 
motives, aims and intentions of his, by refusing to spell these out. By 
the same token, the account seems to explain also the psychological paradox 
by laying bare the intentional character of self-deception; the shame in 
acknowledging the engagement as his motivates the individual to disavow 
the engagement in question. Furthermore, our feeling that there is in some 
sense deep insincerity involved in self-deception seems to be justified by 
the account. 
But by circumventing the "cognition-perception" paradoxes, the account en-





speculations about what the self-deceiver does, but no analysis is 
presented and it is not clear how an analysis could be extracted from 
these speculations. He does say that the self-deceiver "persistently 
avoids spelling-out some feature of his engagement in the world11 (p.47} 
but it is not obvious how to construe this analysis, especially because 
there is no explicit indication of what sort of proposition the self-
deception is supposed to be about. The weak point of the theory is that 
the skill that Fingarette talks about has simply too much work to do. 
It seems as though the skill to spell out must spell out to itself what 
it must not spell out to the person, in other words, it must nullify its 
own·-exercise since the skill must not spell out. Fingarette•s theory 
invokes another equally paradoxical notion:· i-t seems to be the case that 
in self-deception one recognizes and yet deliberately avoids recognizing; 
one grasps and yet deliberately avoids grasping. Therefore, Fingarette's 
skill which is supposed to explain the paradox is itself paradoxical, 
insofar as it has to do, at one and the same time,. two contradictory things: 
to spell out and not to spell out. 
Moreover~ the ski 11 invokes the problem of consi:i ousness. We have the 
paradox that the self-deceiver is engaged in the world somehow, he assesses 
this fact, but finds over-riding reasons not to spell it out. Either 
this engagement-plus-assessment-plus-decision operates entirely without. 
consciousness or it does not. If it does operate without consciousness~ 
then self-deception is purely figurative, a metaphor based on other-deception, 
but not literal self-deception. If it does not, then the self-deceiver 
must somehow be conscious of the engagement, or part of it, and the theory 
is returned to the paradox it wished to evade in the first place. Further-
more, the question arises whether the inability to spell out his engagement 
is an involuntary inability (rationally or psychological incompetent? or 
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prevented by some alien force?) or is it a voluntary refusal, a deliberate 
rejection? Does the self-deceiver really believe that the engagement is 
not his own or does he merely pretend so? 
Haight argues that we cannot understand self-deception merely in action-
volition terms: "as long as self-deceivers are people, 'know• and 'believe' 
must apply to them somehow." (1980, p.92). Of course, deception in 
general does have an action-volition side (A makes B believe that!), but 
i~ tells only half the story. It is not at all clear that Fingarette's 
skill of spelling out can operate except in terms of language and cognition.(?) 
The essential thing about the skill is that it enables the individual to 
assess· the reason for and against spelling-out a certain engagement~ - How 
can one assess reasons without using concepts like: noticing, r~tognition, 
be 1 i ef ,- argument, etc.? 
Another objection can be raised. It is true that a person deceives himself 
through his own agency, but in deceiving himself a person is not only an 
agent, he is also the victim of his own act of deception. Fingarette's 
theory does not offer an adequate explanation of how the self-deceiver is 
also a passive victim, a state which marks the distinction between self-
deception and hypocrisy. Moreover, Fingarette commits the error of inter-
preting all cases of self-deception as being motivated by shame. It cer-
tainly is a serious kind of self-deception, but definitely not the only 
kind. For example, there is no shame involved in the case of the mother 
who deceives herself about her son's death--- distress, anxiety certainly, 
but no shame or guilt. She may be criticized for being irrational but 
not for non~acknowledgement of her moral duties. Abelson (1977, p.98) 
points out that even in cases of moral self-deception, Fingarette fails to 
distinguish between cases in which the self-deceiver excuses himself on the 
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grounds that his actions are not really his own (the only case Fingarette 
examines, although not the ones in which the agent pleads coercion by 
some force) and cases in which the self-deceiver has genuinely persuaded 
himself that he was justified in a course of action that by all objective 
standards is immoral. 
And lastly, if the self-deceiver does not avow the engagement as his, does 
not accept responsibility for it, why then the elaborate "cover up" tactics? 
If he doesn•t avow it as his in the first place, there is no need to employ 
-self-deceptive strategies so that he does not avow the engagement as his. 
Fingarette•s own example (1969, p.30) is of a person who has cancer but 
refuses to- acknowledge it. The cancerous-self is, therefore, an engagement 
which he disavows, and avows only the healthy-self as engagement. The -
cancerous-self is, thus, no part of his synthesized identity, his belief~ 
system, his values, his attitudes, etc. But if it is not there, why 
deceive himself about it? After all, the disavowed cancerous-self is not 
spelt-out, not "registered in the mind". Following Pears• argument about 
irrationality (see beginning of Chapter 3), if the conflicting belief or 
awareness is not registered in the mind, the question of irrationality is 
greatly deflated. 
So it seems as though self-deception must include a "cognition-perception" 
element, but just how rigidly beliefs and thoughts are applied to the 
self-deceptive process may be an area worth investigating. It has been 
suggested that the self-deceiver intentionally misinterprets the evidence, 
and to do this he must believe that the evidence does count strongly 
against £, while both interpreting it not to count strongly against £ and 
believing his interpretation. Mele (1983, p.372) suggests that this is 
not necessarily the case. The person•s misinterpretation can be explained 
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on the weaker and unproblematic supposition that he recognizes or 
believes that the evidence might be taken to count strongly against .E.· 
Furthermore, to say that the person intentionally interprets the evidence 
in the way he does, is not to say that the person intentionally misinterprets 
the evidence, i.e. that it is his intention to misinterpret the evidence. 
It may be the case, of course, but it is not necessarily so. As Mele 
remarks, the self-deceived cancer patient believes and sincerely avows that 
he will not die of cancer; nevertheles~he may believe that the chance 
that he :is. wrong is significant enough to warrant looking into funeral 
- arrangements. 
At the beginning of this chapter, I referred to the sliding scale of cases 
of self-deception. In case (1) where there is balanced evidence for .E. 
and for not-.E_, it is obvious that the evidence allows enough latitude so 
that the agent can consciously choose the evidence he wants in order to 
support his belief that .E.· He is not guilty of forming an irrational 
·belief in the face of strong counter-evidence. He is not even manipulating 
evidence to suit his belief or even avoiding evidence that supports the 
opposite belief. He is conscious of all the evidence, but he bases his 
belief on the evidence he wants. He is irrational only insofar as not 
suspending belief when faced with balanced evidence for .E. and not-.E_. As 
Pears (1974, p.103) notes, in case (1) there is no irrationality insofar 
as the agent does not flout the precept: "Accommodate your beliefs to your 
evidence." It flouts a different precept of reason: "Get all the available 
evidence that you need." This is irrationality of a different kind. 
Davidson in How is Weakness of the Will Possible? develops the idea of 
latitude in a case of self-deceptive akrasia, in which the agent•s premises 
do not actually entail the value-judgment that they indicate to be the 
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rational one to make about the particular predicament and so, under 
the influence of a rebellious desire, he is able to make the opposite 
value-judgment without contradicting himself. In this kind of case he 
has enough latitude to draw a consciously irrational conclusion. He 
makes a wishful belief on which he bases his value-judgment, and then 
goes on to perform the akratic action without inhibition. For example, 
the reformed smoker who accepts a cigarette knows that it might (but not 
that it will necessarily) revive the habit. He banks on the outcome that 
. it-won•t and is, therefore, prepared to take the risk. In this case the 
self-deceiver knows that his belief conflicts with the evidence of studies 
.done in the related fie 1 d, but he a 1 so knows that the evidence is.· i neon-
elusive. This latitude makes it possible for the wrong belief to be 
formed, i.e. 11 Smoking won•t revive the habit11 on which he bases his-value-
judgment that it is alright for him to accept the cigarette,·which he does 
without inhibition. 
I don•t want to embark on a discussion of akrasia itself, but the idea of 
latitude is useful, because it can be applied to cases of self-deception. 
People very seldomly have absolute certainty that the available evidence is 
conclusive. It is common enough to hold onto a belief even though there 
is good counter-evidence, or to refuse to accept a belief despite good 
evidence for it, because evidence is often difficult to interpret and to 
judge. As Hanson remarks, 11 We must not forget the variety and the dimensions 
of human incapacities and failures ... (1986, p.109) 
Davidson describes the notion of latitude in the following way: 
11 Probably it seldom happens that a person is certain 
that some proposition is true and also certain that 
the negation is true. A more common situation would 
be that the sum of the evidence available to the agent 
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points to the truth of some proposition, which 
inclines the agent to believe it (makes him 
treat it as more likely to be true than not). 
This inclination (high subjective probability) 
causes him .••• to seek, favour or emphasize the 
evidence for the falsity of the proposition, or 
to disregard the evidence for its truth. The 
agent then is more inclined than not to believe 
the negation of the original proposition, even 
though the totality of the evidence available 
to him does not support this attitude." 
(Davidson, 1985, p.139) 
-The analysis of self-deception operating with latitude is then that the 
self-deceiver holds the false belief that£ on the basis that he believes 
that not-£ .is more likely to be true than£, and it is this thought which 
prompts him to behave in such a way as to cause himself to believe that£· 
He does this .by means of the eight different strategies noted earlier on 
of one-sided evidence gathering and biased thinking. The paradox of self-
decepti.on i.s, thus, watered down to: self-deception is when the self-
deceiver's motivation originates in the recognition that the evidence makes 
it more likely than not that not-£ is true and that the self-deception is 
done with the intention of producing the belief that£, i.e. a belief in 
the negation of not-£, because the agent wishes that £· 
At this stage I want to note an interesting solution presented by Priest to 
the epistemological paradox. This paradox rests on the assumption that 
the self-deceiver holds both the belief that£ and its negation. But Priest 
notes that "to reject something is not to accept its negation. One can 
reject something without accepting its negation." (1986, p.105). This 
rejection of the belief that not-£ does not involve the agent•s stronger 
inclination to accept the negation of the original proposition (as with 
Davidson), but to suspend judgment altogether. For example, a man is ex-
tremely attracted to other men, is aware of this strong physical attraction, 
but because he does not want to acknowledge to himself his homosexual 
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tendencies, he deceives himself about them. But how is this self-
deception instantiated? Instead of rejecting the belief 11 I have homo-
sexual tendencies .. and accepting its negation, i.e. 11 I do not have homo-
sexual tendencies .. , he can remain agnostic. This means that he remains 
intellectually detached by neither believing it nor refusing to believe 
it. Since the self-deceiver holds neither the belief that£ nor the 
belief that not-£, the epistemological paradox is dismissed. 11 It is, 
perhaps, the confusion between rejecting something and accepting its nega-
tion which_ is at the root of the view that one cannot believe a contradic-
tion ... ( p.106). This view based on the trichotomy accept/reject/ 
_be_agnostic {or what Parsons calls the assert/deny/neither trichotomy) 
c~rtainly seems an attractive and plausible interpretation, but I think it 
is applicable. only to peripheral cases of self-deception, rather than the 
_ typical and more problematic ones in which the self-deceiver does firmly 
hold a particular belief (rather than to suspend the holding of either 
_belief) for which there is little or no direct evidence in 11weak11 self-
deception, or strong, indusputable counter-evidence in 11 hard11 self-deception. 
The world is full of confusing facts and, according to the view of many 
people, conflicting evidence, e.g. the loving father who shoots his family; 
the manufacture of nuclear arms in order to maintain peace, etc. The self-
deceiver has the comforting knowledge that inconclusive evidence allows 
him to select evidence that supports his favoured belief. Since his 
favoured belief is now 11 rationally 11 supported by evidence, the self-deceiver 
happily accepts the belief as being a rational belief. The knowledge that 
absolute certainty about the truth of anything is rare enables the person 
to adopt inconsistent beliefs. By invoking the notion of latitude, the 
meaning of 11 know 11 and 11 belief 11 is considerably watered down. 11 Know 11 is 
more like 11 suspect11 , and 11 belief11 shades into 11 0pinion 11 • With the meaning 
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of the terms watered down, the paradox is, therefore considerably 
weakened. 
"(S)elf-deceivers neither just believe, nor 
both believe and disbelieve, nor just disbelieve 
what they present themselves as believing. In-
stead, they must be seen as people who are genuinely 
uncertain whether something that they want to 
believe is really so, and who decide to act as if 
it were so not in the hope of deceiving others, but 
in the hope of eliciting decisively confirming 
evidence from others. This project of •experimen-
-tation by bluff• is a natural part of youth•s adap-
tation to reality, and may well form the preceeding 
stage of what later becomes a properly self-deceptive 
reaction to reality." (Kipp, 1980, p.316} 
Kipp's interpretation is certainly applicable to the "weak" case (1) of 
self-deception~ but not to all cases. One of the features of a more 
radical type of self-deception is that the self-deceiver deliberately avoids 
·~~§H)firming evidence from others". 
I stated that the notion of latitude weakens the paradox of E and not-E. 
The way-in which latitude deflates the epistemological paradox is that it 
allows the agent consciously to form an irrational belief when his other 
beliefs (i.e. the belief that the evidence is inconclusive) allow him to 
form it without self-contradiction. Latitude reduces the irrationality of 
the belief formed in cases (1) and (2) since the evidence allows that belief 
to be formed, but the belief, however, still remains irrational because it 
is caused purely by a wish. The agent chooses to believe that E because 
he wants to believe that£· Naturally, the agent•s latitude allowed by 
the evidence will diminish as his premises become stronger and make the 
opposite belief more probable, case (2), but it will not vanish altogether 
until they actually entail the opposite belief, cases (3) and (4). In 
these latter cases, the self-deceiver cannot consciously form a belief that 
does not fit a perceived fact in a case where there is no latitude. "For 
in such a case he would know which proposition fitted the fact and he would 
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have to believe the contradictory proposition and no sane person can 
believe this conjunction ... (Pears, 1982b, p.174). In the next two 
chapters I shall deal specifically with these problematic cases. 
As I have stated at the beginning of the chapter, these aforementioned 
solutions to the paradoxes of self-deception do give valid accounts of 
the phenomena we label as 11 Self-deception11 , but according to Pears' 
sliding scale, these various solutions cannot account for cases (3) and (4). 
In these cases the self-deceiver cannot appeal to latitude since the con-
clusion is necessarily entailed by the premises or the self-deceiver cannot 
evade or distort the counter-evidence because it is too strong and over-
powering for a sane person to avoid or change to suit his own desi~es. 
The above approaches were based on the definition of self-deception as 
persuading oneself to believe something which one suspects to be false. 
If, however, we adhere to Foss• condition for self-deception, we may well 
find ourselves returned to the paradoxes. 11 0ne thing not always recognized 
about deception is that knowledge is a prerequisite: to deceive another, 
-one must bring it about that the other believes what one knows to be false." 
(Foss, 1980, p.241). Although this is not necessarily true of all 
deception, certainly not of 11 Weak 11 deception, it does seem to apply to 
11 hard11 cases of deception, i.e. case (6) of other-deception and cases (3) 
and (4) of self-deception. It may seem as though I am contradicting my-
self by invoking Foss' requirement of knowledge for 11 hard 11 cases, when on 
~112 I invoke the requirement of knowledge for intentional cases of self-
deception. However, the interpretation of 11 knowledge 11 differs. Know-
ledge in intentional cases entails an awareness or at least suspicion about 
the truth of the belief that not-£ (or about the falsity of the belief 
that£), whereas knowledge in "hard11 cases entails a certainty about the 
truth of the belief that not-£. Add to this the Sartrean qualification 
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that the self-deceiver "must know the truth very exactly in order 
to conceal it more carefully", and we seem back in the quagmire of the 
epistemological paradox. The solutions presented in this chapter rely 
on a less strict definition of deception (i.e. to persuade oneself to 
believe something which one suspects to be false), whereas in "hard" 
cases the stricter definition is employed (i.e. to persuade oneself to 
believe something which one knows for certain to be false). In these 
cases, it does not seem possible to give a coherent account without in-
voking a Theory of Systems. 
The criticism levelled at the interpretations of "weak" self-deception may 
be-that these views regard that a person who has deceived himself about a 
particular matter as no more than that his judgment was mistaken-and that 
he should have known better. However, while this is the case in "weak" 
self-deception, such uses appear to be peripheral and not to reflect the 
central features of the concept as normally understood. "Weak" self-
- -'deception essentially implies some kind of deliberate refusal to face the 
truth or-to interpret the truth realistically. But surely matters are 
different when the self-deception is brought about and maintained by the 
self-deceiver's intentionally concealing from himself what he at the same 
time knows for certain to be the case, or when the counter-evidence is 
too obvious and overpowering to ignore, or when the deductive evidence 
necessarily entails the belief that not-R· 
11 We seem, in other words, to have arrived at the 
following unsatisfactory position: either we 
must accept a watered-down version of the concept 
that fails adequately to capture its primary 
function in thought and language, or else we must 
simply acquiesce in the existence of paradoxes 
viewed by many philosophers as falling well below 
the threshold of what is logically tolerable." 
(Gardiner, 1970, pp.231-232) 
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In the next two chapters I want to show that the different Theories 
of Systems succeed in accounting for "hard" self-deception, and that 
these theories do not fall "below the threshold of what is logically 
tolerable11 • 
* * * * * 
In this chapter I looked at various solutions that tried to explain away 
the paradoxes of self-deception. These succeeded in doing so, by basing 
_the1r interpretation of "deception" on the loose definition, an interpr~­
tation that allows the self-deceiver intentionally to cause his own self~ 
. deception without an inherent paradox. By appealing to latitude, either 
within the evidence which is inconclusive, or latitude within his own 
inductive reasoning process, the "weak" self-deceiver is able to fonn con= 
scio.usly two opposing beliefs. Other theories again have succeeded in 
explaining away the paradox by denying that self-deception necessarily en-
tails an opposite belief. But whatever the theory, as I mentioned in 
the conclusion, a cardinal feature of "hard" self-deception seems to be 
lacking, i.e. the knowledge that the self-deceiver has not only of what is 
necessarily true, but also the knowledge that he is evading, distorting or 
suppressing this truth. However, there are various degrees of self-
deception, not all cases of se1f~deception are "hard" cases, and the 
theories presented in this chapter adequately account for the phenomena of 
"weak" self-deception. I disagree with the view that these cases are 
"phenomena we falsely call 'self-deception'", since these "weak" cases of 
self-deception are analogous to "weak" cases of other-deception. Not all 
cases of self-deception fall within cases (3) and (4) and not all cases of 
other-deception entail a direct lie, case (6). But to leave the investiga-
tion into self-deception here is to tell only half the story. I shall 
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attempt in the next two chapters to present the other half, a half which 
does not exclude 11 Weak 11 self-deception, but one which complements it to 
give a coherent account of self-deception in general. 
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Notes 
1. In order to solve the apparent problem posed by conflicting desires, 
Plato divided the soul. However, there is nothing intrinsically 
paradoxical about consciously having incompatible desires. After 
all, this is an all too human affliction. We may even be aware that 
our desire cannot logically or physically be satisfiable, but that 
does not necessarily lead to the abandonment of that desire. However, 
the case of conflicting beliefs is different, because beliefs aim at 
the truth. The idea of two conflicting beliefs within one conscious 
belief system certainly seems paradoxical, but this is the case of 
"hard" self-deception with which I shall deal in Chapters 5 and 6. 
2. See Fingarette and Elster (1979, p.179). 
3. This is in direct opposition to Foss who states that knowledge is a 
necessary condition for deception. .. •••• to deceive another, one 
must bring it about that the other believes what one knows to be 
false." (1980, p.241). See also Haight (1980, p.9). 
4. For the sake of consistency within this thesis, I have swopped both 
Bach's and Haight's notation of Rand not-£. Throughout my work the 
belief that R refers to the favoured, but 1rrational belief----the 
self-deceiver desires that Rand comes to believe that R' whereas 
not-R is the truth which generates the unwelcome belief that not-R. 
Bach has chosen the exact opposite notation, i.e. the belief that£ is 
the unwelcome belief and the belief that not-R is the favoured bel1ef. 
I have changed all his notations, even in the quotes, to conform with 
my choice of notation. 
5. For an explanation of the mechanics which make mental distance possible, 
see the Freudian and Functionalists' Theories of Systems in Chapters 5 
and 6 respectively. 
6. Haight herself raises an objection to this interpretation of literal 
self-deception by A. A1(the one "self11 ) and A2 (the other 11 Self") 
may be in the same cerebral cavity, but clinical experiments have shown 
that these two selves have two different belief systems, personalities~ 
memories about experiences, etc. It is, therefore, debatable whether 
A1+A2 form a "self", a psychological unity which deceives itself. 
1. Other philsoophers have noted this objection and have developed 
Fingarette's theory to include terms of cognition. See Martin (1986~ 
p.13ff): "Full and sincere acknowledgement to others entails knowing 
or believing what one is saying. But it goes beyond mere cognitive 
states by being a revelation or open expression of what is known •••. 
There are some rough analogies between acknowledgments to others and 
to oneself. Both involve bringing into the open something that has 
been or is a likely candidate for concealment .... ($)elf-acknowledg-
ment especially requires that the belief (or knowledge) becomes active 
by being brought into an intimate relation with other aspects of the 
personality. There must be a willingness to integrate it into one's 
conscious thoughts, reasoning, emotions, attitudes, values and actions. 11 
'p.14- 15). · Cf, also Elster's (1979, p.178ff) view of self-
deception in terms of self-modification. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE FREUDIAN THEORY OF SYSTEMS 
In the last chapter I looked at various theories pertaining-to "weak" 
self-deception in which the characterising feature is the self-deceiver•s 
appeal to latitude, either in the way in which the often ambivalent evidence 
can be interpreted or in the latitude allowed via inductive reasoning in 
drawing a conclusion. However, if we move onto cases (3) and (4) the 
latitude is severely curbed and the self-deceiver can no longer ignore 
the fact that'he now holds two inconsistent beliefs, since the evidence 
which presents itself. to him necessarily implies the conclusion that not-_E.. 
As I have mentioned earlier, two inconsistent beliefs within the same 
belief system point to the fact that the beliefs cannot all be true. 
Since no sane person can rationally believe that an explicit contradiction is true 
(i.e. aB(p+-p)), the initial belief and its explicit negation ~ill have to 
be kept apart in the subject•s mind (i.e. aBp+aB-p). Pears states that 
11 The only thing that cannot happen is that two contradictory beliefs should 
be caught in the same focal consciousness and both survive. It really is 
impossible to believe the conjunction of two contradictory propositions 
if the cautionary belief is in the person•s consciousness." (1984, p.76). 
It seems as though the two inconsistent beliefs will have to be assigned 
to different systems within the same brain if successful "hard11 self-
deception is to be achieved and maintained. I have looked at how mental 
distance and role playing can, to a certain extent, succeed in maintaining 
the chasm, but the more irrational the belief or the more overwhelming the 
counter-evidence, the more drastic the self-deceptive tactics the agent must 
employ. Mental distance, Orwellian "doublethink" or self-deceptive role 
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playing can no longer do the job when the self-deceiver clearly under-
stands the concepts he is using. Then aBp+aB-p is possible as long as 
we grant the possibility of two belief systems within the person. The 
different theories of Systems have different interpretations as to what 
·these two systems encompass or how they are brought about (i.e. the 
criterion for the division). In this chapter I shall look specifically 
at the Freudian theory of the Divided Mind and at Pears• .and Fingarette•s 
modifications of it. In Chapter 6 Davidson•s Functional theory of 
Systems will be examined. The aim of the examination is to see how these 
theories overcome the four paradoxes of self-deception. 
My aim in this chapter is not to give a psychologically detailed account 
of Freud•s theory, but to sketch it broadly in general terms in order to 
examine it from a philosophical point of view. Freud•s theory about the 
way in which the two contradictory beliefs are kept apart in the self-
deceiver•s mind is that the one that gives satisfaction remains in con-
sciousness, while the other is kept out of consciousness. The criterion 
for the division in Freud•s theory of the Divided Mind is, therefore, that 
of consciousness. One of the two contradictory beliefs can be held con-
sciously in the sense that the self-deceiver is readily able and willing 
-to attend to it, whereas the threatening belief is placed in the uncon-
scious in the sense that the self-deceiver cannot readily attend to it 
(except when he is under special influences like hypnosis, drugs, psycho-
therapy, etc.). The unconscious belief which is suppressed (the unwelcome 
true belief that not-E) is the basis for the self-deception. 
Freud•s view has its attractions: if someone forms a very irrational 
belief, it seems obvious that he cannot consciously believe that it is 
very irrational. Freud was concerned mainly with the unconscious, which 
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is a permanent reservoir of deeply suppressed wishes, drives and 
thoughts. However, as I have illustrated in Chapter 4, in most cases 
of self-deception there is no deep suppression into the unconscious 
but rather a shifting away of attention from the rational belief, or 
only a shallow suppression into the preconscious {in the sense that the 
self-deceiver is not readily able, but is able with a certain amount of 
effort to attend to it), and even that only needs to last as long as is 
necessary for the particular piece of self-deception. I do not want to 
embark on a discussion of how the theory of the Divided Mind can be used 
to explain "weak" self-deception, which would entail suppressing the 
belief that not-£ into the preconscious ---this is like evading not-£ 
because one has a suspicion that not-£, but this suspicion is never clearly 
and consciously examined or evaluated by the agent. Invoking the theory 
of the Divided Mind with all its problematic philosophical implications 
in order to explain "weak" self-deception is like killing an ant with a 
sledgehammer. It can be done, very effectively, but the same result 
can be achieved by less drastic means. The "less drastic means", in 
this case, occur in the theories discussed in Chapter 4. This chapter 
will concentrate on the theory of Systems as applied to "hard" self-
deception. 
The word "conscious" forms the core of the Freudian theory and it is, there-
fore, imperative that the meaning of the word is defined. It is exactly 
this area which has given rise to various confusions, since there are at 
least two meanings of "consciousness", with some interpretations of the 
Freudian theory not stipulating which meaning is used, or even with the 
meanings used interchangeably.(1) One meaning of "consciousness" is the 
name of the main system which controls a person's life and the other meaning 
of ''consciousness" is the name of a relation between any system and the 
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elements to which it reacts, a "being aware" of certain elements 
even when they belong to a different system within the person. Tradition-
ally, Freud's split in the psyche was conceived to be between the Conscious 
and the Unconscious, each eventually conceived as a system. The two 
systems are quasi-autonomous, often incompatible with and alienated from 
each other. The Unconscious is an illogical cess-pool which operates 
according to "primary processes" in the absence of causal and temporal 
relations, whereas the Conscious operates according to the more rational 
"secondary processes". The two systems interact by way of conflict 
rather than co-operation. The central problem of the theory of consciousnes~ 
as a system is to offer an explanation of how the rational and cautionary 
beliefs are pushed into this illogical system, whereas the irrational belief 
is allowed to flourish in the more rational system. 
The later Freud describes some kinds of irrationality as forms of self-
division in which consciousness splits itself into different systems. The 
·"conscious" to which the later Freud refers should be interpreted in a 
more "functional" sense, according to Pears (1984, p.37), Fingarette (1969~ 
p.130) and Clavell (1986, p.504). In the "functional" sense, the line 
between various systems is drawn to reflect the interactions between a 
person's mental attitudes. 
" •••. in one and the same individual there can 
be several mental groupings, which can remain 
more or less independent of one another, which 
can 'know nothing' of one another and which can 
alternate with one another in their hold upon 
consciousness •.•. If, where a splitting of 
the personality such as this has occured, con-
sciousness remains attached regularly to one of 
the states, we call it the conscious mental state 
and the other, which is detached from it, the 
unconsciousness one." (Freud, "Five Lectures on 
Psychoanalysis" S.E. vol.XI, p.19) 
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Since these various groupings can "alternate with one another on 
their hold upon consciousness", the name "conscious" is not the fixed 
name of a fixed, static system, but is rather a label that can be 
attached to a particular mental state, depending on the level of aware-
ness of that particular mental state. The functional meaning of "consciousu, 
therefore, refers to a dynamic quality which can be attached to different 
systems at different times, and to the dynamic interaction that exists 
between different systems. Consciousness is not the name of a static pool 
in which certain ideas are entertained, but consciousness is itself an 
active mental force. The functional sense of consciousness means that 
different systems or elements come to attention (a kind of inner eye) so 
that they ~re conscious when attended to. Consciousness, therefore, is 
interpreted as being active, rather than passive. 
I shall first look at Freud's theory with "conscious" referring to a passive 
separate system and later at Pears• and Fingarette•s interpretations of the 
Freudian theory with 11 Conscious 11 referring to the active relationship that 
holds between the system and the elements to which it reacts. It is 
especially this functional interpretation which will form the basis for 
Davidson's theory. (see Chapter 6). 
11 (S)ome mental phenomena that we normally assume 
to be conscious, or at least available to con-
sciousness, are not conscious, and can become 
accessible only with difficulty, if at all. In 
most functional respects, these unconscious 
mental states and events are like conscious 
beliefs, memories, desires, wishes and fears." (Davidson, 1982, p.291) 
The early theory of the Divided Mind claims that the psyche of an individual 
is split, that there is some kind of duality within the mind. The con-
scious part and the unconscious part are kept separate by a "censor" which 
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prevents the self-deceiver (the self-deceiver does not prevent himself) 
from recognizing certain things about himself, e.g. deep-rooted fears 
and wishes. This is analogous to the deceived in a context of other-
deception in that the deceived is prevented from learning about matters 
which the agent does not wish the victim to know. I shall start with 
Pears' interpretation of Freud which shows that paradox 1 (and 2, 3 and 4, 
for that matter) need not arise, i.e. "If I have deceived myself that£, 
I believe that £ but at the same time I really know that not-£." 
In Chapter 2 I showed that wishful thinking is quite possible, even though 
there is no evidence for R or even when there is evidence against R· 
What happens, via the Freudian short-circuit, is that the wish for R gives 
rise to the wish to believe that R which, in turn, causes the belief that£ 
(when R is too difficult to bring about in the real world). The wish, 
therefore, produces 1) satisfaction that R when R is believed and 2) the 
actual belief that R· This Freudian short-circuit can be applied in self-
deception as well. In the Freudian account, the general wish for£ is 
the agent which sets the complex short-circuit in motion, initiating the 
whole process of self-deception. The central principle of this complex 
structure is the wish for R which is the suppressive agent, or the censor 
which stands guard in-between consciousness and the unconscious. Sartre 
conceives the psychoanalytical censor as "a line of demarcation with 
customs, passport division, currency control, etc., to re-establish the 
duality of the deceiver and the deceived ... (1958, p.SO). The duty of the 
censor is to screen various aspects from consciousness. First of all, it 
has to screen the rational but unwelcome belief that not-£, since two 
incompatible beliefs cannot both survive in the same conscious belief system. 
Only the belief that£ is left in consciousness because it is this belief 
that gives satisfaction and the general wish of the self-deceiver is to avoid 
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stress and conflict. The censor, by screening the belief that not-£, 
is maintaining the state of primary deception, i.e. deception about 
the true state of affairs. Furthermore, the censor must also screen 
from consciousness the belief that he is being irrational, i.e. the fact 
that the wish itself caused the belief that£· This belief cannot be 
in consciousness for then the irrationality of the favoured belief will 
be immediately apparent to the rational person, and the favoured belief 
will collapse. Since the whole purpose of self-deception is to form and 
maintain the favoured belief, this cautionary belief that the favoured 
·belief is caused purely by a wish and is, therefore, irrational must be 
screened from consciousness. The censor, on this level, is responsible 
for maintaining the state of secondary deception, i.e. to screen the 
belief that he is deceiving himself. Finally, the censor has to screen 
from consciousness the fact of the consequential distortion in the self-
deceiver's intellectual processes which allows him to practise self-deception. 
This too is on the level of secondary deception. The agent can, of course, 
be conscious of the general wish for £, but if the self-deception is not 
to be dissipated, the censor must screen these three aspects from conscious~ 
ness. There is nothing intrinsically irrational about the wish; it, how= 
ever, becomes an agent of irrationality when it starts distorting reason. 
Diagrammatically, the view can be represented as follows: 
Unconscious censor Consciousness 
Erimary deceEtion: 
1. the belief that iL 
not-.E_ ' 
screens the general produces via , the belief secondary deceetion: wish for .E. short circuit" that .E. 
2. the fact that the IL 
wish caused the I' 
belief that .E. 
3. the fact of the lL 
distortion of " 
the agent's in-




Since the unconscious is inaccessible and, therefore, also the belief 
that not-£, it is clear how the above theory overcomes the paradox of 
how the self-deceiver can believe that E while at the same time knowing 
or believing that not-£. At first glance this seems like a neat package 
in which the knowledge that not-.E_ as well as the knowledge that he is 
deceiving himself is safely screened from consciousness and the belief 
that p is the only one the self-deceiver is conscious of. 
-Before :looking at the philosophical implications of this theory, I want to 
apply it to a hard case of self-deception in which the evidence allows no 
latitude. Emma is an unmarried devout Catholic who has given birth to 
an illegitimate child. Having had a child out of wedlock is for the pious 
E11111a a particularly abhorrent sin which fills her with great anxiety. As 
a rational being, she deduces from the medical reports, her actual experience 
of the pregnancy and the birth, the arrangements she had to make for the 
adoption, etc., that she has had an illegitimate child and holds the corres-
ponding belief. On the other hand, Emma~.s speech -and actions deny the 
existence of the child or that she was ever pregnant. She never refers to 
the child or the confinement, has destroyed all cards and documents relating 
to the birth, got rid of the clothes given to her for the baby and does not 
acknowledge its existence in any way. Her speech and actions confirm her 
sincerely held belief, "I do not have an illegitimate child." Since it 
is impossible for Emma to change the actual state of affairs, the only way 
to get rid of the anxiety and dissonance caused by the conflicting beliefs 
is to revert to self-deception which is initiated by her strong desire to 
appear virtuous and to avoid shame, guilt and anxiety. This case has been 
greatly simplified, in that in typical cases of "hard" self-deception it is 
not merely a single belief, i.e. Emma's belief that she does have an ille-
gitimate child, that has been suppressed, but a complex of beliefs and 
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feelings which, in turn, generate other conscious beliefs and feelings 
over a long time. How then is paradox (1) avoided in the case of Emma? 
First of all, her desire to appear virtuous and to avoid shame generates 
the belief that£, i.e. that she does not have an illegitimate child. 
This belief is based purely on her wish and for this reason Emma cannot 
be aware that the contribution of the wish was necessary for the formation 
of her irrational belief, otherwise the plan of self-deception will be 
defeated. Apart from screening the rational belief that not-£ from Emma•s 
consciousness (primary deception), the general wish to avoid shame and 
_ anxiety- also screens its own contribution in the formation of the irration8,1 
belief, as well as screening from her consciousness the very fact that 
screenings of irrational processes are taking place (secondary deception). 
Emma.may, of course, be quite aware of the existence of the general wish 
itself, but not of the irrational sequences of that wish if the self-
deception is to be successful. 
Pears applies the Freudian theory to special cases of self-deception by 
appealing to the notion of time in order to overcome the paradox of how a 
person can consciously decide to deceive himself. He states that usartre 
goes too far when he argues that we cannot appeal to lapse of time in order 
to remove the incoherence ... (1974, p.106).(2) Self-deception is not 
necessarily like lying. There can be a time lapse between believing that 
not-£ and wanting to believe that£ and forming the belief that£· Audi 
remarks that 11 acts of self-deception are not acts of putting oneself into 
self-deception at a stroke; they are acts manifesting it or conducive 
to producing it, such as putting certain kinds of evidence out of mind, or 
sincerely denying something one unconsciously knows to be true ... (Audi, 1982, 
p.142)(my emphasis). Self-deception, therefore, does not necessarily en-
tail that the self-deceiver must believe that£. and believe that not-£_ at 
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the same time. The self-deceiver need not hold these two incompatible 
beliefs either simultaneously or hold both in consciousness. He may 
decide with the help of the censor to get himself to believe that£ when 
he believes that not-£. So, at the outset he does not believe that£, 
but during the process he relies on his general desire for£ to gradually 
suppress the belief that not-£, or it weakens through the subject's 
avoidance of supportive evidence for not-£. Trusting to luck, the self-
deceiver eventually consciously believes that£· However, the two beliefs 
are Aever simultaneously entertained in the same consciousness. The 
rational belief is either suppressed or it has faded completely. Not only 
does time overcome the inconsistency of the two beliefs (paradox 1), but 
Pears-notes that with time the wish .screens also the uncharacteristic 
distortion of the intellectual processes when the self-deceiver first know-
ingly embarked on his plan of self-deception, and so with time the self-
deceiver becomes also less and less aware of the motive for the plan of 
self-deception in the first place (paradox 2). Pears adds that the plan 
of self-deception "cannot be fully reviewed when it approaches completion." 
(1974, p.107). It is the plan of the censor that with the lapse of time 
the motive -the rational tendency to believe that not-E_-will be screened. 
Eventually the motive may come through in a different version, a version 
that will not contain the tendency to believe that not-£. 
In order to remove the appearance of incoherence from Emma•s plan to instill 
in herself a belief which is in direct contrast to a belief she already 
holds (paradox 2), Pears suggests that she, though quite aware of her 
rational tendency to believe that she does have an illegitimate child, can 
rely on her wish to believe that she does not. She can, at first, consciously 
and intentionally embark on the project of self-deception with the explicit 
intention of not dwelling on the distressing subject. She may include her 
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motive when describing her action in the following way: "I am going 
to dwell on my virtuous nature and disregard any evidence that may point 
to my lack of virtue because I suspect that I have sinned and I want to 
believe that I am virtuous." In other words, the first stage in the plan 
is to screen the rational tendency to believe that she has an illegitimate 
child. During the initial stages of the plan she is able to review her 
plan to get herself to believe that she has not sinned. With time her 
motive of the rational tendency to believe otherwise is screened from her 
consciousness, or if she is conscious of her motive it is in a way which -
does not include in any way knowledge of her sinful lapse. Emma's motive 
is, of course, an essential part of the whole process of self-deception 
at first, but there must come a stage where she can no longer be aware of 
her initial motive. Just as a time lapse brought about the fading from 
consciousness of the belief that she has sinned, so a time lapse can bring 
about the fading from consciousness of the intention to form the plan of 
self-deception. At this later stage, she may describe what she is doing, 
but her description will make no reference to her motives. The problem 
raised is that when Emma starts planning her campaign, she must make pro-
vision for this stage and has to decide in advance how she is going to 
proceed from this point on in the execution of her plan. In other words, 
she is faced with an extra task if her plan is to be successful. However, 
Emma does not know when this stage will appear and cannot plan for further 
action after this stage has passed. She has to rely on the "discreet 
operation" of her wish to believe in her virtuousness and to avoid shame, 
and it is reasonable for her to expect that this wish will guide her actions 
in such a way as to further her plan. Pears notes that the self-deceiver 
rarely plans "the strategy of his campaign in advance. What usually happens 
is that his project seems to improvise itself as it proceeds." (p.109). 
In the context of other-deception, the deceiver's motive for saying that£ 
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is that all the time he believes that not-£. Therefore, Emma's project 
of getting herself to believe that she is virtuous is similarly motivated 
by the belief that she has sinned. The original belief that not-_2. has 
either become weaker or it has faded from consciousness altogether. The 
belief that not-_2. can be weakened by using the tactics employed in 11Weak11 
self-deception (e.g. avoiding the photo albums in which there is undis-
putable evidence of her pregnancy, etc.) or the use of these tactics can· 
- have the result that the belief that not-_2. is still strong, but has grad-
ually been screened from consciousness. Time, therefore, removes--the 
belief that not-_2. as well as the motive for the plan of serf-deception from 
Emma 1 s consciousness. In this example of self-deception, thus, paradox 1 ~ 
and 2 have been overcome. 
But paradox 3 and 4 still have to be dealt with. Paradox 3 states that if-
the self-deceiver divorces his belief that not-_2. from the rest of his thoughts 
and beliefs, the process becomes unintelligible. In order to·motivate the 
process of self-deception and to guide its strategy, an awareness·of the 
belief that not-_2. is needed. And since paradox 4 (which states that not· 
only the belief but the whole plan is incoherent and cannot be made possible 
merely by being screened from consciousness) is an extension of paradox 3, 
Pears maintains that the same arguments are applicable in showing how in 
Emma's case the paradoxes are overcome. The paradoxes are based on the 
assumption that the screen deprives the rational tendency to believe that 
she has sinned from its motivating force when, in fact, it keeps on motiva-
ting Emma in her plan of self-deception even though she is not conscious of 
the motive. One can argue that since the belief that she has an illegiti-
mate child and has, therefore, sinned (this is, of course, not a necessary 
conclusion, but this is Emma's assessment of her own situation) is no longer 
conscious, Emma has no need to perpetuate the self-deception any longer. 
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However, even though the belief in her virtuousness has taken over 
from the belief that she has sinned, it does not mean that the motivating 
force of the latter belief will die away. The powerful motivating force 
of unconscious desires and thoughts is often demonstrated in cases of 
post-hypnotic suggestions and Freudian cases of hysteria. The rational 
tendency to believe that she has sinned is divorced from the rest of her 
conscious thoughts and beliefs, but it still guides and motivates Emma's 
actions and plan from behind the screen.(3) I shall return to the 
_objections raised to this view a little later on. 
There are various philosophical implications and problems in this interpre-
tation of the Freudian theory of systems. First of all, the theory is 
based on the general wish which acts as a censor or screen. Looking at 
the diagram, it becomes apparent that the general wish for £must screen 
the fact that it caused the belief that£, in other words, the wish must 
screen an aspect from itself. Screening this aspect from the consciousness 
of the self-deceiver seems to call for a second wish, the wish to maintain 
an unawareness of the necessity of the contribution of the first wish in 
the formation of the irrational belief that£ and a second (or perhaps, 
third?} wish to screen the consequential distorti.on of the self-deceiver's 
intellectual processes caused by the first wish. This objection can be 
extended to include an infinite regress of screening wishes, i.e. a third 
wish is needed to screen the second wish from consciousness, etc. Pears 
overrules this objection of an infinite regress by suggesting that the 
general wish practises self-reflexive suppression and need not be suppressed 
by another wish which, in turn, is suppressed by yet another, etc. Pears 
suggests that the unawareness of the necessity of the first wish in the for-
mation of the irrational belief is not screened by a second wish, but is a 
further intellectual distortion produced by the first wish itself. He 
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interprets the wish rather as a single wish multiplying distorted in-
tellectual processes, rather than a whole series of multiplying wishes 
behind the screen. So, instead of having many different wishes, each 
screening the previous one, we can postulate a general wish which will 
include, in Emma's case, the wish to avoid shame, to avoid conflict and 
anxiety, to avoid awareness of the irrationality, -to avoid awareness of 
that irrationality and its contribution to it, etc. It is, therefore, 
possible, to explain the secondary effects of the screening without postu-
lating a complex plan behind the screen. With this approach, Pears is 
"multiplying the effects of a single wish" instead of "multiplying wishes 
behind tfle screen." (Pears, 1974, p.101). However, exactly how-the wish 
suppresses itself and gives rise to the consequential distortions is un-
clear, because we have no direct access to the mind of the self-deceiver, 
and even-if we were ourselves deceived, we would have no direct access to 
the wish which has screened its operation from our consciousness. "The 
dynamism of Freud's theory exposes it to a dilemma. If the suppressing 
agency is always a wish, then either there is an infinite regress of 
suppressing agencies or suppression is self-reflexive. The second option 
is clearly preferable even if we have no picture of the way in which this 
self-reflexiveness works." (Pears, 1982a, p.275-6) 
Another problem seems to present itself: surely it is irrational for a 
rational person to keep his own truth seeking faculty in check? How is 
this possible? Pears notes that it can be rational to curb the truth 
seeking faculty when investigating oneself. If we take the case of Emma; 
she could be rational in wanting to believe that she is virtuous and thus 
to believe that she does not have an illegitimate child, because if she 
were to confront consciously the belief that she does have an illegitimate 
child, that knowledge would shatter the self-confidence she so desperately 
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needs to build up her self-esteem. Not only could it be rational to 
screen her primary deception from herself, but her secondary deception 
as well, for the same reason. 
Sartre objects that the difficulty that Freud•s theory seems to remove 
merely re-emerges at a different level. The question Sartre asks: focuses on 
the status of the censor itself. In the diagram the censor stands inbetween 
the unconscious and the conscious. However, if the censor is to perform 
the-functions assigned to it--- selecting the drives that need to be con-
cealed, interpreting and resisting the analyst•s probings, etc- it must 
presumeably be aware of the material in question and aware of its own 
activity in seeking to stop this material from becoming explicitly conscious. 
But now the paradox recurs within the censor, for it both knows but conceals 
certain aspects from itself what it knows. The question that Sartre asks 
is whether the censor is conscious or unconscious. He poses the problem 
.in the form of a dilemma: if the censor is in the conscious, it must be 
aware of the irrational sequence and its necessary defeat by reason. If 
the censor is aware of the illegitimacy of the favoured belief, the paradox 
of self-deception will remain unexplained. However, if the censor is in 
the unconscious, Sartre states that it then would not be aware of what needs 
to be concealed. 11 I must know the truth very exactly in order to conceal 
it more carefully ... (Sartre, 1958, p.49). According to Sartre, the trans-
lucency of consciousness demands that "(t)hat which affects itself with 
bad faith must be conscious (of) its bad faith since the being of conscious-
ness is consciousness of being ... (p.49). In other words, the censor must 
have complete understanding of the deception as well as of the truth it is 
altering. If the censor were unconscious, it will not know what the unwel-
come belief is. How can the censor screen certain aspects from itself if 
it does not know what these aspects arer 11 Al1 knowing is consciousness 
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of knowing .••• But what type of self-consciousness can the censor have? 
It must be consciousness (of) being conscious of the drive to be repressed 9 
but precisely in order not to be conscious of it ... (p.53). If the 
deceiving agency lacks awareness of the illegitimacy of the desired belief, 
then:we shall have to say that it lacks the awareness because it has 
screened certain facts from itself. This, of course, leads to an infinite 
regress of-deceiving agencies. However, to say that the censor is in the 
unconscious is the uninteresting part of Sartre•s dilemma, because nobody 
--would-suggest that the rebellious centre of activity deceives itself in 
the unconscious. If, on the other hand, we hold that the deceiving agency 
or censor is aware of the illegitimacy of the desired belief, we still sit 
with the paradox that was meant to be solved in the first place. The para-
dox arises from the requirement that throughout the process of acquiring 
the desired belief, the deceiving agency must maintain the opposite belief. 
In self-deception the censor seems to adopt a complex strategy and in order 
to put this complex strategy into action, the censor must have some appre-
ciation of the existence and strength of the belief which is the negation 
of the desired belief. Sartre argues that since the deceiving-agency is 
capable of planning the complex process of self-deception, it is rational 
with knowledge of the conscious and it must, therefore, reach and accept 
the rational conclusion that it is practising self-deception. As a rational 
faculty, the wish then must annul the process of self-deception. Even if 
it is said that the censor keeps only the embarrassing facts out of con-
sciousness and does not necessarily keep itself out of consciousness, the 
problem will still not be solved. It offers no explanation of self-
deception, but is simply a redescription of the as yet unexplained phenomenon. 
There is still the problem of how two systems, mostly independent of each 
other, manage to coexist in a single person. 
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"The very essence of the reflexive idea of 
hiding something from oneself implies the 
unity of one and the same psychic mechanism 
and consequently a double activity in the heart 
of unity, tending on the one hand to maintain 
and locate the thing to be concealed and on the 
other hand to repress and disguise it. Each 
of the two aspects of this activity is comple-
mentary to the other; that is, it implies the 
other in its being. By separating conscious-
ness from the unconscious by means of the censor,--
psychoanalysis has not succeeded in dissociating 
the two phases of the act." (Sartre, 1985, p.53) 
_ Pears extends Freud's theory and replies to Sartre's criticism as follows: 
"This'is not a convincing argument. The natural 
objection to it is that the consciousness out of 
which the censor has to keep the unwanted belief 
is only the main system of desires and beliefs 
which run the daily life of the person. There 
is no reason why the censor itself should not be 
conscious of the existence of the unwanted belief 
in the unconscious. This would be entirely com-
patible with its consciousness of the existence 
of the opposite belief in consciousness. In fact~ 
the censor might even share the unwanted belief 
with the unconscious." (Pears, 1984, p.37) 
However, this solution clearly calls on the second meaning of "conscious~~~ 
i.e. the functional relationship that holds between the two systems, now 
referred to as the main system and the sub-system. The main system 
controls the agent's daily life and includes the favoured but irrational 
belief as well as the information that makes it irrational. This is the 
system with the alleged paradox for it contains both the irrational belief 
and the rational faculty of the person. However, the inability of the 
rational faculty to recognize the favoured belief as irrational is due to 
the sub-system which includes 11 the cautionary belief, that, given his in-
formation, it was irrational to form the favoured belief". (Pears, 1984, 
p.67). This is, of course, on the level of secondary deception in that 
the belief that the belief in the main system is irrational cannot be in 
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the main system and the general wish to avoid conflict banishes the 
cautionary belief to the sub-system. Since I am concentrating on "hot" 
cases of self-deception the agent's wish is the culprit which upsets his 
reasoning. The rebellious desire to believe that .E. (and its contribution 
in the distortion of the intellectual processes) is aware that it cannot 
remain in the main system otherwise the main system's rational tendency 
will override it. The desire's only course of action to ensure the sur-
vival of its resultant irrational belief that .E. in the main system, is to 
'take awareness of its own necessary contribution in the formatton -of the -
belief that .E. out of the main system and for the desire to set up and act 
as nucleus for the sub-system. The irrational belief that .E. remains in 
the main system but since the cautionary belief is no longer in the main 
system, the rational faculty of the main system fails to recognize the 
irrationality of the irrational belief and, therefore, does not interfere 
with it. The sub-system exploits the main system to allow both the rational 
faculty and the irrational belief to survive side by side. Diagrammatically, 
the systems can be represented as follows: 
sub-system : : main system 
I I 
I I 
self ~fl~x1v~ suppressio_!!_~ general wish I 







~ irrational belief wish for main system t~- causes · ~· form the irrational --------- (produces satis-
belief faction) 
sub-system mani- , main system ~ the rational belief that 2. rational faculty 
not-£ (primary deception) pulates and guide~ directed onto I main system external world 
the cautionary belief 
(secondary deception) 
This diagram differs from the previous one one a number of issues. First 
of all, the Sartrean citicism of whether the wish is conscious or not is 
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no longer applicable. The general wish practises self-reflexive suppre-
sion on part of itself, viz. the rebellious wish. The agent can be aware 
of the other aspects of the general wish. So, instead of belonging 
either to the unconscious or to the conscious, the general wish in this 
later interpretation belongs to both systems. Furthermore, the later 
theory places far more emphasis on the dynamic and functional aspect of the 
two systems. Instead of a wish separating the two systems, now the sub-
system directly influences the main system. But the most important _ 
:difference between the two interpretations is that the sub-.syste111- comes into 
_being only when there is a need to conceal irrationality from the agent'·s 
main system. Once there is no more need for self-deception, the consc-ious-
ness-preventing relationship falls away. In contrast, Freud's earlier 
theory postulated a permanent, unconscious well whether the agent was bein-g 
irrational or not. 
However, this later interpretation also has some problematic philosophical 
implications. The principle on which it rests is that ''if a person con-
sciously believed that the belief he was forming was irrational, that would 
prevent him from forming it, whereas, if the same cautionary belief were 
not conscious, it would not prevent him from forming it. 11 (Pears, 1984, p.72) 
In other words, for Freud the permissive cause of irrationality is a failure 
of consciousness. Pears notes that this principle can be divided into 
two parts. The first part then: 11 If a person•s~ cautionary belief, that 
the belief that he was forming was irrational, were conscious, it would 
prevent him from forming the irrational belief... Therefore, if the agent 
detects the operation of the wish and recognizes its results as irrational, 
he will stop deceiving himself. However, this does not always happen. 
Very often the wish in consciousness, and its consequential distortions of 
the intellectual processes, may 11 Still retain some of its power to fascinate 
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and delude." (p.73). The consciousness that a belief is caused 
purely by a wish is not sufficient to prevent it from being formed. 
Pears extends the theory further down the scale to milder cases of irra-
tionality and it is here that he comes to the conclusion that "it is 
quite certain that mild cases are not always stopped by consciousness." 
(p.74). However, in this chapter I am concerned with whether "hard~~ 
cases of irrationalities are stopped by consciousness of their nature and 
causation. Applying the principle to "hard" cases, Pears concludes that 
.. it_ is "p_lausible to suppose that serious cases are always _stopped." 
(o.73). 
. . 
The first part of the principle, i.e. the non-permissiveness of a conscious 
cautionary belief, holds in serious cases of self-deception, but what about 
the second part? The second part of the principle addresses the question 
of the permissiveness of an unconscious cautionary belief---"if the same 
cautionary belief were kept out of consciousness, it wouJd not prevent him 
from forming the irrational belief." (p.78). This is an important 
point, for there would be no point in banishing the cautionary belief 
from the consciousness of the main system if it still obstructed the fonna~ 
tion of the irrational belief when it (i.e. the cautionary belief) is in 
the sub-system. In other words, it must lose its power to obstruct when 
it is banished from the main system. 
I shall now return to the objection I raised earlier on: Emma•s rational 
tendency to believe that she has sinned is divorced from the rest of her 
conscious thoughts and beliefs, but it still guides and motivates her actions 
and plan from behind the screen. If the second part of Freud•s principle 
is applied then, as Emma with time becomes less and less aware of the motive 
I 
for her self-deception, as well as of how she is to fulfil her plan (she 
was unable to formulate the plan in its entirety from the outset), the plan 
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of self-deception will become less and less effective and will eventually 
fail for it is that very motive which steers the plan of self-deception 
in the desired direction. The motive behind the project will, therefore, 
gradually lose its force as the project reaches completion. However, 
underneath Emma's increasing belief that .E_, there is still the screened 
but undiminished rational tendency to believe that not-E_. Pears states 
that "contrary to Sartre's assumption, the fact that it is screened from 
you will not necessarily deprive it of its motivating force. Your wish 
to believe E. emerges as the plan to deceive yourself that E. only because 
you have a rational tendency to believe not-E_. The fact that you have 
this tendency may continue to produce its effect even when it has been 
screened from you." (Pears, 1974, p.107). 
Therefore~ it is not clear whether unconscious beliefs are, in fact, power-
less to produce their normal effects in consciousness. Certainly, our 
actions are often controlled by preconscious beliefs. For example, Emma 
might avoid the photograph album containing evidence of both her pregnancy 
and of her illegitimate child because she suspects she might find distressing 
pictures there, and yet she might not be conscious of this belief. But 
there is a twofold problem here: 
1. her irrational belief that she does not have an illegitimate child 
is explained by keeping it in the consciousness of the main system, 
whereas the cautionary belief is kept out of the consciousness of the 
main system and is banished to the sub-system. 
2. However, her avoidance of the photograph albums is governed by a pre-
conscious belief (i.e. a suspicion that the albums may contain dis-
stressing evidence), one that must be producing its normal effect in 
consciousness. 
How can the belief in (2) produce its normal effect in the consciousness of 
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the main systems, but the cautionary belief in (1) does not ---if it 
did the self-deception would cease. In order to address this problem 
it is necessary to look at the structure of the Freudian sub-systems and 
the "key to the problem will turn out to be their rationality. They are 
built around the nucleus of the wish to believe and this wish is the cause 
that blocks the normal effect of the cautionary belief." (Pears, 1984, 
p.80/81). In other words, because the sub-system is built around the 
rebellious wish, it acts rationally when it prevents the cautionary belief 
from producing its normal effect in consciousness but allows the girl's 
preconscious beliefs about the photograph album to produce its normal 
-· 
effect, by diverting her attention to picking up a novel. The sub-system 
is, therefore, a dynamic and rational system. It is on this point that 
Freud's and Davidson's theories both agree. 
"The sub-system is built around the nucleus of 
the wish for the irrational belief and it is 
organized like a person. Although it is a sep-
arate centre of agency within the whole person, 
it is, from its own point of view, entirely 
rational. It wants the main system to form the 
irrational belief and it is aware that it will 
not form it, if the cautionary belief is allowed 
to intervene. So with perfect rationality it 
stops its intervention." (Pears, 1984, p.87). 
So, for successful self-deception to take place the sub-system must be 
able to dominate and guide the main system (e.g. to avoid Emma from paging 
through the albums). From the above discussion, it is seen that a condi~ 
tion for the manipulation of the main system by the sub-system is the in-
ternal rationality of the latter system. However, there are further con-
ditions which apply to the sub-system. Apart from 1) being internally 
rational, the sub-system also 2) has to react to certain elements in the 
main system in order to manipulate it successfully (if the sub-system were 
totally divorced from the main system it could not exert any control over it), 
183 
and the sub-system must also 3) be aware of the main system's problem 
which is that there is evidence pointing to an unwelcome conclusion. 
Furthermore, it 4) ought to be aware of the achievement of its goal, viz. 
the main system's eventual formation and maintenance of the desired belief. 
These additional conditions seem to threaten the internal rationality of 
the sub-system which has to acquire the information without acquiring the 
elements themselves. The cautionary belief in the sub-system makes it 
impossible for the sub-system to accept the evidence from the main system 
and to draw its wishful conclusion, nevertheless. Surely, if the sub-
system contains the main system's evidence as well as the cautionary belief~ 
it must fo~ the rational belief that she has had an illegitimate child. 
This the sub-system does do. But a discrepancy is immediately apparent: 
how can the sub-system hold this belief if it is built around the wish to 
believe the opposite? "Whatever the sub-system, and however it is marked 
off from the main system, it cannot accommodate the rational belief, if it 
is built around the wish to form the irrational belief. In fact, it may 
not even be able to accommodate the evidence and the cautionary belief, 
because, together, they push it so hard towards the rational belief." 
(p.90). 
Two complementary solutions are applicable to the above problem. The first 
one is based on what I shall term Pears' Principle: "A system can react to 
a belief or desire in another system without necessarily sharing it." 
(p.88). So, whenever the sub-system reacts to a belief belonging 
to the main system, it does not necessarily mean that the sub-system must 
contain that belief. The sub-system can, therefore, become aware of the 
evidence in the main system without taking in that evidence into its own 
system, for if it did, the sub-system would lose its own internal rationality, 
a necessary condition for "hard" self-deception. The second solution 
focuses on the various contents of the general wish. The wish in the main 
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system is the rational faculty•s desire for truth; the wish in the 
sub-system is the desire to believe that£; and over all stands the 
desire to avoid conflict. It may seem that another paradox is lurking 
in this, but as I have discussed earlier on, there are not multiplying 
wishes, but only one wish with multiplying effects. Pears suggests 
that perhaps the wish that lies at the heart of the sub-system should be 
specified in a more discriminating way. So, instead of naming it the 
wish to believe that£, it should be rephrased as "the wish that the main 
system should fonn the pleasure-giving belief," or as "the wish to eliminate 
the distressing belief from the main system". The main system faces a 
problem in that it looks onto a hostile environment, an environment that is 
constantly going to remind Emma of her sin. The wish in the sub-system, 
as part of the general wish to avoid conflict and distress, may have at its 
core a concern about the likely effect of that problem on the main system. 
In other words, the sub-system has as its environment the main system, and 
the elimination of anxiety and distress in the main system is what the wish 
in the sub-system has as its semi-altruistic aim. The main system, on 
the other hand, has as its environment the external world. So, when Emma•s 
main system finds itself unable to dominate and change the environment and 
to undo the distressing event, the sub-system dominates the main system and 
eliminates the distressing belief from the main system. The paradox is 
avoided in that both systems have different env.ironments, different inputs~ 
aspirations and different problems, and because of all these differences 
the two systems receive and process information differently. This, in 
turn, implies that the two systems have different consciousnesses of their 
own (i.e. the functional meaning of 11 Consciousness 11 ) which enable them to 
react to information. The sub-system has no direct access to the external 
world, so if it did have an internal consciousness, it would be one that 
was .. buried alive... Pears notes that the unconscious often operates as if 
it has an internal consciousness of its own. (p.99). However, if 
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this consciousness if "buried alive", then because of its alienation 
from the external world and the resultant lack of evidence, neither the 
truth nor the falsity of this hypothesis can be determined. 
Fingarette, like Pears, prefers the functional interpretation of the 
.Freudian theory of consciousness and suggests that Freud himself favoured 
this view. Fingarette (1969, p.111) quotes the opening words of Freud's 
last paper entitled "Splitting of the ego in the process of defence": 
-
"I find myself for a moment in the interesting 
position of not knowing whether what I have to 
say should be regarded as something long 
. familiar and obvious or as something entirely 
new and puzzling. But I am inclined to think 
~the latter." (Freud, 1938, XXIII, p.275) 
According to Fingarette, the "new and puzzling" concept of the defensive 
process is. that it is not something that happens to the ego, but it is 
-
rather something the ego does, a motivated strategy. The productive cause 
in the defensive process is still the wish to avoid anxiety but, Fingarette 
-
maintains, Freud did not appreciate the importance of the rOle of the ego 
in the mode of operation of the defensive process until the "very last days 
-
of his life". Traditionally, the split was between Consciousness and the 
-
Unconscious, with the latter characterized by a "primitive" character. 
All elements that, therefore, split off from the ego take on a markedly 
"primitive" character. The problem for Freud with this interpretation is 
to explain how the split-off element still retained to a great extent the 
fundamental characteristics of the ego, or in Pears' tenns, how the sub-
system can be internally rational. To solve this problem, Fingarette pos-
tulates three principles on which the Freudian theory rests and then re-
casts Freud's theory _in more functional terms. The three principles are: 
1. The self-alienating characteristic of defence is reflected in an 
alteration of consciousness. 
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2. What is of great importance in defence is the "dynamic" aspect. 
3. The alteration of consciousness in defence should be understood in 
terms of the "dynamics" of defence, rather than by reference to 
traditional terms like "knowledge" and "ignorance". (Fingarette, 1969s 
p.127). 
Accordingly, Fingarette rephrases. Freud • s theory as follows: 
"The result of defence is to split off from the 
more rational system (i.e. the system which is 
defended) a nuclear, dynamic complex. This 
nuclear entity is a complex of motive, purpose, 
feeling, perception, and drive towards action." 
( p. 129) • . 
So, instead of conceiving the two systems as Consciousness and the Uncon-
scious, he interprets the two systems as operating within the ego.(4) 
The two systems are the elaborated ego-structure and the split-off ego-
nucleus. The reason for the split, according to Fingarette, is the incom-
. -
patibility between the ego-nucleus and the current ego. The split is too 
great for the integrative capacities of the ego, or the self-synthesis of 
the person, that the ego gives up any attempt to integrate the ego-nucleus. 
In other words, the ego does not acknowledge the ego-nucleus which is ex-
perienced by the person as the "not-me"; the ego disavows that part of 
itself which cannot be integrated into the self-synthesized personal identity. 
According to Fingarette, the ego treats this unassimilable but ego-like 
system as "outside" rather than "inside". This is, of course, Fingarette 1s 
interpretation of Freud, an interpretation that gives support to his own 
view of self-deception as a form of disavowal (see Chapter 4). But perhaps 
Fingarette reads too much into Freud when the latter stated: 
"When this process (of defence) occurs for the 
first time there comes into being a nucleus and 
centre of crystallization for the formation of a 
psychi ca 1 group divorced from the ego- a group 
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around which everything which would imply an 
acceptance of the incompatible idea subsequently 
co 11 ects... (Freud, t895 I I , p. 123 as quoted by 
Fingarette, 1969, p.-132) 
By recasting Freud•s theory in- terms of 11 disavowal 11 , ego-rejection and 
11 ego-synthesis 11 to support his own view of self-deception as 11 a refusal 
to spell out one•s engagement in the world11 , Fingarette lays himself open 
to the same criticisms as before (see Chapter 4). It may be an interesting 
account of why self-deception takes place, but Fingarette fails to state 
just how it happens. Furthermore, I think that he is misrepresenting the 
Freudian theory when he states, 11 Freud •••• eventually appreciated-that 
his therapy had always been oriented primarily to self-acceptance •••• 
rather than to •knowledge• •••• as.curative. Avowal of one•s engagements 
i~ the optimal goal of classical psychoanalysis ... (p,142). 
In the next chapter, I will show how Davidson•s functional account of self-
deception can be based on the exact same quote from Freud. Freud•s theory 
can be interpreted also in terms of 11 knowledge11 and 11 belief11 and 11 reasons 11 s 
an account that is primarily interested in how self-deception works rather 
than the why of self-deception. 
* * * * * 
In this chapter I have looked at a theory of self-deception that can account 
for "hard~ cases of self-deception. The cases I have concentrated on are 
cases of self-deception in which the productive cause is a desire (i.e. a 
11 hOt 11 case of self-deception) and the permissive cause a failure of con-
sciousness. Pears admits that Freud•s theory 11 WOrks perfectly as a theory 
about the permissive cause of the extreme cases of irrationality that would 
be impossible without it, and it can be extended to cases that would only 
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be difficu.lt without it ... (Pears, 1984, p.77). Freud's theory can, 
therefore, be applied to the majority of cases of self-deception, viz. 
11 weak11 cases where 11 a failure of consciousness is an important luxury 
rather than a necessity. In these cases the Freudian theory of systems 
still has considerable explanatory power, although, it must be admitted, 
less than in the extreme cases that could not occur without a failure of 
consciousness ... (p.78). · 
I stressed the importance of distinguishing between the two meanings-of 
-
11 Conscious"-the first, more traditional, meaning refers to the name of 
the system that controls our daily lives, and the second meaning to the 
i·nter-action that exists between this sytem, the main system, and a 
rebellious sub-system that is brought into being when the subject practises 
11 hard11 self-deception. The earlier theory built on the first meaning faces 
certain problems which the later theory built on the second meaning can 
answer. Fingarette maintains that Freud himself saw the shift in emphasis~ 
but there is no direct evidence in Freud's writings of this. What I term 
the 11 later11 Freudian theory is, in fact, the theory as interpreted by 
Pears, Fingarette and Clavell. 
In terms of the early theory, Pears appea 1 s to the notion of time to 
overcome the various paradoxes. Owing to the subject's avoidance of 
not-E._ because of the general wish to alleviate conflict, lack of supportive 
evidence for the belief that not-E._ either weakens the belief or causes it 
to fade gradually from consciousness. Once it is safely out of conscious-
ness, the self-deceiver can rely on his wish for .E. to generate the belief 
that .E. in consciousness, a belief that can be held without conflict since 
the belief that not-E._ is safely screened by the censor. However, the 
problem that arises is that the second part of Freud's principle holds that 
when the rational belief that not-E._ and the cautionary belief are in the 
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unconscious, they have no power to prevent the formation of the 
irrational belief in consciousness. And yet, these beliefs do have 
an effect on consciousness and do guide it. Here Pears relies on the 
later theory which appeals to the internal rationality and consciousness 
of the rebe.llious sub-system. The sub-system is built around the wish 
for the irrational belief and everything within the sub-system, therefore, 
works towards actualizing the formation and maintenance of the irrational 
belief in the main system. The sub-system is the organizing centre 
which forms, plans and guides the whole strategy of self-deception. This 
is not necessarily the case in the inttial stages during which the self-
deceiver may intentionally plant the seeds for the plan of self-deception, 
trusting that the general wish for .e_will take over the nurture and care 
of these seeds. The self-deceiver cannot plan and envisage the actual 
growth of the. mature plants, but relies on certain forces (i.e. 11 the dis-
creet operation of his wish11 ) to do the job. He, therefore, hands over 
responsibi.lity at this stage so that when eventually, with time, the seeds 
of self-deception blossom into a full-grown state of self-deception, the 
agent has divorced himself from the process. 
The sub-system, therefore, seems to be a highly organized and complex 
system, taking note of dangers, steering the main system away from not-.e_, 
screening the irrationality of the agent's belief from consciousness, 
etc.----pointing to a system that is both internally rational and conscious. 
But this threatens to be another fertile breeding ground for the epistemo-
logical paradox: if the sub-system is internally rational and conscious, 
how can it contain both the rational and cautionary beliefs and yet be 
built around the nucleus of the wish for the irrational belief? Pears 
suggests that the internal rationality of the sub-system is not threatened 
if the wish around which it is built is described as the wish for the well-
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being of the main system, i.e. the wish for the main system to form 
the irrational belief that will give the agent satisfaction. With per-
fect rationality, the sub-system eliminates not only the rational and 
conflicting belief that not-£ but also the cautionary belief from the 
main system, allowing the irrational belief to flourish unhindered and 
to give satisfaction. 
It is precisely this later aspect of the Freudian theory on which Davidson 
-builds his own Functional Theory-the apparent rational relationship 
that exists between these two semi-autonomous sytems: 
"After analysing the underlying problem of 
explaining irrationality, I conclude that any 
satisfactory view must embrace some of Freud's 
most important theses, and when these theses are 
stated in a sufficiently broad way, they are free 
from conceptual confusion." 
(Davidson, 1982, ~.290) 
In the 1 ast chapter I shall 1 oak at how Davidson bases his theory on that 
of Freud and how the functional theory hopes to escape "conceptual confusion~~. 
191 
Notes 
1. Cf Kipp (1980, p.309). He criticizes Freud unfairly by stating 
that the Freudian theory 11 seems to require that two mutually opaque, 
autonomously thinking and willing consciousnesses should exist 
within the soul of the self-deceiver, yet that these consciousnesses 
should also exist within a unified consciousness that grounds the 
self-deceiver's identity as a self. Without the first of these two 
conditions, properly deceptive concealment of belief and intention 
seems unthinkable, and without the second, properly self-deceptive 
reflexivity, within the relation between deceiver and deceived, seems 
equally unthinkable... Kipp's reference to the first condition refers 
to consciousness (indeed, consciousnesses) as a separate system, 
whereas the second 11 Unified consciousness .. refers to the relation that 
holds between the two systems. 
2. Sartre stipulates that in self-deception the initial belief that not-..e. 
and the suppression of it must happen simultaneously and 11 not at two 
different moments... In Chapter 4 I discussed that this is not a 
necessary condition in successful lying to others. When A lies to B, 
B may first examine and mull over what A has told him before coming to 
believe it. 
3. See Hamlyn (1971) who argues that the self-deceiver does know what he 
is doing, but he does not know it consciously. Self-deception is an 
intentional activity that involves a strategy. See also Audi who 
states that unconscious beliefs 11 tend to manifest themselves in con-
sciousness and behaviour, and in essentially the same way as conscious 
beliefs11 through, for example, slips of the tongue. (1982, p.137). 
Furthermore, he argues that it is as if the self-deceiver were two 
people because he operates at two levels: at the conscious level and 
at the unconscious level or 11metalevel from which he manipulates his 
own consciousness or behaviour ... (p.141). 
4. It is important that 11 ego 11 is not equaled with the traditional meaning 
of .. consciousness .. , since tha ego can operate on different levels of 
consciousness. The ego is the 11 Control centre .. of the personality, 
either holding back or releasina the expression of basic drives, and 
attempts to reduce tensions byealing successfully with the environ-
ment. Ego is part of a later Freud's dynamic structural model of 
personality, whereas consciousness is a level in the early Freud's 
static topographical model of the personality. The ego can operate 
on the unconscious level when it represses something which is unaccept-
able to the person. 
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CHAPTER 6 
D~VIDSON'S FUNCTIONAL THEORY OF SYSTEMS 
I ended the last chapter with Davidson's reference to Freud, and in 
_this chapter I want to trace similarities in the two theories of systems, 
as well_ as the differences which, however, do not lead to the exclusion 
of one theory by the other, but rather to a complementing and unification 
: of both t~eories into one coherent theory of self-deception. As Pears 
notes, "it is true that the functional theory is compatible with Freud's 
i.dea." (1984, p.88). As my starting point I am going to take the four 
fundamental Freudian doctrines on which Davidson bases his theory and 
shall trace his development of them in order to explain how irrationality, 
especially internal irrationality, is possible: 
1. The mind contains a number of semi-independent structures, having 
mental attributes like thoughts and memories. 
2. Thes-e systems can interact to cause further events in the mind, or 
outside it. 
3. Some of the dispositions and events that characterize the various 
substructures in the mind are like physical forces when they interact 
with other substructures--- a causal relation between parts in which 
reason does not play its usual normative and rationalizing rOle. 
4. Unconscious mental states and events are like conscious beliefs, 
memories, desires, wishes and fears. (Davidson, 1982, p.290) 
Before looking at how Davidson explains irrational action, it is necessary 
to establish what, for Davidson, constitutes standard reason explanations 
for rational behaviour. After all, irrationality is a breakaway_ from 
193 
rationality and should, therefore, be interpreted against a background 
of rationality. Davidson's pattern of reason explanations concentrates 
on the rationalist motif in his thought. To be rational is to have 
sufficient reasons for what one does, in thought and in action. According 
to Davidson, a reason is a mental cause which is a rational cause, at 
least in-normal, intentional action. This view is first developed in 
Actions, Reasons, and Causes in which reasons consisted of motives. To -
be rational was to have a "primary reason" to rationalize one's actions. 
This "primary reason" was both a "pro-attitude" or desire and-a belief_ 
about how to satisfy it. The primary reasons included some desire of 
the agent whether it was to touch an elbow or to pull out weeds or even to 
cheat one's son out of greed. (Davidson, 1963, p.7) 
"In the light of a primary reason, an action 
is revealed as coherent with certain traits, 
long - or short-termed, characteristic or not, 
of the agent, and the agent is shown in his 
rOle of Rational Animal •••• Central to the 
relation between a reason and an action it ex-
plains is the idea that the agent performed the 
action because he had the reason." (p. 8,9). 
In How is Weakness of the Will Possible? Davidson regards reasons as premises, 
and these reasons must be good enough to ward off charges of irrationality. 
This rationalist view of reasons as premises, and of reason-guided activity 
as the making of valid moves from all the available premises, develops the 
earlier view of a "primary reason". In Paradoxes of Irrationality Davidson 
further develops the pattern of reason explanations. He looks at both 
the causal role as well as the logical relation of reasons to actions. 
He quotes Hume in order to illustrate the pattern of reason explanations. 
"'Ask a man why he uses exercise: he will answer, 
because he desires to keep his health. If you 
then enquire why he desires health, he will readily 
reply, because sickness is painful.'" (Davidson, 1982, p.293) 
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If we are to explain the person•s taking exercise, the explanation will 
have to include at least two factors: (1) the 11 pro-attitude11 of the 
agent, a desire for health and, (2) a belief that in acting in a certain 
way he will realize his desire and be satisfied, a belief that exercise 
will make him healthy and that there is, therefore, something desirable 
_ about taking exercise. In this way, his taking exercise is explained 
in terms of reasons, a belief-desire pain. However, this belief-desire 
_pain is related to the action in two ways to yield an explanation. 
_Firstly, beliefs and desires have a content, a content about the desira-
bility of health and the way in which to fulfil this desire by acting in 
__ a certain way, and these contents imply that there is something desirable 
about taking exercise. There is, therefore, a 1 ogi ca 1_ connection between 
the contents of the desire and belief and the action of taking exercise. 
Secondly, the reasons the agent has for acting in a certain way must be 
the reasons for that action, i.e. he exercises because he wants to be healthy 
and because he believes that exercise promotes health. In other words, the 
reasons, i.e. the desire and belief, must play a causal rOle in· bringing 
about the action. 
--
11 •••• there is no inherent conflict between reason 
explanations and causal explanations. Since beliefs 
and desires are causes of the actions for which they 
are reasons, reason explanations include an essential 
causal element ... ( p.293). 
Davidson stresses the causal aspect of intentional, rational action by 
referring to our wishes, hopes, desires, beliefs, thoughts, etc. which 
depend on simple inference from other beliefs and attitudes. We believe 
that exercise promotes health on the basis of induction from hearsay or 
reading or personal experience. The action of exercising is intentional 
and, regardless whether this intention to exercise is executed or not, the 
intention itself is caused by a desire to be healthy and a belief that by 
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exercising .we will be healthy. There is, therefore, both a logical 
(or rational) and a causal aspect of the intention itself. It is this 
logical connection between the contents of various pro-attitudes and 
beliefs and what they cause which forms the basis of Davidson's functional 
theory. Thus, according to Davidson, all intentional actions have a 
rational element at the core. For the action to be intentional, the 
belief-desire pair must, of course, cause the action in the right way. 
·In Chapter 1 I noted that the belief-desire pair·can cause the action in 
various ways, but for A to deceive B. intentionally., the belief and-desire. 
cause actio.n x in the ·right way. For example, the man with a rope on the 
mountain- has the desire to ki 11 his companion and the belief that by 
dropping- the rope the friend wn 1 be ki l1 ed. He may become so -·agitated 
by- his wicked thoughts that he drops the rope. In this case there is a 
belief-desire pair which causes his friend· to be killed, but he did not-
intentionally kill hts friend because his belief and desire did not caus~ 
the dropping of the rope in the right way. It is only in the case of his 
intentionally dropping the rope, knowing the other will be killed (and is. 
killed) that the killing is an intentional action; in other words, that the 
belief-desire pair caused the action in the right way. There is no in-
herent "onflict between reason explanations and· causal explanations {at 
least, in rational behaviour). Since beliefs and desires are causes of 
the actions for whi~h they are reasons, reason explanations include an 
essential causal element. In other words, in standard reason explanations 
not only do the propositional contentsof various beliefs and desires bear 
appropriate logical relations to one another and to the contents of the 
belief, attitude or intention they help to explain, but the actual .states 
of be 1 i ef and desire a 1 so cause the exp 1 a i ned state or event in the right way. 
If this is the basis of standard reason explanations for rational action, 




of irrationality, it is necessary to appeal to the principles of 
rationality and intentional rational action. As Davidson points out 
in Paradoxes of Irrationality (p.303), the central paradox of irrationality 
is that it needs to be placed in a structure that allows for the inconsis-
tent and unintelligible which is the central feature of irrationality. 
However, if too much incoherence is allowed into the system, there is the 
danger of removing the entire theory from the background of rationality 
which is needed as a yardstick against which we can measure the degree of 
··the perversion of rationality. On the other hand, if we explain a theory 
of irrationality too well in a too structured system, we may turn it into 
a disguised or merely alternate fonn of rationality. This is the first 
paradox with which Davidson grapples: how is it possible to reconcile an 
explanation that shows an action, belief or emotion to be irrational with 
the element of rationality inherent in the description and explanation of 
all such phenomena. 11 The difficulty in explaining irrationality is in 
finding a mechanism that can be accepted as appropriate to mental events 
and yet does not rationalize what is to be explained.•• (Davidson, as quoted 
by Clave ll , 1986, p. 503). In other words, there is a conflict between 
the standard way of explaining intentional action and the idea that such an 
action can be irrational. The view that no intentional action can be in-
ternally irrational stands at the one extreme in the scale of possible views 
and is labelled the 11 Plato Principle .. by Davidson.(1) 
.. Someone who knowingly and intentionally acts 
contrary to his own principle; how can we ex-
plain that? The explanation must, it is evident, 
contain some feature that goes beyond the Plato 
Principle; otherwise the action is perfectly 
rational. On the other hand, the explanation 
must retain the core of the Plato Principle, other-
wise the action is not intentional ... 
(Davidson, 1982, p.297) 
The psychological state or event of self-deception entails what is loosely 
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called a propositional attitude which points to the relevance of a 
reason explanation and thus to the element of rationality in self-deception. 
However, self-deception is irrational and the element of rationality cannot 
prevent its being at the same time less than rational. In other words, 
to have a reason for believing an irrational belief (e.g. because one desires 
that~ were the case) entails an appeal to rationality or a -deviation from 
it. 
This brings Davidson to the second problem in that if a cause:is described 
in non-mental terms, it loses touch with the element of rationality. 
"Events conceived solely in terms of their physical and physiologi-cal prop-
erties cannot b~ judged as reasons." ( p.299). These -neutral forces 
have no mental status as beliefs or attitudes, but are external to the 
mind, according to Davidson, and therefore cannot be part of -the rational 
or irrational. They are part of the non-rational. The conclusion is 
-thus that the description of irrationality must entail a mental description 
of a mental cause, thereby making it a candidate for being a reason. By 
appealing to both rationality and causation, Davidson hopes to reconcile 
the two tendencies in Freud's theory. "On the one hand he (Freud) wanted 
to extend the range of phenomena subject to reason explanations, and on the 
other, to treat these same phenomena as forces and states are treated in 
the natural sciences. But in the natural sciences, reasons and propositional 
attitudes are out of place, and blind causality rules ... ( p.292). 
Davidson hopes to bridge this gap by looking at the causal element of reason 
explanations. Hence his search for a 11mechanism that can be accepted as 
appropriate to mental events." 
However, I have not yet answered the question posed earlier on, namely what 
then is irrational action? and how is internal irrationality possible 7 
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The answer is found in Paradoxes of Irrationality in which Davidson 
discusses at length the idea that irrationality always incorporates a 
mental state which causes another mental state but is not a reason for 
it. The causal link remains in that one mental state causes another, 
but the logical rel~tion is distorted, for in "hot" self-deception a wish 
is not a justified cause for a belief. 
Most of Davidson's theory of irrationality is applied to cases of akrasia. 
I shall, therefore, first examine his reason explanation for akrasia, 'ex-
tract general principles and then apply these to cases of self-deception. 
Let me start with an example- of rational behaviour, based :_on Davidson's-
example of the man in the park (1.982, p.292ff), develop it into a case· 
of irrational action, and then see where the mental breakdown in rationality 
occurs which gives rise to irrationality. Tim has discovered that his 
friend Eric has stolen some money from him. Very disappointed, Tim writes 
Eric-a letter expressing his dismay at his friend's disloyal deed, arid 
deposits this letter in Eric's post box. On his way back home, he feels 
that the sum was a negligible amount, and not worth the loss of a friend-
ship. He returns to Eric's house and retrieves the still unopened letter 
from the box. Here everything Tim does is done for a reason, which makes 
the corresponding action reasonable. In each case the reasons for the 
actions tell us the intention with which Tim acted, and thereby give us a 
reason explanation of the actions. As I noted before, there are two 
factors involved in reason explanations. First of all, there is a value, 
wish or attitude of the agent-Tim wants to communicate his disappointment 
to Eric. Secondly, there is a belief that by acting in the way to be ex-
plained, he can promote the relevant value or satisfy the relevant desire-
Tim believes that by delivering the letter he will make known his feelings 
to Eric. Furthermore, these two factors, the action on the one hand, and 
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the belief-desire pair on the other, are related to each other in two 
different ways in order to yield a standard reason explanation. Firstly~ 
there must be a logical relation. Beliefs and desires have a content, 
and the content must be such that it implies that the action will satisfy 
it. Tim has a desire to save the friendship; he believes that by re-
moving the recriminating letter he will save the friendship, and he concludes 
that there is something desirable in returning to Eric•s, which is his 
_reason for going back. Secondly, Tim went back to retrieve the letter 
because h~ wanted to save the friendship. In other words, the reasons play 
a causal rOle in the occurence of the action.(2) 
How can Tim•s action be interpreted as being irrational? Before returning 
to retrieve the letter he has deliberated on two issues: he has a motive 
(the desire to remain friends) for taking away the letter, but he also h~s 
a motive for leaving the letter there (the desire to communicate his disap-
p~intment to Eric). If in his own judgment, the former consideration out-
weighs t~e latter, he will be acting in accordance with his final value-
judgment_ (i.e. to save the friendship). If, however, in his own judgment 
the latter consideration outweighs the former, and yet he acts on the 
former, he will be acting against his own better judgment. In other words, 
the akratic act is irrational. How has it become irrational? 
And this brings me to an extremely important distinction made by Davidson. 
Tim•s action may appear akratic to an observer, i.e. external irrationality, 
but there is not necessarily an inconsistency by Tim•s own standards, in 
other words, there is not necessarily internal irrationality. Before de-
veloping Tim•s case into one which reflects internal irrationality, I want 
to repeat the distinction made at the beginning of Chapter 3. External 
irrationality is not conceptually problematic, whereas internal irrationality 
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does seem to involve a paradox. 
11 Much that is called irrational does not make 
for paradox. Many might hold that it is 
irrational, given the dangers, discomforts, and 
meagre rewards to be expected on success, for 
any person to attempt to climb Mt. Everest 
without oxygen (or even with it). But there 
is no puzzle in explaining the attempt if it is 
undertaken by someone who has assembled all the 
facts he can, given full consideration to all 
his desires, ambitions and attitudes, and has 
acted in the light of his knowledge and values. 
Perhaps it is in some sense irrational to believe 
in astrology, flying saucers, or witches, but 
such beliefs may have standard explanations if 
they are based on what their holders take to be 
evidence. It is sensible to try to square the 
circle if you don't know it can't be done. 
The sort of irrationality that makes conceptual 
trouble is not the failure of someone else to 
believe or feel or do what we deem reasonable, 
but rather the failure, within a single person, 
of coherence or consistency in the pattern of 
beliefs, attitudes, emotions, intentions and 
actions... (p.290). 
Tim's either negative or positive evaluations are what Davidson terms con-
ditional or prima facie judgments. This judgment is, of course, not 
necessarily conclusive. Davidson in How is Weakness of the Will Possible? 
distinguishes between these prima facie or conditional evaluative judgments 
(e.g. 11 With all the evidence carefully considered, I ought to do ~11 ) and 
unconditional judgments (e.g. 11 I will do x_''). The 11 all things considered .. 
or conditional judgment does not come into conflict with unconditional 
judgments, because to judge an action desirable is not yet to judge it more 
desirable than any alternative. The move from "It would be best to do x" 
to "I shall do i' does, therefore, not necessarily involve inconsistency. 
"Our 'best' judgments ..•. could naturally be taken 
·to be those conditioned on all the considerations 
deemed relevant by the agent; but an action is 
geared to unconditional judgments. Since there is 
no principle or psychological law that says we must 
trim our unconditional judgments of what is best to 
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our best judgments, someone can judge, and 
act, contrary to his own best judgment ... 
(Davidson, 1985 b, p.201) 
In other words, the akrates who judges 11 It would be better not to do y 
than to do y; but y is desirable and I shall do 'i..." is not· yet guilty of 
inconsistency in judgment. To reduce the akrates•s supposed irrationality 
to inconsistency requires, according to Davidson, an extra higher-order 
premise, the judgment that 11 I ought to act on my own best judgment, what 
I judge best or obligatory all things considered ... 
Therefore, a person who is aware of the fact that he has good reasons both 
for and against an action is not necessarily entertaining a contradiction. 
Most actions we perform, or consider performing, have something to be said 
both for them and something against. We speak of conflict only when the 
pros and cons are so closely weighted and balanced, as to make a choice 
difficult. If I have accepted an invitation (and wish to keep my promise) 
for a dinner party on Friday evening and if I want and am expected to attend 
a friend•s funeral on Friday evening, simple logical deduction will tell 
-
me that I 1 ll have to be at two different places at the same time, but logic 
cannot tell me which to do. Since logic cannot make the choice for me, 
the question may arise then in what respect either action would be irrationa1. 
' Even if I add the condition that all thing~ considered I ought to go to the 
dinner party, yet attend the funeral instead, it is still unclear whether 
the irrationality is evident. Inconsistency does not arise if I have only 
the two judgments: the conditional judgment that in the light of all my 
evidence I ought to attend the dinner party, and the unconditional judgment 
that I will attend the funeral. Pure internal inconsistency enters only 
if I hold, what Davidson calls, my second-order principle: that I ought to 
act on my own best judgment, everything considered. It is this description 
that makes an akratic act irrational and it is only when we can describe an 
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action in just this way that it becomes problematic. When I discussed 
Davidson's view of akrasia in Chapter 2, I noted the fairly extensive 
quote in which Davidson argues for the distinction between internal and 
externa 1 i rrati ona 1 i ty. For the action to be internally i rrationa 1 the 
agent must go against his own second-order principle. If, on the other 
hand, he does not hold this principle, there is nothing necessarily para-
doxical about his action which to us, as onlookers, may, however, be judged 
to be irrational, i.e. externally irrational. To explain the agent's 
action we need say only that his desire to do~ (that which he considers 
best) was not as strong as his desire to dol (the externally irrational 
action).(3) 
That returns us to the initial problem which is now phrased differently. 
Instead of asking, "How do we explain someone who knowingly and intentionally 
acts contrary to his own better judgment, all things considered, and who 
is capable of avoiding irrational action?" the question now is, "How do 
we explain someone who knowingly and intentionally acts contrary to his own 
second-order principle?" When Tim returns to retrieve the letter he has a 
reason: he wants to save the friendship and he believes that by destroying 
the letter he will do so. But in doing so, he ignores his second-order 
principle that he ought to act on what he thinks best, all things considered. 
The motive for ignoring his principle (that he ought to act on his better 
judgment that Eric should know that Tim is aware of his disloyalty and that 
he should thus leave the letter) is the very strong desire to retrieve the 
letter and so save the friendship. And this is the point at which irra-
tionality enters. The desire to save the friendship has entered into the 
rational decision. It was a rational decision, all things considered, not 
to return to Eric's, and given this principle, Tim ought to have acted on 
such a conclusion. But he doesn't. Irrationality entered when his desire 
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to return made him override his principle. Although his motive for 
ignoring his principle is a reason (a motive) for ignoring the principle, 
it is not a rational reason against the principle itself. And so, when 
it enters in this way, it is irrelevant as a reason, to the principle and 
to the action • 
. Davidson's interpretation of this kind of irrationality depends on the 
distinction between a reason for having, or acting· on, a principle and a 
reason for the principle itself. I shall use an example which is analogous 
to Davidson's example of the man desiring a well-turned calf. (p.298). 
A young man very much wishes that he were handsome and this leads him to 
believe that he is. His reason for having this belief is that it gives him 
pleasure. However, if he holds this belief purely because he wants to 
believe it, then his holding the belief is irrational. Wishing to have a 
- certain be 1 i ef does in no way contribute to the truth of that be 1 i ef. It 
is for this reason that a wish is not a reliable cause for a belief (except, 
as I have noted earlier in Chapter 2, for the belief that one has that wish). 
The wish to have a belief gives no rational support for the truth of the 
belief itself, but what it does make rational is that this proposition 
should be true: He believes that he is handsome. This, however, does not 
give rational support for his belief: I am handsome. This is a case of 
irrationality. His desire, therefore, is a reason for having the belief 
(it gives him pleasure), but it is not a reason for the belief itself (it 
is not a justified cause). So, his desire to be handsome causes his belief, 
but the desire is not a reason to believe that it is so; there is no logical 
relation between his desire and his belief. The irrationality does not 
lie in the belief itself, but in the fact that it is caused by a wish. 
This is an important point and I shall discuss later how Davidson's example 
of irrationality is actually ambiguous. 
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As noted before, in standard reason explanations the propositional con-
tents of various beliefs and desires have a logical relation to one 
another, and the belief-desire pair cause the action. However, in the 
above example, a desire caused a belief, but the judgment that a certain 
state of affairs would be desirable is no rational reason to believe that 
it exists. "In the case of irrationality, the causal relation remains, 
while the logical relation is missing or distorted." In other words, 
"there is a mental cause that is not a reason for what it causes." (p.298). 
And so, Davidson bridges the gap that posed a problem for Freud---the 
causal relation that holds between mental events- as well as the problem 
posed by the Plato Principle---the explanation of an irrational belief 
still retains an element of rationality in that the irrational belief is 
explained by a mental cause that is not a reason for it. 
I noted earlier on that since the bulk of Davidson's writing on irrationality 
is addressed to the problem of akrasia, I would briefly examine this phe-
nomenon and then extend the principles of the theory to the concept of self-
deception. The similarity is that both the weak-willed ag~nt and the self~ 
deceiver operate in a context of mental conflict. The akrates acts inten-
tionally on one or a few· favoured reasons, and not on all the reasons that 
are recognized as being relevant to his situation. He has reasons both 
for and against a certain cause of action; deliberates on the reasons for 
his action; but then discards them in favour of "better" reasons for another 
course of action. This is the cognitive aspect of weakness of will and 
which Davidson refers to as "weakness of warrant." The agent, with all 
the evidence available to him, will judge a certain hypothesis more probable 
than not, and yet he goes against this hypothesis. The agent, like the 
self-deceiver, has to decide between two mutually exclusive hypotheses: the 
hypothesis supported by relevant evidence and the negation of the hypothesis. 
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The analogous weakness of the warrant enjoys the same logical structure 
(or, as Davidson points out, illogical structure) as weakness of will. 
The cognitive error in weakness of the warrant is an irrational belief 
which goes against the available evidence, whereas weakness of will in-
volves an irrational intention or intentional action which goes against 
the values the agent holds. "Weak11 self-deception then, according to 
Davidson•s argument, includes weakness of the warrant in that an irrational 
belief i-s held, even though the self-deceiver has better reasons for 
-accepting its negation. "Weak" self-deception, therefore, is analogous to 
akrasia. However, the "hard" self-deceiver is guilty of irrationality on 
at least-one further count: the fact that his favoured belief is caused 
solely by his desire for that belief; there is no evidence to support his 
favoured belief. In other words, the desire is a mental cause which is 
not a reason for the favoured belief. Whereas in akrasia there is no 
"psychological law that says we must trim our unconditional judgments of 
what is best to our best judgments" (Davidson, 1985 b, p.201), there is, 
fa~ us rational people a psychological law which encourages us to trim our 
beliefs to the available evidence. There is nothing intrinsically irra-
tional about the akrates who intentionally performs an action purely because 
he so desires, but there is something intrinsically irrational about the 
agent who intentionally forms and holds a belief purely because he so desites, 
even though he knows, as a rational person, that rational beliefs should be 
based on the available evidence. And this is what makes self-deception 
more problematic than akrasia. 
As I noted in Chapter 4, "weak" self-deception, according to Davidson is 
not necessar.ily internally irrational on this first level since, like in 
weakness of the warrant, there are reasons both for and against a certain 
proposition. There are better reasons for accepting the negation of the 
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proposition rather than the proposition he does accept. The negation 
of the proposition rather than the proposition the self-deceiver accepts 
is, therefore, more likely to be true, but the self-deceiver bases his 
acceptance of the proposition on what he takes to be only part of the 
relevant evidence. To reduce "weak" self-deception to inner irrationality 
would require that the self-deceiver also holds a second-order principle~ 
the "normative principle against which such a person has sinned •••• called 
the requirement of total· evidence for inductive reasoning: -when we are-
deciding among a set of mutually exclusive hypotheses, this- requirement_: 
enjoins us to give credence to the hypothesis most highll ~~pported by all 
available relevant evidence ... (Davidson, 1985, p.140). However, like the 
second-order principle for akrasia, this principle for inductive reasoning 
is not always operational. Davidson notes (p.141) that someone who-acts 
or reasons in accord with these principles does not do so at all times, 
otherwise internal irrationality would not be possible. Nor does the 
person who acts or reasons in accord with these principles do so seldomly 
or never: to accept the principle is to act or reason in accord with it'-
most of the time. Davidson adds the condition that the acceptance of 
the principle consists mainly in that person's 11 pattern of thoughts .. 
being in accord with the principle. This does not mean, however, that 
the person who accepts the principle of the requirement of total evidence 
must be constantly aware of it. 
However, in this chapter I am concerned mainly with "hard 11 self-deception. 
Davidson has shown that many of the things we might mean in calling a 
thought process or an action irrational do not involve paradox. "Hard" 
self-deception is a case of incoherence within a single person in the 
pattern of his beliefs and desires, and it is this inner irrationality that 
gives rise to conceptual difficulty. The paradox is brought about by the 
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fact that desires, beliefs and the actions they explain, are distinguished 
and identified partly by their logical relations with one another, that is, 
rational relations. These logical relations can also be described in 
tenns of certain second-order principles such as ~'Believe that proposition 
for which there is the greatest amount of evidence"~ and "Perform that 
action you think is best, all things considered". The problem is that 
akrasia and self-deception seem to be cases precisely of not believing or 
acting in accord with the over-arching principles of rationality or co-
herence~ So the "hard" self-deceiver is guilty on two counts: firstly, he 
·clings to a belief for which there is no evidence (as opposed to the "weak" 
-self-deceiver who bases his belief on only part of the evidence) and the 
belief is caused purely by a desire that acts as a mental cause but is not 
-a reason for the favoured desire; and secondly, he goes against his 
second-order principle which, as a rational person, he must hold. The self-
deceiver has a "reason" for this weakness of the warrant, but it is a 
"reas~n" which he himself has brought about. Self-deception is self-induced. 
The self-deceiver's "reason" is his desire to believe that£ and is, there-
. fore, not a rational reason, but it is a cause of the belief that£· 
In the example of Emma, the mental cause for her belief that£ (i.e. the 
belief that she does not have an illegitimate child, that she is virtuous, 
etc.) is her desire for .P.· This desire acts as a "reason" for forming 
the belief that£, but it is not a rational reason for forming the belief 
that .P. against the second-order principle of ''Believe that proposition 
for which there is the greatest amount of evidence .. , nor as a rational 
reason or "justified" cause for bringing about the belief that .P.· So the 
desire, or mental cause, has to operate in part as an irrational reason. 
Baier criticizes Davidson on the ground that in his theory a mental cause 
which operates in part irrationally is not to be regarded as a reason in 
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respect of that part of its operation, but only as a cause that is not 
a reason. Pears (1985) defends Davidson's view by replying to Baier's 
criticism that it is true that the mental cause is irrational or "surd" 
at that point in its operation, but this does not mean that it is, there-
fore, not a reason. Pears points out that Davidson means that the 
mental cause does not operate as a rational reason and not that it does 
not operate as a reason at all. Davidson himself does not make this clear 
distinction and so his dictum that in irrationality "a mental cause does 
not operate as a reason" may lead to confusion. He does, -however, note 
the "ambiguity of the phrase •reason for believing 111 in Paradoxes, but it 
is only later in Deception and Division that he elaborates on the different 
application of 11 reason". 11 Charles has a reason to believe that £11 .is am-
biguous. 11 A reason of the first sort is evaluative: it provides a motive 
for acting in such a way as to promote having a belief. A reason of the 
second kind is cognitive: it consists in evidence one has for the truth 
of a proposition ... (1985, p.143). In other words, we could see the evalua-
tive reason or motive as a causal (albeit irrational) reason, and the 
second cognitive reason as a .logical (and, therefore, rational) reason. 
Davidson's earlier explanation, however, gives the impression that reasons 
are necessarily rational for he says more than once that, when a mental 
cause is operating irrationally, it is operating as a cause that is not a 
reason. What he means is that it is then operating not as a rational 
reason, but as an irrational reason. 
Pears draws attention to two easily confused, but in fact two quite 
different, distinctions. First of all, Davidson should distinguish between 
a mental cause that operates non-rationally and one that operates as a 
reason, i.e. rationally. An example of a mental cause operating non-
rationally is Davidson's own example of a person humming a tune and it 
reminds him of a name. The point that is being made here is that non-
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rational mental causation is not necessarily irrational. The humming 
of the tune is a simple case of association. Here the humming is a 
mental cause for the recollection, but not a reason for it, at least 
not in the sense of 11 my reason for it 11 , or a 11 good11 reason for it. 
Nevertheless, this is not a case of irrationality. 
Davidson offers a second, more difficult, example to substantiate his view 
that being in a mental state which has a mental cause which is not a reason 
(or-rational reason) is· not a sufficient condition for irrationality. An 
agent sets out to change his owrr character by taking a certain cause of 
action.-- -There are several ·ways in which this may come about. Davidson 
focuses on a case in which the agent's 11 reason 11 for changing his present -
character is based on a value that he does not yet accept. In this case, 
the value-that produces the change is extrinsic to his present character 
and so, although it operates as a cause in his development, it does not 
operate as a rational reason for it. And yet this type of action, a type 
of self-criticism or self-evaluation and reform, seems to be the very 
essence of rationality, an action which is held to be the basis for rational 
growth.· I shall illustrate Davidson•.s point with an example: I desire 
to change the gluttonous aspect of my character, viz. my desire for chocolate 
cake. My desire to change must be operating from without the content of 
the value that is to undergo change. From the point of view of the changed 
value there is no reason for the change, since it comes from an independent 
source. So when the changed value is brought about, the desire to change, 
although it caused the changed value, cannot be a rational reason for what 
it caused. Davidson is impressed by the fact that the value operates 
from outside the part of the agent's character that he wants to alter so 
that, in a certain sense, the change originates in a different system to 
that which is being changed. This leads to the question that will introduce 
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the second part of Davidson's theory: must this different system be 
another part of his character? With this last example Davidson should, 
in order to avoid misinterpretation, have made the distinction between 
mental causes that operate as rational reasons (as in all rational beha-
viour) and mental causes that operate as irrational reasons. It is this 
very operation of a mental cause as an irrational reason that leads to 
the central-question in Paradoxes of Irrationality: "How is internal 
irrationa1:ity possible?" 
Davidson's answer is that human agents are: often divided against themselves. 
He wants reasons (non-rational, rational and irrational) to be mental 
causes, and wants to characterize irrationality as having a mental, so a 
reason-like, cause of one's action which, nevertheless, fails to have the 
right "logical relation" to its effect to be a rational reason. In this 
way, Davidson's theory retains the core of rationality- the Plato Principle-
which is imperative if a theory of irrationality is to make any sense at 
all. Davidson looks to social interaction for a model of that sort of 
mental cause, and then applies the model to a single agent. Davidson's 
gardener (1982, ·p.300) wants another person to enter his garden, so he 
grows a beautiful flower there. The other person craves a look at the 
flower and consequently enters the garden. The gardener's desire caused 
the other's craving and action, but the gardener's desire was not a rationa:l 
reason for the other's craving, nor one on whi~h the other person acted. 
Here the act of entering the garden was done intentionally and not against 
the will of that person.- The mental cause, namely the designing will of 
the flower-grower, brought about its effect, namely the other person's 
entering the garden, but it was not a rational reason for the other person's 
action. 
Davidson suggests that the idea can be applied to a single mind and person. 
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"Indeed, if we are going to explain irrationality at all, it seems we 
must assume that the mind can be partitioned into quasi-independent 
structures that interact"(p.300). Thus, a single person is divided 
into two systems in order to explain the formation of an irrational belief 
that he is competent to detect and avoid. The two systems, main system 
and sub-system, must be to some degree independent if we are to understand 
how. they harbour inconsistencies, and how they interact on a causal level. 
The explanation must appeal to the supposition of two semi-autonomous de-
partments in the mind: "one that finds a certain course of action to be, 
all things considered, best, and another that prompts another course of-
act.ion. On each side, the side of sober judgment and the side of incon-
tinent intent and action, there is a supporting structure of reasons, of 
interlocking beliefs, expectations, assumptions, attitudes and desires." 
(p.300). Davidson's idea of mental compartmentalization is one of over-
lapping territories, but with a degree of independence, for how else then 
would reason be defeated? He emphasizes that his idea of mental compart-
mentalization should not be confused with phrases like "partition of the 
mind" or "segment of the mind .. which may erroneously be taken to suggest 
that what beyongs to one part of the mind cannot belong to another. 
'Quasi-independent sub-systems .. are postulated within one person at the time 
of irrationality. The person's total system of beliefs and desires, 
second-order principles (which dictate what is to be done when desires con-
flict) splits into a rebellious sub-system consisting of the desire and 
beliefs relevant to its satisfaction. 11 The sub-system is built around 
the nucleus of the wish for the irrational belief and it is organized like 
a person. Although it is a separate centre of agency within the whole 
person, it is, from its own point of view, entirely rational ... (Pears, 1984, 
p. 87) . 
The question which necessarily arises is, 11 When does such fragmentation 
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occur?" According to Davidson, "the breakdown of reason-relations 
defines the boundary of a sub-division." (Davidson, 1982, p.304). This 
is because in a case of irrationality, "there is a mental cause that is 
not a reason for what it causes. So, in wishful thinking, a desire 
causes a belief. But the judgment, that a state of affairs is, or would 
be desirable, is not a (rational) reason to believe it exists." {p.298). 
The parts are defined in terms of function, in terms of the operative con-
cepts of reason and cause. Davidson's criterion for the boundary between 
!llain system and sub-system reflects the interaction between the attitudes, 
desir_e_s and beliefs of a person rather than the Freudian criterion which 
involves consciousness of them. If, for example, an agent's belief that 
i~ would be irrational to indulge in a particular piece of wishful thinking 
fails to intervene in the main system and fails to prevent him from indul-
gi_ng in i_t, that belief is assigned to a sub-system. This is what Pears 
terms the cautionary belief. When the line between the two systems is 
drawn in this way, the result is a functional theory, because it is the 
actual functioning of the cautionary belief that decides on which side of 
the line it should be placed. The belief is cautionary and its proper 
function is, therefore, to intervene and stop the irrationality, but what 
it actually does, according to Pears, is "to sit on the sideline and let 
it happen." (Pears, 1984, p.69). 
Reasons, as developed in How is Weakness of Will Possible?, are assimilated 
to premises in valid arguments, all contained within one arguer. The main 
system is seen as an autonomous reasoner, yet the sub-system with its 
rebellious desire produces its own practical syllogism. Both systems, 
therefore, retain their essential core of rationality. If both systems 
display internal rationality, the question arises of how irrationality 
comes about. Davidson uses the model of inter-personal relations in his 
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account of reasons for actions to illustrate the causal relations 
between sub-system and main system. He shows us how a mental cause 
of a mental effect need not be a rational cause, when the mental cause 
is in one person and the mental effect in another (the example of the 
flower-grower). Cases of social interaction seen as causal ·links between 
autonomous structures, are likened to the outcome of the conflict between 
a motivating desire and the principle to do what is judged best to do or 
to believe that for which there is most evidence. If someone's powerful 
will overcomes another's principled resistance to it, the first person's 
will may cause the other's surrender, so mental causes of mental effects 
may fail to be rational reasons at the interpersonal level. Davidson 
suggests that we use this as a model for understanding the akrates and 
self-deceiver. Here too, he suggests, are mental causes operating across 
the boundaries of semi-autonomous structures, mental causes which fail to 
be rational reasons. In other words, the causal relation remains but 
the logical relation is distorted. The division has nothing to do with 
consciousness as in the early Freudian theory of the dividedmind. An 
element, according to the functional theory, is assigned to a sub-system 
whenever it fails to interact rationally with any element in the main system. 
The division depends on the function of the belief. The main-system con-
sists of all the desires and beliefs in the subject's psyche that interact 
with one another in a rational way to produce further desires and beliefs~ 
and eventually speech and action. If one of the desires or beliefs fails 
to interact in a rational way with any element in the main system, it is 
banished to a sub-system. This sub-system, however, does not appeal to 
lack of consciousness. 
Davidson's criterion seems to suggest that the desire or belief is assigned 
to a sub-system whenever it is guilty of non-intervention in the main 
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system; when it fails to intervene in the main system in some rational 
way in which it ought to intervene. Pears (1982, p.94ff) makes an im-
portant distinction. He refers to the failure to intervene rationally 
as the negative version of the criterion, but then postulates his own 
positive version: "It might mean that a desire or belief is assigned to 
a sub-sys-tem when it does interact with some element in the main system, 
but in an irrational way." (p.94). There is, therefore, a distinction 
between these two faults: the difference between irrational intervention 
and failure to intervene rationally. If we use the positive version, a 
- wish that causes an irrational belief will be assigned to a sub-system 
simply. because of its objective i rrationa 1 ity or irrationa 1 causation. 
If this version of the criterion is used, we need not even inquire whether_ 
- the person is competent to detect and avoid the i rrati ona 1 i ty, or whether .. _ 
he possesses the cautionary belief which, nevertheless, fails to int~rvene., 
-and stop the formation of the irrational belief. The irrational efficacy 
of the wish, whether the person is aware of it or not, is sufficient to 
assign the wish to the sub-system. When this version of the criterion is 
used, Pears points out, a sub-system wi 11 be needed for any kind of -
i rrati ona 1 i ty-. 
However, i_f the negative version applies, we are dealing with irration-
alities that the person can detect and avoid, the kind of cases of irra-
tionality that interest Pears and Davi.dson. For in these cases, a sub-
system will be needed only to house an element that belongs to the agent 1 S 
psyche, but fails to produce the effect that it ought to produce, namely 
the inhibition of the irrational belief. In my example of the young man 
who wishes he were handsome, which is an adapted example of Davidson's man 
with the well-turned calf, it is not clear which version has been used. 
In this example the irrationality does not lie in the relation between 
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belief and evidence, but in the fact that his wish caused the belief---
and it is obvious that wishful thinking is irrational. So, it is not 
clear whether the sub-system in this example was brought about because 
of the objective irrational efficaEy of the wish (the positive version) 
or whether the sub-system was brought about because the cautionary belief 
failed to intervene rationally (the negative version). 
Pears states (p.98) that Davidson, in discussion with him, had told him 
that the negative version of the criterion is the one that should be 
developed, the version that applies to cases of irrationality that the 
agent is able to detect and avoid. Not only that, but Davidson is con-
cerned With internal irrationality, which supports ·the negative inter-
pretati'on.- Pears notes several reasons for preferring the negative 
version·. ~Firstly, the positive version postulates a sub-system in any 
case of irrationality. However, if the psyche of the agent cannot see 
the ·conflict between two incompatible elements, then there is no reason to 
suppose that they have to be kept apart, to avoid conflict, by being des-
ignated to two different systems in his psyche. It is only when the psyche 
is competent and able to detect the irrationality, that the sub-system 
comes into being (the negative version) to avoid conflict. Secondly, in 
the positive version the wish that causes a belief is banished to the sub-
system because of this fault, its objective irrational efficacy. The 
wish cannot be placed in the overlap between the two systems (Davidson's 
compartmentalization is that of 11 0verlapping territories 11 ) because the 
purpose of the positive application is to keep the wish and the belief 
apart for the same general reasons for which two contradictory beliefs 
have to be kept apart, namely because their relationship is objectively 
irrational. However, Davidson stresses that the wish and the belief do 
interact because the wish causes the belief and gives satisfaction in the 
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main system, but only across a line that marks the failure of their 
rational interaction. Davidson, therefore, places the wish, like 
Freud, in the overlapping section of the two semi-autonomous systems, 
one causally operative wish that belongs to both systems. Pears' other 
reasons for preferring the negative version include the productive in-
ventiveness of creative thinking which often relies on non-rational asso- -
ciation of ideas. Surely when the origination of a belief is irrational 
there need not always be a sub-system. Creative thinking would be 
severely inhibited if only linear rationality were always requi-red-.-
But how then is Enma • s case interpreted by the functi anal -theory? Enuna -
has good reason to believe that she has an illegitimate chil~ (the per~ 
-sonal experience, the photographs, etc.). However, this thought is pain-
f~l and, therefore, to be avoided by her. The awareness of her unwelcome 
belief g-alvanizes her plan of self-deception, she is motivated to instill 
in herself a belief that she is virtuous, and she is motivated in the 
process of self-deception to satisfy that belief. However---and this 
is- where the difficulty. in explaining self-deception surfaces -once 
she has successfully reached the state of self-deception she must be 
motivated constantly to maintain this state which is continually threatened 
by evidence or even her memory. Paradoxically, her motivation is, there~ 
fore, based on the fact that the evidence points to her having had an 
illegitimate child. It seems as though, by a complicated circuitous 
route, we are right back to the epistemological paradox, i.e. the simul-
taneous entertainment of incompatible beliefs. But a successful state 
of self-deception is possible for there is a point in the sequence that 
led to Emma's state of self-deception in which there was a mental cause 
that was not a rational reason for the mental state it caused. Obviously 
Emma's two conflicting beliefs are kept apart, in two different systems. 
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Davidson, like Pears, holds that it is quite possible to hold incom-
patible beliefs but that it is not possible to conjoin them. Of course, 
the vast majority of Emma's beliefs are shared by both systems (in the 
large overlapping territory) but the contradictory beliefs cannot belong 
to the same system, for that would destroy the irrational belief. But, 
I have not yet noted where in the sequence that led to her successful 
state of self-deception there was an irrational step. The self-deceptive 
state consists of Emma's holding two conflicting beliefs and the step that 
· · ~made this possible is, therefore, the irrational point in the sequence: 
Emma's drawing of the boundary that keeps the inconsistent beliefs apart. 
-The negative version of the criterion for drawing the boundary is used 
in this·example, for the irrationality exists in the relation between 
belief and evidence and not merely in the fact that the belief is caused 
by a wish.- The cautionary belief that she is being irrational, the 
-second-order principle that she should hold that belief for which there 
is most evidence, the initial belief that she has had an illegitimate 
child and which motivates its own negation are all "walled off" from the 
rest of Emma's mind. What causes the sub-system to be walled off is her 
desire to avoid accepting what her second-order principle counsels. How-
ever, this-desire is not a rational reason for neglecting her principle. 
uNothing can be viewed as a good reason for failing to reason according 
to one's best standards of rationality." (Lavidson, 1985, p.148) 
I trust that it is evident at this stage how Davidson's theory overcomes 
the four main paradoxes postulated by Pears. First of all, it is 
possible for the self-deceiver to believe that£ and believe that not-£ 
at the same time, since the two beliefs are relegated to two different 
systems that fail to interact rationally. The second paradox, in which 
the intention must be screened, is one which Davidson addresses without 
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invoking the notion of consciousness. It is paradoxical that the 
state of self-deception is constantly motivated by that about which the 
agent deceives himself. In other words, the fact that the evidence 
points to the unwelcome belief motivates the self-deceiver to perpetuate 
his state of self-deception. This is made possible by the agent's 
drawing of the boundary which brings about a breakdown in reason rela-
tions- and, therefore, allows the irrationality to remain unchecked in 
the ma~in system. The drawing of the boundary is caused by the desire 
- tO:-avt>id- following the rational path that points to the acceptance of 
the unwe-lcome belief and this is in itself an irrational act. The 
Sartrean criticism of an infinite regress does, therefore, not apply 
since:- the boundary signifies a collapse of rational relations- a boundary 
that allows all sorts of irrationalities to operate unhindered. The 
third paradox addresses the problem that continuing motivation is needed 
if the -self-deception is to be successful. In order for the state of 
- self-deception to be maintained it needs to be motivated by the desire 
to_ avoid- a-ccepting the second-order principle, but this is walled off 
from the rest of the self-deceiver•s mind. So, it seems as though what 
is needed- for a successful state of self-deception is both an involvement 
of the sub-system with the main system, as well as a separation of sub-
system from main system. Davidson's theory is centred on just this 
paradox: the interaction between sub-system and main system is contained 
in the causal relation of the desire in the sub-system causing the 
belief in the main system, and the separation of the two systems is 
brought about by the systemic boundary which signifies a collapse in 
reason relation--- the sub-system fails to interact rationally with the 
main system. The same application of the causal link/logical breakdown 
is valid in addressing the fourth paradox, which is an extension of the 
third one. 
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It seems at first as if Davidson's theory constitutes a more favourable 
theory to adopt because it does not appeal to the problematic notion of 
11 consciousness 11 • Furthermore, the functional theory does not only 
hold for cases of 11 hard11 self-deception but for all cases of self-
deception or all cases of irrationality for that matter. Since it has 
- a much wider scope of application than the Freudian theory it also 
escapes the problem of having to establish just when the irrationality-
is serious enough to warrant the Freudian interpretation. The functional 
- theo·ry need not be concerned with whether it is a case of 11weak11 se 1 f-
deception which can be explained by one of the theories advanced in -
Chapter 4, or whether it is a 11 hard 11 case which needs to invoke the 
Freudian theory of the divided mind. The functional theory need not 
answer the problematic question of 11Just how much counter-evidence is 
needed-before we appeal to the unconscious? .. 
But,- there is one severe drawback to Davidson's theory. As Pears points 
out: 
11 However, this advantage is achieved in a way 
- -that might be found worrying. It is achieved 
by definition. A system's boundary is simply 
-defined as a line across which some element in a 
person's psyche fails to produce its normal 
rational effect on the elements that control his 
daily life. That definition guarantees a per-
fect fit between the functional theory of systems 
and the phenomenon of irrationality that the 
subject is competent to avoid, but the trouble 
is that it seems to deprive the theory of all 
explanatory power ... (Pears, 1984, p.84) 
By appealing to a definition on which to base a theory is to rob the 
theory of much of its explanatory power. At least, Freud's criterion 
of consciousness for the division between sub-system and main system is 
empirically discoverable, but Davidson's criterion, it seems, leads merely 
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to a redescription instead of an elucidation of the original phenomenon 
of irrationality. In other words, the functional theory offers only 
the productive cause of irrationality (the wish to avoid accepting what 
the second-order principle points to) but not an empirically discoverable 
permissive cause. The explanation of irrationality is based on the 
failure of the sub-system to intervene rationally, but that failure is 
tied to the very phenomenon requiring explanation, namely the coming 
about of the sub-system. 
_ However, Pears notes that, "The theory is simply not concerned with the 
permissive cause of irrationality in the main system. It is not inten-
d~d, and it must be made clear from the start that it is not intended, 
as a theory about the situation in the main system that makes irration- , 
ality possible." (Pears, 1984, p.85). In other words, the functional 
theory does not try to oust the Freudian theory as the theory of self-
~eception. What it does do is to look at the other side of. the coin, 
as!. theory of self-deception, i.e. at the rational (or, rather irrationa1) 
implications rather than the psychological implications. As Davidson 
himself notes, "How can a person fail to put the inconsistent or incom-
patible beliefs together? •••• It would be a mistake for me to try to 
answer this question in a psychologically detailed way." (Davidson, 1985 9 
p.147). He adds that the boundaries between obviously conflicting 
beliefs stipulated by a theory concentrating on the rational implications 
are not discovered by introspection. These boundaries are rather con-
ceptual aids to the coherent description of how inner irrationality is 
possible. The two emphases, of psychology on the one hand and ration-
ality on the other, constitute one of the major differences between the 
two theories. However, as I have noted before, these differences are 
not mutually exclusive, but should be seen as complementary factors in 
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the theory of self-deception. According to Pears in Motivated 
Irrationality, the self-deceiver must 11 forget 11 orhide from himself 
the fact that his desire (both to avoid the painful belief and to 
satisfy the agent by forming the favoured belief) caused the favoured 
belief or caused the 11 rustication 11 of the unwelcome belief. The objec-
tion that Davidson raises to this explanation is that if the self-deceiver 
. succeeds in hiding from himself the necessity of the contribution of the 
wish to the formation of the irrational belief, he is clearly self-
deceived and in a state of self-deception. He is, so to speak, in a 
_ .. pleasantly consistent frame of mind 11 • {p.146). However, this pl~asure __ _ 
of the self-deceived state is unstable and is constantly threatened by 
the.. overwhelming evidence and the agent • s memory. Therefore, continued 
:: motivation is necessary and this motivation is based on the fact that 
the evidence points to the unwelcome belief. Rlf this is right, then 
the self-deceiver cannot afford to forget the factor that above all 
prompted his behaviour: the preponderance of evidence against the in-
duced belief ... (p.146). This may seem a rejection of Pears• and Bach.'s 
.. views, but Davidson interprets these differences as being partly due to. 
different choices as to how to describe self-deception rather than 
substantive difference~(4). Davidson stresses the actual process of 
self-deception, whereas Pears and Bach describe the state of self-
deception. The differences are, therefore, complementary rather than 
exclusive. 11 To me it seems important to identify an incoherence or 
inconsistency in the thought of the self-deceiver; Pears and Bach are 
more concerned to examine the conditions of success in deceiving oneself." 
(p.147). Davidson, therefore, emphasizes the incoherence of self-
deception which makes the irrationality clear, but then it is difficult 
to explain self-deception psychologically. Pears stresses and explains 
the actual phenomenon, but then plays down the irrationality as a result. 
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However, the similarities between the two theories are far greater 
than the alleged differences. First of all, both Davidson and Pears 
stress that to believe simultaneously a set of two inconsistent propo-
sitions is possible, i.e. aBp+aB-p, but it is not possible to believe 
the conjunction when the inconsistency is obvious, i.e. aB(p+-p), at 
least, ·impossible for a sane and rational person. . Furthermore, both 
Davidson and Pears conceive the boundary as a dynamic aspect in self-
deception. "We should not think of the boundaries as defining permanent-
·and separate territories." (p.147). For Davidson, the sub;;.system falls 
away when the irrationality ceases- either there is no more- need for 
self-deception or the irrationality has been pointed out to the person---
who, as a ·rational being, refrains from continuing with his-irrational 
practice. For Pears, the boundary between sub-system ana·main system 
"shifts 11 when the subject is made aware of the irrationallty,-perhaps 
through psychoanalysis. What both theories, of course, rely on is the 
power of the sub-system over the main system. For the sub-system to -
effectively manipulate the main system, it needs both an interna1 ration~ 
ality and, for the Freudian theory, an internal consciousness, which-the 
sub-system in the functional theory already has. (The objections that 
can· be raised to the.se two claims were dealt with in the last chapter, and 
the functional theory can be defended by the same arguments offered.) 
It is now obvious how closely Davidson's theory follows the four Freudian 
principles mentioned at the beginning of the chapter: For Davidson cer-
tainly the mind is compartmentalized into two semi-autonomous systems, 
both with thoughts and beliefs. "Only by partitioning the mind does it 
seem possible to explain how a thought or impulse can cause another to 
which it bears no rational relation." (Davidson, 1982, p.303). The two 
systems, of course, share most of the beliefs in the person's psyche, 
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but certainly the two incompatible beliefs are kept apart by being 
relegated exclusively to different systems. The two contradictory 
beliefs cannot belong to the same territory ---"to erase the line between 
them would destroy one of the beliefs. I see no obvious reason to 
suppose one of the territories must be closed to consciousness, whatever 
exactly that means, but it is clear that the agent cannot survey the 
whole without erasing the boundaries.u (Davidson, 1985, p.147). The 
"closed to consciousness" feature is one found in the theory of the early 
-· Freud, but it seems as though the view that the agent is unable to "survey 
-the- whole without erasing the boundaries" is similar to the theory which 
depends on the later interpretation of Freud, i.e. the postulations of 
"splits in the ego". As I noted in Chapter 5, the later Freud states 
that the mental groupings can alternate with their hold on consciousness 
(thus, not relegating one system exclusively and permanently to the un-
conscious) and they can remain more or less independent of one another. 
This echoes Davidson's overlapping of territories. Furthermore, Freud 
. places the phrase "know nothing" in inverted commas when he says that 
these mental groupings·can "know nothing" of one another. The fact that 
the phrase has been placed in inverted commas points to a specific em-
ployment of the meaning of "know". I am sure that it refers to the 
formal, logical and rational meaning of "know" and this leads us straight 
to the Davidsonian interpretation--- that is, there can be no rational 
relation between these two mental groupings. However, the fact that the 
sub-system is separated from the main system does not make it powerless. 
In fact, Freud has described and explained by help of experiments just 
how powerful the sub-system is in directing our slips of the tongue, and 
other forms of irrational behaviour. Therefore, even though the two 
mental groupings can "know nothing" of each other, there is some causal 
connection--- again, the Davidsonian principle in his theory of self-
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deception. Similarly, for Davidson the sub-system is a directive 
element in our irrationality. 11 Being out of bounds does not make the 
exiled thought powerless; on the contrary, since reason has no juris-
diction across the boundary ... {p.148). The two systems interact 
causally in that the desire in the sub-system causes the belief in the 
main system, but the logical relation is distorted, allowing the irra--
tionality to exist in the main system. 11 What is essential is that 
certa1n~thoughts and feelings of the person be conceived as interacting 
to produce consequences on the principles of intentional actions, these __ 
consequences then serving as causes, but not reasons, for further mental 
events. 11 (Davidson, 1982, p.304). Davidson's causal relation is like 
-Freud-'s': "physical force 11 which causes the irrationa 1 bel i·ef, but reason 
is, of course, thwarted by the systemic boundary that has been drawn. 
What is needed is a certain amount of autonomy to parts of the mind.--
••The three elements of psychoanalytic theory 
on which I have concentrated, the partitioning 
of the mind, the existence of a considerable 
structure in each quasi-autonomous part, and 
non-logical causal relations between the parts; 
these elements combine to provide the basis for 
a coherent way of describing and explaining im-
portant kinds of irrationality. They also 
account for, and justify, Freud's mixture of 
standard reason explanations with causal inter-
actions more like those of the natural sciences, 
interactions in which reason does not play its 
usual normative and rationalizing role ... (p.304) 
Davidson's theory is, therefore, not an opponent to the Freudian theorys 
but is rather a complementary view. However, I have not yet mentioned 
the last Freudian claim, i.e. the claim about unconscious mental states 
and events. It seems as though the notion of consciousness constitutes 
the damaging difference which threatens the conjunction of the two 




earlier on, the functional theory can account for phenomena of irra-
tionality without accepting this claim. According to the Davidsonian 
view, it is possible to give a plausible account of irrationality without 
·introducing something like an unconscious piece of knowledge. Davidson 
does not reject the notion of the unconscious, but merely states that 
its introduction is unnecessary. The functional theory need not appeal 
to· such problematic concepts like 11 the unconscious 11 , but this does not 
mean that the functional theory denies that something like the unconscious 
exists.·- -The real force of the conjunction of the two theories into one -
·genera1 theory is that it expands the explanatory powers of the theory. 
'•If to an otherwise unobjectionable theory 
(the functional theory) we add the assumption 
of unconscious elements {the Freudian theory), 
the theory can only be made more acceptable, 
that. is, capable of explaining more." (p.305) 
* * * * * 
In this last. chapter my aim was to show how Davidson's functional theory 
complements rather than rivals the later Freudian theory of self-
deception. First of all, the standard reason explanation for nonnal 
intentional action was given which acts as a background against which 
irrational behaviour can be measured. In standard reason explanations 
there is a desire as well as a belief about how· to satisfy that desire. 
This belief-desire pai~ constitute a reason for that action. The word 
"reason", however, has a two-fold meaning: it refers both to the motive 
which causes the action as well as the logical relation of the desire-
belief pair and the action they help to explain. In standard reason 
explanation we always have, therefore, a two fold relation: a causal and 
a logical or rational relation. 
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This being an explanation for normal intentional action, I then went 
on to investigate how irrational action deviates from this, where the 
breakdown occurs. As Davidson noted, in order to explain irrational 
behaviour it is necessary to see it against a background of rationality 
and explanations of irrational behaviour must, therefore, have a 
rational·core ---the Plato Principle ---if we are to make any sense of 
irrational behaviour at all. For Davidson then, explanations of irra-
tional behaviour entail a desire which acts as a cause for a belief, but 
which-is not a justified cause, i.e. the logical relation is distorted. 
·Davidson distinguishes between two forms of irrational behaviour. ·Firstly, 
there is behaviour that seems irrational to us- external irrationality-
but need not necessarily involve the agent's going against his own 
second-order principle. This is especially the case in akrasia and in 
"weak" self-deception in which the agent has reasons both for and against 
a certain belief or course of action, but then, basing his judgment on 
on 1 y part of the evidence, he chooses that be.l i ef or course of action 
which he desires, but which goes against the better reasons he has for 
the other option. This may seem irrational to us, but unless the agent 
accepts a second-order principle, the belief or action need not be in-
ternally irrational. And it is especially this second case of irration-
ality, internal irrationality, that interests us. This is, of course, 
the area of "hard" self-deception in which the evidence is so overwhelm-
ingly in favour of the unwelcome belief that the agent, as a rational 
person, cannot help but form that belief. 
It was necessary at this stage to distinguish between the various impli-
cations of the use of "reason". Pears notes that a desire can act as 
a reason for an action or a belief but then it acts as an irrational 
reason. A desire can be a reason for having a belief but not a reason 
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for the belief itself. The self-deceiver brings about his own 11 reason 11 
for the belief itself and this is the point in the sequence at which 
irrationality enters. Davidson employs "reason .. as being synonomous 
with 11 rational", but this led to criticism when he states that in irra-
tional behaviour a mental state can be a mental cause of another mental 
state but not a reason for it. Pears rephrases this dictum to read 
that in irrationality there is a mental cause that is not a rational 
reason for what it causes. 
In order to explain how "hard 11 self-deception is possible, Davidson bases 
his theory on-the four Freudian principles. He states that in an inter-
personal situation there can be a mental state which causes another mental. 
state but is not a rational reason for it. The same is possible within 
an· intra_personal situation, i.e. within one mind. But it is only by 
partioning the mind that it seems possible to explain how a thought can 
cause another to which it bears no rational relation. The mental parts-
are conceived, like in Freud's theory, as semi-autonomous agents, but what 
is essential is that there is interaction between certain thoughts and 
feelings of the person, which produces consequences on the principles of 
intentional actions. These consequences serve as causes, but not rational 
reasons, for further mental events. And if some mental events act as 
causes for some other mental event in the same mind, a degree of autonomy 
to parts of the mind is necessary. 
The autonomy is brought about by the drawing of the boundary which keeps 
the inconsistent beliefs apart and which makes it possible for the sub-
system to fail to interact rationally in the main system. The drawing 
of the boundary is in itself an irrational step for it is caused by the 
desire to avoid following the rational path in which the second-order 
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principle directs the agent, but the drawing of the boundary is not 
a rational reason for allowing the agent to practise his self-deception 
unhindered. As Davidson notes, .. Nothing can be viewed as a good reason 
for failing to reason according to one's best standards of rationality." 
(p.148). There is, of course, the distinction then of a reason for 
igno·ring the second-order principle and a reason for thinking that the 
principle is no longer good or that · he need not abide by it. There 
can be a reason for the former, but not for the latter. The agent has a 
motive or desire that is the cause of his behaviour and it may be a 11 good11 
reason under certain circumstances- Emma may reason that if she does 
not- ignore the second-order principle, she wi 11 have a nervous- breakdown, 
This case is describable in the language of rationality in the broad 
sense, but there cannot be a reason for going against (as opposed to 
ignoring) the over-arching principle of rationality. Irrationality is5 
therefore, explained in terms of sub-systems perfectly coherent in them-
selves, but disjoined from the main system so as to permit the irration-
a 1 i ty to flourish there~ 
This notion ties up with Freud's description of irrationality in terms 
of some· self-division. It is especially the later description of these 
divisions as "splits in the ego 11 and which employ the notion of the 
conscious in, what Pears terms, a "functiona1 11 sense that link up very 
closely with that of Davidson. The two theories are, therefore, com~ 
plementary to each other. Davidson's theory concentrates on the rational 
aspect of a theory of self-deception and Freud's on the psychological 
aspects. The balance between the two is delicate because, as Davidson 
notes, to stress the one is to underplay the other. How we interpret 
self-deception will depend on our choice of description. 
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Notes 
1. The other extremist interpretation is founded on the Medea Principle 
in which an action, although intentional, is not in itself an action 
. for which the agent can be held responsible. If the agent is to 
blame, it is not for what he did, but because he did not resist with 
greater resolve. What the agent did had a reason -an overwhelming 
passion- but the reason was not his and, therefore, not truly in-
tentional. However, this case of-rrrationality brought about by 
"outside" stronger forces is not the one that creates conceptual diffi-
culty and is, therefore, not discussed in any detail. 
2. Tim can, of course, retrieve the letter and still communicate his 
disappointment in other ways -e.g. by acting coolly towards Eric, 
-c not returning his telephone calls, hinting at his disappointment to 
a third person, etc. But I have deliberately simplified the example 
_ by excluding these options and so tailored the example to illu~trate 
the ·principles of Davidon's theory. 
3. · Baier (1985) accuses Davidson of freeing the akrates not only from 
the charge of inconsistency, but also from the charge of irration-
-ality, if he disavows, or simply doesn't avow, the second-order 
principle. Although Pears (1985) agrees with Baier in stressing the 
importance of the appropriate second-order principle, he feels that 
she is harsh in her cirticism, for Davidson does not deny its impor-
tance. Davidson's point is only that the difficult thing is to ex-
plain internal irrationality, but that, if it becomes clear that an 
agent is not being internally irrational because he does not accept 
the appropriate second-order principle and is, nevertheless, exter-
nalry irrational, that difficulty vanishes. There is no suggestion 
by Davidson that there is nothing wrong with external irrationality, 
or even that it does not need to be explained. The point is simply 
that the special difficulty of internal irrationality does not arise 
in this kind of case, because there is no internal irrationality. 
4. In Chapter 4 I discussed Bach's view. This view advocates that the 
self-deceiver cannot actually believe in the weight of the contrary 
evidence. Bach shares Pears' view that the actual attainment of the 
state of self-deception cannot co-exist with the original motivation 
of that state-the conflict is.just too great. 
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